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The Democratic Party is left in a state of
paralysis, able only to follow initiatives
from the Czech lands. • •
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leads to disagreements among Slovak
Communists over their future tactics
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This work attempts to show why socialism, understood in
~ ..t. ~~\;\~!.\.:l~d
a broadly Marxist sense, tFillmphiid in Czechoslovdkia, but why
it took a form ultimately unsuitable for so advanced a society.
The first chapter i~troduces the problem and discusses the
methodology and structure adopt~d for analysing the 1945-1948
period.
Part I is concerned with the inter-war years. Czechoslovakia
was created and developed as a small, landlocked state incorp-
orating large, pote~tially hostile national minorities. This
was the b8ckground against which political ideas took shape.
The situetion favoured reformist politicians wIth a strategy
of seeking security through dependence on the West. Hopes for
socialist revolution proved to be illueory and led ollly to a
split in Social Democracy out of which the Communist Party
was formed.
The history of its strategies in the following years can
be characterised as a conflict between twa gwneral tendencies
both of which are identifiable throughout the fJarty's history.
One was a genuine attempt to grappl~ with Czechoslovak realities:
this was most clearly personified by 5meral. The other was
based on sectarian attitudes and simrlistic theories. Its inspi-
ration was a natural r~volutionary impatience, an insistence
on avoiding what were felt to be the betrayals of Social Demo-
cracy and a belief that the Russian rEJolution provided an
example to be followed in Czechoslovakia. The Comintern waS
decisive in ensuring the victory of this trend over 5meral,
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anj also in providing a theoretical justifica~ion which had
a lasting impact on later Communist Party thinking. The hist~ry
of the party, seen as a conflict between these two tendenci~3,
was therefore contradictory: it laid the basis both for later
successes and for later failures.
Part II analyses the destructiun of the Czechoslovak state
in 1938 and 1939 and the consequent changes in Czech and Slovak
national consciousness. The Nazi occupation. with its increasing
brutality, led to ideas of restoring a Czechoslovak state while
simultaneously radically changing its national, social and
political structures. Such thoughts developed at home and among
politicians in emigration the most important of whom was Benes.
He established a government in exile in london and accepted
the need for reforms which made possible better relations with
the Communists who. instead of advocating immediate socialist
revolution, were ~orking out relevant and realistic policies.
In spring 1945 Eene;'s allies and the Communists joined
to form a coalition government. for the former this was inten-
ded to be a temporary compromise. Benes feared that, given
the political complexion of the resistance particularly in
Slovakia plus the immense strp-ngth of the Soviet Union, he
might otherwise have been unable to rp-turn home as President.
The Communists did not clarify their ultimate aims, but were
evidently very satisfied with ~he new government.
Part III details thr creation of the basis for a new Czecho-
Sl~VAk republic in the first ypar after liberation. A deep
end sometimes spuntaneous process of sOLiul change took place
confirming the Co,munist Party as the leading force in 1101itics.
\xxxvii)
Most of industry waS nationalised ~nd new and powerful workers'
organs were created. The government increaser1 its control over
basic economic mechanisms. The German minority was expelled
and land and property given to Czechs. Ne~ organs and instit-
utions of power, .within which the Communists had great strength,
wAre created.
This revolutionary process did not follow any preconceived
plan. In fact it indicated weaknesses in the Communists' ideas
as clearly socialist changes were taking place under a coalition
government. Nevertheless, the strength of the Communist Party
was confirmed in general elections in May 1946. Other parties,
owing to their past histories and socidl and ideological bases,
were unable to identify so cl05ely with the revolutionary
changes or to command such support. This does not me~n thAt
their role was purely a negative one of holding back changes.
The Social Democrats were firm partners of the Communists and
the others contributed at least by maintaining a control over
power so that policy measures had to be discussed and argued
for in public befure implementation.
Slovakia is treated Eeparately as, owing to the different
structure of Slovak society and to its distinctive recently
preceding history, the Communist Party did not have so strong
a position within society and the revolutionary social chang~n
did not have so deep an impact as in the Czech lands. The
Communists failed to evolve d strategy suitable for Slovak
conditions and, by early 1946, Slovakia definitely apprared
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•as a danger for them.
Part IV shows how, with its ~olitical dominance confirmed,
the Communist Party tried to lead Czechoslovak society further
in.a socialist direction. The main emphasis was placed on econ-
mic policies and a start was marle towards centralise~ economic
planning. This became the cp.ntral axis of social as well a~
economic policies and consequently the focal point for social
conflicts. There waS persistent discontent over living standards
from all sections of society while civil servants and small
businessmen also feared that further revolutionary chang~s
would threaten their security.
The acceptance of planning by the other parties seemed to
confirm that further socialist development would not be a s'Jdden
revolutionary act, but rather a gradual prucess of evolution,
compatible with 8 coalition. This, plus the need to defuse
continual criticisms from coalitiun partners, led Czechoslovak
Communist leaders to follow Stalin in suggesting that the dict-
atorship of the proletariat might no lunger be necessary. The
Communist Party was beginning to adapt its theories in view
of its concrete experiences, but the heritage of ideas from
the Comintern was still clear. The view that a one-party state
would ultimately be the ideal was not lejected. There waS also
cause for unease withi~ the other parties whBn the Communists
proclaimed the aim of winning an absolute majority in the next
elections. Part of the strategy for achieving this aim was an
agricultural policy whereby the Comnlunists tried to mobilise
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peasant opinion against other parties around proposals for land
reform. They also insisted on retaining and strengthening their
dominance within the police force.
Part V traces the growing divisions in Czechoslovak politics
during the autumn uf 1947. Already befo~ that there were tensions
and divisions in society stemming from social conflicts and
from the strategies of the parties. From mid-1947, however,
the tendency towards division began to dominate over the tend-
ency for parties to find compromise agreeme~ts within the coa-
lition. The principal cause of this was the changed interna~
tional situation. US involvement in Europe led to Soviet fears
of isolation and Stalin therefore beg3rJ to insist on consoli-
dating his allies around him. ,
This coincided with economic difficultie~ threatenning the
Communist Party's strategy of winning popularity frJm the suc-
cess of its economic policies. The outcome of these twa factors
was a vigorous political offensive by the Communists aiming
for an absolute majority in the n~xt elections so as to confirm
Czechoslovakia as part of a Soviet bloc.
This was opposed by the other parties but they could not
form a solid anti~Communist bloc. TheIs were steps towards this,
particularly when the Czech right wing qave SUPP~lt to the
Slovak Democratic Party when revelations cbout an anti-state
conspiracy gav~ the Slovak Communists Rn opportunity for part-
icular belligerence. Genercllly, however, the different parties
responded to the Communist offensive in distinct ways. They
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were partly hamstrung by their inability to openly and vigorously
propose a credible alternative international orientation to
incorporation into a Soviet bloc.
Part VI shows how political tension mounted 8t~adily, giving
rise to the february crisis which itself led to deep changes
throughout society. The analysis of the actual events shows
the miscalculations and blunders by right-wing politicians
and also points to two interrelated aspects of the Communists'
victorious tactics. The first was their ffiobilisationof massive
support on the basis of their social and economic policies
and of their general post-war record as firm defenders of the
revolutionary changes. The second aspect was their exploitation
of -the situation, and also of the key positions of power they
had acquired over the preceding period, to establish an effec-
tive monopoly of power for themselves.
Although the Communists did not intend an immediate change
in social and economi~ policiES, the political power change
soon unleasKed internal p~essures which, when combined with
direct pressures from the Suviet Union and when set against
the background of the Communists' inability to understand the
needs of the new situation, led increasingly to the adoption
of the "Soviet model" of soci~lism.
The conclusion is that the general socialist victory stemmed
from tho very specific CLBchOdlovak situation. The possibility
was there for a new model uf socialism, but ~he 1945-1948 •
period waS in no sense an ideal. The Communist~ activities
in February 1948 could even appear as an attempt to overcome
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the faults of the multi-party system. In the event they led
to the evolution of a model of socialism unsuitable to Czecho-
slovakia's needs. There were reasons for this in the intern~
ational situation, in domestic social conflicts and, above all,
in weaknesses in the ideas that the Communist Party had devel-




ON METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES
1.1 The significanteof the events in Czechoslavakia in the
1945 - 1948 period
The 1945-1948 period in Czechoslovakia saw two major political
,changes with far-reaching social impllcatirins. The first was the so
'cialled"national revolution" of 1945 which followed the defeat of
Nazi Germany and led to the creation of a ~ewCzechos16vakrepubii~.
The Communist Party won 38% of the votes in general elections but,
even bSfore that, under a multi-party coalition government, the
Czechoslovak state set out in a socialist direction with the nation-
alisation of most of the country's industry, a land reform and a
foreign policy based on close relations with the Soviet Union. This
situation Iasiadfor less than three years: in February 1948 the
Communist Party established an effective monopoly of power. This
second major political change was followed by further fundamental
There can be no doubting the importance of this brief'
transformations of social relationships and institutions.
within th~ history of the Czechoslovak republic. February 1946
appeared to the Communists to be the culmination of,their previous
history while the power system established at the time, based on the.
, '
one political party, hps not been fundamentally challenged since •
.~"
Nevertheless, the events of February and the possibilities of the
preceding period are inevitably brought into the centra of discussion
when questions are ruised relating to the method of exercising power
;in Czechoslovakia. So the fact that Czechoslovakia started to
- 1.-
, . develop a "model" of socialism containing a genuine plur~lity of.
parties can still be a politically important question today.
The subject of this thesis also has a wider international sig-
nificance. This was clear at the time as. the governments of the U.S.
Britain and France issued a joint declaration suggesting that
events of February 1948 were a 'threat to their own political
institutions1• They were subsequently quoted as a
f,or setting up N.A. T.D. Today they have another international
significance as certain Western Socialist and Communis
hoping to imple ment socialist changes within
They do not look back at successful examples of this from other
countries' experiences and that inevitably means that
remain schematic and, on some crucial points, vague. Although
Czechoslovakia's experience after 1945 can neither prove nor disprove
the feasibility of a similar social transformation in another place
·and at another time, it rem~ins a unique example of a,democratically
elected multi-party government implementing socialist;changes in'
what,even then, was one of the most advanced countries in Europe.
This experience is therefore invaluable for the sharpening and
clarification of a number of theoretical concepts that are becoming
more topical today.
So, for a number of reasons, the development of Czechoslovak
society in the 1945-1948 period is worthy of serious study. There
is already an immense body of literature from several different
points of view and it would be ridiculous to ignore, or to pretend
to be influenced by this. It is, in fact, an invaluable basis for
1p•E• Zinner: Communist strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918-
~, London, .1963, p.V.
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further investigation because of the empirical data accumulated, the
specific controversies raised and because it provides the basis from
.which the methodology and structure of this thesis was worked out •
.The following sections are in no way intended to give a complete
or exhaustive coverage of the existing literature, nor do they
necessarily· mention all the best works. The aim is rather to in-
dicate the various weaknesses. This then serves as a basis for the
• .methodology and structure adopted in this work.
1.2. The works of politicians and journalists who emigrated to
the West
In discussing the existing literature it is convenient to start
.with books and articles produced in the West where the beginning was
for the most part made around 1950 by post-Februzry 1948 emigres.
They do not all express identical opinions and scholarship is often
·replaced by diatribe and invective which seems to stem from the
bitterness of political.defeat. Nevertheless, there are enough
general similarities to warrant grouping them all together.
It is very common for them to explain the Communist victory of
1948, obvi6usly the decisive event for those who emigrated as a
consequence of it,\_rtermssometimes of their own mistakes plus, and
on this they are pretty unanimous, perfidiolls and deceitful behaviour
on the Communist side. J lhus it is argued that Czechoslovak politicians
in london during World War II should never have souGht such close
relations with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, which was
apparently the Soviet Union's "Fifth Colurnn,,2, Unnl'cessary
2J. Grown: Who's Next? The lesson of Czechoslovakia, London, 1951,
p.27-29.
---
concessions were apparently made giving the Communists important.
3positions of power which they did not deserve.
To complete the argu ment it is useful to explain why the Western
powers could not balance Soviet influence. Here reference 'is some-
times made to Yalta with the claim that the Soviet Union demanded,
• Even if this explains the formation of Czechoslovakia ls"firs
within its own "sphere of influence", governments that, "blindly'.
, 4
fulfilled her wishes and orders" •
post-war government, it cannot possibly explain the 1946 election
results. To complete the e~igr~ argu ment ii h~s t~ be claimed that
the Communist victory stemmed from theiralre~dy holding positions of
power. Then the whole 1945-1948 period can be summarised as no more
than a gradual infiltration of positions of power by the Communist
5Party •
This approach is extraordinarily narrow. It obviates the need
for the emigres to look more generally at their own political ideas
and weaknesses. It also means that the events of 1945-1948 can be
explained without any reference to Czechcs Lnvak La! s preceding history ,
and how that might have affected the outcome. As everything is
reduced tq a simple fight for political power there·is
examine the revolu tionary social and economic chang~s from May.1945
onwards.
5Even the more sophisticated writers still essentially take this
view e.g. Friedmann: Break-up, p.53-6S. for another example see
f. Peroutka: Byl Eduard Bmes vinen? Paris, 1950. He, as will
shown, had been able to things more realistically when he lived
through the events inside Czechoslovakia.
4H• Ripka: Eastern Europe in the Post-War World, London, ,1961,p.56.
1. {_~
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This hae a clear implication for the analysis of post-February
1948 society. It points directly to the theory of "totalitarianism",
whereby, in affect, the mechanism of political
the distinguishing feature of a society6. The
as
~, ,' •• - I.
position, which effectively lumps together fascism and communism,
is well known: "••• the monopoly of power is a means, not
Objectives, ideologies, practices are different things."7This d~es,
not mean that the way how power is exercised is irrelevant: on the'<
.. - -~- . . _.". .~
contrary it is a recurrent theme within this work. Nevertheless,itC'
is only meaningful when placed within an wider ~ontext of theTtotality
'.',':_.
of social relationships. By not doing this the emigre writers
generally managed to cover up a large part of the reason for their
defeat.
Many of the points raised by emigr~ writers will inevitably have,
to be discussed throughout the narrative. Particularly important are,
'the questions concerning Oena~ls relations with the Soviet Union and
with the Communist Party up to the formation of the firsi ~ost-war
government,and the relationship between the Communist Party and the
organs of power after liberation.
There.were also some, albeit very fe~, who could see and
the lack of objoctivity in,other emigre writers. An example is
, 8 : 9Sychrava who was particularly critical of Ripka's major work.
6For a fairly sophisticated example see
Totalitarian Dictaturship and Autocracy,
7R,. Aron: Democracy and Totalitarianism, London, 1968, p.160.
8 v,,; Y k' .., t 'L. Sychrava: Svedectilla ~v5hy 0 prazsem prevra u v unoru
London, 1952.
9H• Ripka: Czechoslovakia Enslaved, London, 1950.
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He poinLed out that Hipka implicitly udmitled to holding different
views from the majority of Czechoslovak people on such important
questions as the international situation, the nationalisation of
industries and the nature of democracy. It would seem ridiculous to
try to ignore this when seeking an explanation for the outcome of the
events of february 1948 •
• 1.3 Some of the more scholarly Western works
Most emigre works were written in the early 1950's. Since then
enough time has passed for nlore serious and objective works to appear;
but, unfortunately, there has been no dramatic improvement in the
methodological framework used. A serious work already referred to,
by Zinner/could still be no more than "a case study of power seilure,,1°
Although he tried to give the post-war period a wider perspective by
an account of the Communist Party's earlier history, he still saw
j:·f ,
the period in terms of~ommunist manrauvci nqs and trickery with their
"perfidy. finally and conclusively exposed by their apparently
sudden and quite unreasonable seizure of undivided power.11
One of the most genuine attempts to achieve objectivity was
the series of articles written by Skilling during the 1950's and




Communist Party from the time of its foundation up to·194812• With,
this wider view he tried to understand better the real nature.of the'
Communist Party. Unfortunately, the sources available to him werSt
Communists could pursue a policy that was in
by today's standards,very inadequate
stand up t~ rigorous investigation~ Moreover,. his
framework is too simple to explain the development
Party. Despite many useful insights he, in effect,·arguesthat
,.
,:. .~... "':l
depending on the wishes and interventions of the Soviet Union,
Czechoslovak traditions. Thus, after 1945, much of its strength'
could be explained by its assimilation of those traditions.
The weakness in this approach becomes clear whenS~illing tries
to explain the development of political divisions in post-war
Czechoslovakia. Taking just one, seemingly homogeneous. national
tradition leaves little scope to explain the fundamental nature of
political divisions. So, while giving an account of svents that is
with little more than a list of points of disagreement that led
12The relevant articles by H.G. Skilling are:
"The Oreak-up of the Czechoslovak coalition 1947-1948" Canadian
Journal of Econom~c and Political SCience, XXVI, No.3, August 1960;
"The Comintern and Czechoslovak Communism: 1921-1929". American
Slavic and East European rip-view,XIX,No.2, April 1960;
"Communism and Czechoslovak Traditions", .Journal of International·
Affuirs,XX, No.1, 1966;
"The Czechoslovak Struggle for National Liberation in World War II",
Sl2vonic and Eastern European Review, XXXIX, No.92, December 1960;.
liThe formation of a Communist Party in Czechoslovakia", American
Slavic and Eastern European Review, XIV, No.3, October 1955;
"Gottwald and the ~lshevization of the Communist Party of: "
Czccho sLova.d,a 1CJ2'J-193~II,Slavic Ri?view, XV, No.4, December 1961;
"The Prague Overturn in 19M3", Canadian Slavic reFErs, IV, 1960 .
Also relevant is H.G. Skilling: .
Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution, Princeton, 1976, Chapter 1,
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ultimately to the February crisis? The feeling of a fight for power
with different pat i cLpant s rcpr-osent i nq different interests
Turning now to ~Iarxist works, the beginnings, were. equaily •
-:,;,. '
,~,' ,;;:
different positions and pursuing definite
1.4 Historical studies inside Czechoslovakia in the
inspiring but later
do go a long way to
The problem at first
Czechoslovakia which effectively dic tated thataccou~tsi~f:;rece~{'i;{:,n,
history had to be subordinated to the needs of propaganda. It was
therefore accepted that the Communist Party had always known what
it was doing and that it followed a preconceived plan, culminating
in the taking of po~er in February 1948. Thus there was considerable
common ground between those suffering from the bitterness of defeat
and those filled with the elation of victory :ttiey could both raduca;
the r~volu tionary changes to a simple 'fight for power' bet~een two
Marxist writers at that time explained away
sides although they could also offer different
which side won ••
social development and of the relationship between social processes' \
1. ,-
and political power by reducing everything, including'aspecially
. -~
political power, to pure class terms. In Czechoslovakia in
to socialism. Historians, subordinated to this political
1950's over-simplification and distortion went even further
consequence paticularly of the condemnation of,
effectively tried to fit the Czechoslovak experience into
- 8 -
· 13schomaLicol models derivod from some of Lenin's works. • The main
stimulus was a shert work by the Soviet theoreticl~n Sobolev14 who
ef!'ectively reduced the novelty of the revoiutions in post-~ar
Eastern Europe to the presence of the Red Army and the existenceof~
the U.S.S.R. Utherwise, he ar qued , they added nothing new to Lenin's
This was followed by a surprisingly active debate
views on the 1905 revolution!
it proved to be extraordinarily difficult to compress
experience into a pre-conceived' schematised mOde115'
arose because of the impossibility of
\ .• )
"bourgeois democre;;tic"revolution and hence the difficulty
a precise definition for the 1945-1948 p8riodi~ terms
from Lenin's writinGs. Thoru wore attempts to be more
suggestions that "elements" of ttJe dictatorship of the
began in 1945 and were suusoc.uerit Ly s t rrnqthoned and multiplied. It
could therefore be concluded that the road was very different from
that of the Hussi~n revolution although the "content" was still said
16to be the same •
13Especial}.y important was "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the
Democratic Revolution" first published in,1905 and included
V.I. Lenin: Selected Idorl,s,~IOSCOw and London, 1968.,
14A•r• Sobolev: Peoples'Domocracy, a New form of Political Organ-~.
isatien of Society, Moscow, 1954.
155ee especially the~contributions to a conference of historians in
1955 in otazl<y nElrodnl a dernokratickerevaluee v CSR, Praha, 1955.
16.., .,.Jan Kozak:
v!t~zstvr nad bur!oAzil , Praha, esp.
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There were oven hesitant suggestions that post-war .revolutions
stemmed from definitely new conditions so
'. 1could only be discovered on the basis of a deep concrete analysis
Nevertheless, the genoral view was that 1945 had seen~a national~
democratic revolution and that a process of "growing over" into>':.:;'
:_,;,ii;~ ~_,;~';'. ",., : j.-: \:~,';:> ,i
", 'J,',democratic revolution essentially like Lenin's bourgeois
a socialis t revolution had followed. So all the comp Laxd ties ofthei,V:,
" .:: . ,"-;",':\:L' '~" lii, ,':".<,:{" i,:~·:.~.':~;
,'...... ,'.}..; . ~. , .. . . _-,
Communist"'s'strategy were simply sub-sumed within the c.onsept'of·,;'.:"",
, ',.;. ;'\, . "'~ t,;? ~J.;,~>
"growing over" which ended with the establishment ofthe?dictator'ship~
~:,'~"':I'/ ;.",:..t:<,;~/: ",>(;;:,,~ .,,_.,:':"'_:~:,t
)
of the proletariat. This could still enable the CommunistPart~.to;~~
claim to have adhered to and successfully applied adefinite'andun~'<:;; ,,::;\':::~.t~
changing strategy. The propagandist or even apologetic constraints '..';"
of these historical investigations were even implicity admitted by
one contributor to the discussion who said,"Today we have a great
advantage over previous discussions because we,now have the theses Of
the Central Committee on the ten years of development Qf our Peoples':~
Democracy. It is now a matter above all of doing our best to present/
and concretise these theses correctl~so as not to come into conflict
'with the historical facts, with the policy of the party and ~ith the
18theses themselves ."
This reveals the decisive methodological weakness of all these
works. Their investigations started not with the facts but with the
conclusions and tho problem then was to fit the facts into the
conclusions. Moreover, by taking a pre-conceived framework they
implicitly excluded the possibility of deriving anything new from a
17K• Kara in otazky, p.322-324~
181• 8ystrina in Cltazky, p.3CJ2
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study of Czechoslovak history. The Czech philopher KosIk could just
as well have beon referr~ng to these historians when he pointed to
the weaknesses of reductionism: "Reductionism is the method of 'no-
thing more than' •••• reductionism cannot rationally explain ~ ..
and qualitative development. Everything new can be reduced to
preconceived conditions and assumptions, the new is 'nothing more,
than' the old" 19.
In the course of the narrative the methodology an~ framework of
these early Marxist approaches will not be adopted. Nevertheless,~:
they do at least raise the question of the relationship Of Communist
Party strategy to the basic works of Lenin and Stalin that allegedly
guided its actions at that time. This point will be taken up in var-
ious of the discussions of the Communists' strategic conceptions.
Before looking at further developments of Marxist historiography·
inside Czochoslovakia, mention should be made of Western Marxists.
Very few have tried to confront and analyse the events in Eastern
Europe after world War II. Even the most serious attempts have not
been based on thorough empirical investigations but have rather been
resronses to immediate political needs: thus for example, Carrillb ~
was especiplly keen to argue that the Communists' did not pursue a
1 t· l' .' f 'd" d d 20as 1ng pO.1CY almlng ur unlVl e power •
It is difficult te find even the beginnings of a methodological
f ramewc rk when sophi:Jticated uastern I"iarxlst theoreticians can
insist that a fundomental aspect of Lenin's teachings is lIthe only
possIb Le 'historical 'nlternativo' to the state power of the
19K• KosIk: Dialektikn Kon~r6tn!ho, Praha, 1965, p.23-24.
Prohlems of Socialism Today, London, 1970, p.56-63.
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bourgeoise is an equally absolute hold on state power by the proleta-
riat, the class of wage-Iabou:u:sexploited by capital,,21. Rigid
adha r-er.ceto this view can on]y lead back to an interpretation of
events as the progressive consolidation of the dictatorship of the
proletariat. It should be added that a careful reading of the works
of M9rx and Engels can leave no doubt that their ideas on political
their
power were more complex and more flexible than some ofAinterpreters
believe22•
1.5. The revival of Czechoslovak Marxist hisn:rjIl]raphy and the
debatB about the "specific road"
Inside Czechoslovakia histori oGraphy followed a different
course which was stimulated both by the condemnations of Stalin and
by the relaxation of restrictions on access to sources. At first
this was not accompanied with outright critisms of the early method-
olegy ;_ there was anyway nothing to put in its place and
historians accumulating 'concrete empirical infon·alion still tried
to fit it with an alleged definite Communist Party strategy of a
democratic revolution "growing over" into a socialist revolution23•
Particularly after the forceful condemnations of Stalin in
1962 historians acquired the self confidence to search for a method-
ology on their own. There could even be open and explicit discussions
of methodology exposing the weakne~ses of past approaches. Two
21E• Balibar: "The Diclatorship of the Proletariat", Marxism Today,
XXI, No.5, May1977~
22cf• W. Weselowski: Vrstvy,trlcly a moe, I'rbrl8,1968, p.38-58.
23e•9• K. Jech: Prohuzen~ vesnicB, ~raha, 1~63 esp. p.242-243.
- 12 -
articles in particular doserve mention. The first was a collective
work pointing to the novelty and complexity of the 1945-194a period.
It pointed out that the period saw not just a fight for power or a
process of consolidation of power but rather a process of
change in which new social relationships were created: it was against
As the situation is recognised as being more
24that background that the fight for power took place, •
t, becomes possible to look with more objectivltYtat the,cruclal'quastion
-i: i;',', ,.,y,:-"I;:""(i\\;;
of the sub jective intentions of the political parti~'~:':;.lt;CO~iQ','b~~\'i
. .,)!':: ' .,,,,':,,",':\\~,'\::.:?J'><,.·-:.:;L./t.?'J: '. ,':>',~~;," :<;> r:;
. "I
recognised again, once the needs of propagandanad' r~ced~d,int~
complete and unchanging conception of what they
This was the point takan up by Opat in his importa;nt'iartiCl~ on,
methodological problBms25 which directed attention to the.inFluenced
background, tha t parties did not necessarily have at: sli,/times
of "the cult of the personality" in deforming earlier,
',.>,'
the 1945-1948 period. He argued that the Communist Party had in
fact pursued a strategy which, albeit not exactly worked out,
corresponded roughly to the "specif Le road" so vigorously repudiated
, ,
in the early 1950' a, He backed this up with quotes from Communist,'
leaders an~ completed his arguRment by trying~to show that, as a
consequence of a'sharpeningof political differences inside
Czechoslovakia stemming from the heig~bened international tension,
the Communist Party was led to change its strategy during 1947.
24Katedra dejin KSC a CSR:"K synteze nasich novodobych dejin.
Socialismus", pHspevky k dejinam KSC, 1963, No.4.
25J• upat r "K metals studia a vykladu nekterych problemB v obdob f
1945-1948", pHspevky k dejinam KSC, 1965, No1
Sen also his bool<;J. Upat: 0 novou demokracii, Praha, 1966.
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It was this that caused the February crisis.
created, within
This differs fundamentally from the emigr~ approach
Party to pursue a strategy broader than just a struggle for
Apparent changes in strategy are then not reducedto~trickery
'I .,'
deceitfulness but are explained within the context
and social conflicts and of a changing
the same time, Dpat fundamentally transcended
the mechanical inevitably of events was firmly~'superseded
'. .....-:._ .
.','i~
process of dvelopment in whigh the various participant~'
different aims and strategies.
In fact, it wason this point that Opat was most strongly
criticised. He was said, by fellow historian Belda, to have
Communist Party too much the object rather~than ,the subject of
history by over-stating the flexible "specific." element lnits
strategy. He allegedly over-looked the party's basic aim which was
attempts to achieve the aim fhat generated conflicts
always the "30viet modal" of socialism i.e. a single party holding
a monopoly of~wer and relegati~g other, organisations to tha rola
"transmission belts". Specificity could then be ascribed only
means and no t the aim, and BeIda could argue that it .wasthe',
government coalition. Changes in the international
not initiate but onl~ accelerated the process leading,tofebruary.
From this BeIda concinued his argu ment presenting the post-February
political structure as almost an adequate precondition for the
"deformations" that followod26•
26J• 3e2,da: 'r[esl<oslovenska cesta k socialismu ", Pr!sp~vkY k dejinam
I(Se, 1967, 1'\0.1,and J. BeIda:" Mocensko-po1itld<~ zm~ny v CSR po unoru
'1'948", Rovue dojin socin1ismu, 106~J, No.2. These are summarised also
in" Some Prohlems Flegording the Czechoslovak Road to Socialism",·
His tory of S0£1:Elisn,_'ycariook1~68, fJrague, 1969,
Although EJelda did place great emphasis on the conscious action
of the Corrrr.un i.s t Party in pursuit of long-standing aims asa
of conflict within society, he ultimately did not reduce the
history of the 1945-1948 period to that27• Perhaps
extent on the basis of this mora complete work that
to accept the possibility of weaknesses in his
Jparticular, he could not conclusively deny that
did change at some point in late 194728•
After the late 1960's
restricted but an interesting contribution
produced under conditions of illegality byJ.
fully aware of the earlier disagreements when
elements in Communis t stra tegy were not particularly importantbut;'\/", :.' ~' . ,,' .~\,'1
that there novertheless was a definite change in strategy:inl~te.1947j. ' " ';"'.', ':",. ",', .-,:1 .... ·;
After that the Communists aimed to establish immediately a monoPQly',.{";",_::,'-;._,_'.
of power and this caused the February crisis29•
Thus the analysis is made more involved
source of this change in Communist
direction of Soviet foreign policy after
rapidly consolidating an Eastern Bloc.
the Communists did make some changes to their policy and that
was, to some extent at least, a consequence of changes in the inter-
275ee the u~lective work J. Belda, ~. Cou~ek, z. Deyl, M.Klime~:
Na rozhran{dvou epoch, Proha, 1968.
280•g• Belda's review of Dpat's book 0 novou demokracii inCeskoslovensky cosopls hlstcrickY, XV, No.2, 1967.





Perhaps the pr i cIpal inddcquacy especially of Delda' s approach
is that it is still set within narrow terms of reference. Oy
recounting and expleining events within the restricted time period
of 1945-1948 it is not made clear why they shoulrl have happened then
not earlier or later or there - not, for example, in France
or Italy. To put those events in perspective it is necessary to
adopt a longer view involving consideration of the Ilistory of the
Czechoslovak state from its inception in 1918.
1.6. Barto~8k's attempt to give a wider historical perspective
.An attempt to fill this gap was the important talk by oarto§ek
to a conference of historians in 19653°. In summarising the relevant
aspects of pre-war Czechoslovakia he paid particular attention to the
general questions of political power and pointed to the inadequacy of
the standard Marxist formulation that the bourgeoisie held power.
He was concerned to sho~, in the very specific conditions of
Czechoslovak society at that time, ~ they held power..
His arg~ ment, reduced to its simplest possible terms, was that
certain representatives of the bourgeoisie were able to formulate
and put into practice policies that scltisfied Czech national aspirat-
ions. The point was that, as a small state founded only in 1918
within the potentially stormy environment of Central Europe,
survival as an independont staLe required a consciDus strategy. This,
30 x '.1 " '.., ,K. Oarto~ei<: "Leskoslovenska sp s l .cno st <3 rovoIuca ", r:esl<aslovensKi1
revaluee v Ietech 1~144-1lJ48, Pr;lha, 1 66.
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b~sed on what was termed the Czochoslovak ~state ideal', included
goneral policies on thu rolations betweon nationalities and on the
social and political institutions and structures: these had to be
compatible with a foreign policy that could afford protection against
potentially dangerous neiuhbours. Uwing to the concrete circumstances
it was the bourgeoisie's representatives who could solve these piob-
31lems and thereby ensure "spiritual hegemony" •
This sots the framework within which the Communist 'Party had to
wort, out its ideas. I~ClrtOGekdid not review its evolution through the
int~r-war puried but did indicate ttlat it failed to develop a con-
creto~ con~incing, positiv~ a1tern8tiv8 for Czechoslovak society and
'therefore coulcJ no tsar iousJ y cha llanqe hour quo i s hegemony. New
possLb.i li tir-c wert, (Ipuned up lJith .tho t.hr aa t from Nazi Germany
culminating in tho colla~no of the Czuchos][lvak Dtate and hence of
the bnur qeoLs "8t.81:8 idnn". The task of the Communists, and of other
political forces too, uas than to f'o rmula r.a a new "state idea" com-
po t Ib Le with'Lh(? chnn:jinD sLtuo t ion in Central Europe.
Tho pos t-suar st rcnq tb uf Lho Cummunists can, then, be related
'to trleir obLlLt.y to f ormu.la te and practise ideas which corresponded to
thonoods .uf L~,'cilCSl uVU:< s onie t y or, more spocifically, which seemed
likoly to onsuro tho socurity of tho st to as desired by the Czoch
This, houe vcr, ""jn no Wi1Y e xhaus ts the problems of understanding
tho c'vcmLs of tho1CJ'i5-19/:0 po r-Lods if anything, it indicates the need
frir furthor concrete onalysis. As Garto~ek ~ade clear, the post-war
:s1 vEbr"!:osek:"Ceskoslovnnsk[." ,p.1?
revolution cannot be sel)n as a simple nogation of the occupation or
of pre-war society: it had to ~e essentially the development of a new
and hopefully better society32. The details of what that could mean
in practice were Leyond the scope of his analysis as he was only
providing a very general framework. He did, however, emphasise the
need to advance historiography with a more careful analytical
approach to the concrete state of Czechoslovak society after May 1945.
he
This,argued, was necessary both in the interests of general object-
/I
ivity and so as to transcend the over-simplified interpretations of
the period which portrayed events as if they were part of a definite
33Communist plan •
1.7. Kaplan's analysis of Czechoslovak society in 1945
A particularly important contribution was made hy Kaplan, a
prolific writer who helped in a number of advances in Czechoslovak
historiography. The particular contribution discussed here
involved a detailed analysis of the nature and consequences of some
of the revolu tionary changes of 194534• The approach adopted was
such that, although he discussed only what did happen, he could also
implicitly indicate that there was scope for alternatives. The
simple histo~ical narrative, in so far as events are explained at all,
often gives the impression of Lnevi tahi 11 ty ,
32Bartosek: "Ceskoslovenska", r •36.
33Barto~ek: ..Ceskoslovenska", p,34.
34K. Kaplan: Znarodn~n! a soc ialismlls, I"raha, 1968.
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His analysis started with the nationalisation of most of
Czechoslovakia's industry in 1945. This he saw as the principal
change after the restoration of the Czechoslovak state and he had
no hesitation in emphasising its central place in Czechoslovak
s~ciety's movement along'~he road to socialisml~5 •
. The nationalisationswere agreed to by all parties within a
broad coalition and Kaplan's elucidation of that process indicated
'that socialism in Czechoslovakia could not be the affair. of one party
or even of one class. It represented, in 1945, the fulfillment of
much wider needs and aspirations and could even be seen as an all-
national process with the working class playing a generally leading
role but one that could not possibly be defined as precisely aa
implied in the term "the dictatorship of the proletariat."
To explain ~ these chnng8s could gain such wide support would
require both a detailed investigation of the period and a broader
view of Czechoslovak history, along the lines undertaken by 8r~osek.
Kaplan, hawver, developed his study in a different direction by
undertaking a detailed analysis of Czechoslovak society in 1945 and
1946. By looking at its social and economic structure and at the new
institution~ and relationships that developed during 1945,he could
reveal the possibilities for that society and the problems it was to
confront.
This recognition and definition of the complexitr of Czechoslovak
society in turn led to an assessment of the political parties not in
c~terms of their udherence to understanding of general or abstract
35K• Kaplan: "~eskoslovensk~ cesta k socialismu", ~eskoslovensk~
revalues v letee~2244-1948, Praha, 1966, p.160.
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principles but in terms of the concrete needs and possibilities of
Czechoslovak society36. He did not look in full at the parties'
activities, but restricted himself to their programmatic formulations.
He then posed the question of whether these were adequate to the task
of leading Czechoslovakia further along the road that it was taking ,
With this analysis Kaplan produced a basis for understanding
i.e. the road to a socialist society via broad national unity and
the democratic approval of the great majority of the population.
,.
'Although no party had the programmatic equipment with which to solve
all the problems that could threaten to disrupt that process, Kaplan
concluded~hat the Communist Party was the closest to what was
required.
the post-war strength of the Communist Party which is omitted or over-
~implified in references to its assimilation of general "national
traditions" or even adherence to a pre-existing or independently
defined !Ipolitical culture". Moreover, it indicates an interpretation
of some of the changes in the Communist Party's ideas which Kaplan
related to the realisation, as forced by actual experience, that the
ideas'evolved during the lifa-time of the Comintern were inadequate.
The immediate post-war period he in fact characterised as one of
searchinQ with nobody able to present clear and convincing ideas of
what socialism in Czechoslovakia would look like37•
36This is obviously a very brief account. Kaplan's work is referred
to in later chapters.
, 37 . ". .' I' 'l! I' .LK. Kaplan: H1stor1cke m~sto ak~n~ho programu", Nova mysl, XXIIi'
No.5, May 1968.
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There are, however, problems. Above all, although Kaplan did
demonstrate the existence of conflicts within Czechoslovak society,
snsi"'l
especially between~roups, it is not clear that these ne~Ed to cul-
minate in so fundamental a change as February 1948. Kaplan's analysis
therefore has to be reconciled with a concrete narrative of events to
show how the parties were not just their programmatic priciples but
also pursued definite strategies culminating in the february events.
38On post-February society Kaplan also wrote a great deal , but
he did ~ot integrate it with his analysis of Czechoslovak society in
1945. He did, however, argue that, whatever the causes and immediate
consequences of February, a process of narrowing of the social base
for political power took place from 1948 onwards. So, from socialism
being an objective need for more or less the whole of Czechoslovak
society, it became restricted to a narrowly "social" question, i.e.
to the immediate social interests of the working class or of a
i th ki 1 39sect on of e war ~ng c ass • How this came about and what wider
significance it had wowld require further analysis of the concrete
events. For the time being at least, that is restricted by the
political conditions inside Czechoslovakia today.
In fact, many of the works on recent history published in the
late 1960is could have very direct political implications. Opat,
with his argu ment that february 1948 was at least to some extent a
consequence of the cold war, could have been supporting argu ments
38e.g. K. Kaplan:vCeskoslovensku,
Nova mysl XXII,
utva~en! generaln! linie vYstavby socialismu v
Praha, 1966 and "Zamys Lenf nad poliLickymi procesy",




for a dogree of political liberalisation in the easier international
climate of the 1960's. Gelda seemed to be pointing out fundamental
weaknesses in the Communist Party's conception of political power,
again a very relevant question in the late sixties. Svec's account
would support the view that a change in the method of exercising
political power inside Czechoslovakia depends to a great extent on
the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Kaplan's approach is today
officially condemned perhaps more vigorously than any o~her as he
was indicating the possibility and even the desirability of seeking
alternative"models" of socialism from that which developed after
Sinco 1969 the relationship between historical study and
practical politics has again been reversed so that the former, even
if not a simple servant of the latter, is at least forbidden to
carry potentially critical implications. A consequence"tif this is
that, although some very useful works have been produced, there has
been no constructive discussion of theoretical or methodological
questions.
1.8 The structure of this th~sis
As hus been indicated, there is already a considerable body
of literature on the events in Czechoslovakia in the 1945-1948 period.
This is a groat advantage as it means that many points have been'
clarified and many blind alleys closed, but it also imposes a great
burden. To make any serious contribution to the subject it is
necessary to consider, and in some cases refute, a number of fairly'
sophisticated argu ments. This can only be done on the basis of
careful empirical investigation paying considerable attention to
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detail.
It is also necessary to construct a complex and sophisticated
argu ment taking as much as is useful from the existing works. This
means that this thesis is long, detailed and not constructed in a
simple way around a single straigt forward line of argument. So, to
prevent the general drift of the argument from being ots::ured,brief
summary and discussion sections are included at various points.
The starting point, following the views of Barto~e~ and Zinner
that preceding history is very relevant to an understanding of the
1945-1948 period, is the creation of the Czechoslovak state in 1918.
This longer historical view can be justified empirically in the sense
that earlier Czechoslov3k and Communist Party history was an issue in
1946 elections and that references particularly to the situation in
and immediately after 1918 were common in Communist Party statements.
There is also a more theoretical justification as it makes possible
an elucidation of how the Communist Party formed its ideas and its
strategy within the changing ezechoslovak society. This involves.
a combination of Barto§ek's approach with an analysis of Communist I
Party history in an attempt both to throw light on the roots and
meaning of.ths Communists' post-war strength and also to provide
a basis for clarifying the Communists' post-war strategy.
Towards theso ends, particular attention is devoted to the
1918-1920 period. This is not intended to be a genui0ely balanced
history of the period as the centre of attention is the splitting
of the Social Democrats. Although the outcome was very different
from trlat of the 1945-1948 period there were a number of illuminating
analogies which are useful partly in their own right and partly
because they strongly influenced the post-world War II approaches
"
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of the Communists and Social Democrats.
For the rest of the inter-war period the aim .is to see why the
Communists were unable to challenge the dominant "state idea" and ~ow
.far they prepared themselves for the new situation of 1945. Unfort~
unately, owing to the lack of secondary source materiali only briaf
references can be made to the policies of the Social Democrats. No
<
attempt is made to treat throughly or objectively the other political
movements as the central theme is restricted to tha relationship
It is for the reader to judge how far this approach to the
between the Marxist parties and the Czechoslovak "state idea".
history of pre-1938 Czechwslovakia helps to give depth to post- World
War II events. There is however, far less scope for questioning the
direct relevance of the history of Czechoslovakia during World War II.
Again, no attempt is made at a complete history and attentio~is
directed onto those aspects that most directly affected the post-war
situation. Particularly important are the strategies of the main
groups in emigration and how they led to the formation of the first
post-war government. This then leads to a sound basis far the most
difficult part of the thesis, the discussion of the so-called
"national -revo LutLon" of 1945.
The term "revolution" was widely used inside Czecho~lovak:ia to
describe the events of 1918 and of 1945. In the latter case it is
certainly justified as what took place involved a thorough-going
transformation touching practically every aspect of .political and
social life. In seeking a framework far analysing the revolutionary
changes there is little to be learnt from the Marxist works of the
Stalin period which, as has been argued, tried to compress the
complexity of the process into a framework of pure class struggle.
- 24 _ ..
Western works on revolution are also of minimal help. One~ of the
apparent classics simply generalises a number of common features of
t 1 t· 40 . d th' I d ttlpas revo u ~ons : ~n no way oes ~s ea 0 a concep ua frame-
work applicable.elsewhere. A more recent and typical work tries to
restrict revolution to a violent change of government while explicitly
excluding discussion of social questions41.
The best framework for discussing the Czechoslovak 1945 revolut-
ion seems to be an adaption from Kaplan Is work. Instea.d of concen';"7"
trating solely on the nationalisation of industry, an attempt will
be made to show the social transformation in greater complexity in-
eluding other economic and social changes and the construction of new
organs and institutions of power.
from the analysis of this revolutionary process a basis is laid
for understanding both the nature of the multi-party system that grew
out of it and the sources of conflict within society as a whole.
More will be said in the relevant chapter on the analysis of political
Instead, parties must be ~aced firmly within the full complex
parties, but it must be emphasised here that an orthodox "systems"
42approach ., whereby a "political ays tanr ~s implicitly defined
separately from the rest of the social being, is totally inadequate.
of social relationships. The parties themselves were clos~ly inte-
grated into the revolutionary changes and especially the Communist
Party played a major role in constructing new institutions and
40C.C. Brinton: The Anatomy of Revolution, London, 1953.
41 P. Calvert: Revolution, London, 1970, p.141.
42The example discussed later is G.A. Almond and G.B. Powell,
Comparative [:Iolitics: A Oevelopment..\Approach, Boston and Toronto,
1966.
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relationships which miCht, in a "systems" approach, be hived off into
an ill-defined "political culture".
T~ approach to the parties as adopted differs from Kaplan's in
that it is not restricted to the par~ics' stated programmes but aims
also to analyse how their concrete policies took shape. Ahove all,
the aim is to show, with the help of a concrete narrative of policies
and events, how the various conflicts within society ultimately led
to the February crisis. This is intended to be a reconciliation of
Kaplan's approach with that of BeIda.
It would be possible to end the narrative with the February events
and the consolidation of a monopoly of power for the Communist Party.
worK"
That approach has been used in manYl\and inevitably leaves the im-
pression that the central issue in the preceding period was the fight
for power. This work, however, includes a final section on post-
February society in an attempt to s-w tw tre change in political power
.began to affect other aspects of society. Without this the immediate
consequences and possi~ilities of the February events would not be
made clear.
1.9.A nate on sources and terminology
The sources and terminology used con both give the impression
of an unjustified bias, and every effort has therofore been made to
use a wide range of sources on potentially controversial issues and
to refer to primary sources wherever possible. This raises a further
problem relating to the volumes of collected wor~s and other documents
that have been published inside Czechc sLovak La, Got twald' s works
pub Liehed in the 1950's, for example, cr.n t ain many aLt.ero t i ons from
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the original speeches and articles. Generally these are minor
stylistic improvements but occasionally they influence the political
content. Unfortunately, it is not possible to check this for those
speeches that were published for the first time in the volumes of
collected works. It does seem, however, that from the mid-1960's on-
wards volumes of published documents are far more scrupulous in
faithfully reproducing the complete and unaltered original wording.
Nevertheless, even these later works are selective in the
documents they publish so that, even if they are the basic sources
for some parts of this work, it is reassuring to be able to check
their implications against the information contained in some of the
more serious Western works.
On terminology, the aim has been to minimise the scope for
objections that are not central to the main argument. Terms such as
fascism, revolution, revolutionary change, social class or social
groups are not rigorously defined. They are often simply used in the
way they were in the period under discussion without the terms them-
selves representing any deeper ideological or theoretical standpoint.
The terms, "reaction", "terror", and "totalitcrianism" cannot be
treated in t-his IIneutral" way as they were a source of direct political
contention and played a role in political propaganda battles between
parties.
The term socialism has also been given different meam~s and can
be defined in a multitude of ways. To give it too precise a defini-
tion would only creato scope for unnecessary controversy, but it
must be given some general meaning if it is to have relevance to the
changos that did toka place in Czechoslovakia. It will therefore be .
used in the broadest Mnrxist sense to refer to B social and economic
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system historically supersoding capitalism and based on some form of
social ownership of the basic means of production.
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P/HIT I
THE CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA UP TO 1938.
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For reasons explained in the introduction, the events of the
1945-1948 period cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of
Czechoslovak history. In particular, there was a striking analogy
with the events at the end of World War I although at the same time
there were profound differehces. The similarities were obvious:in
the emergence of a Czechoslovak state and in the important role in
setting the future direction of that state played by groups who had
spent the war in emigration. There was also a similar hope, or
even assumption, held by much of the population that the new state
would be of a socialist character.
For the purposes of this work, the pricipal difference between
the two periods can be related to the frustration of that hope after
1918 and to how the socialist movement reacted to its disappointment.
Thus by 1921 Social Democracy, searnn~y unable to understand and cope
with events,had split into two parties thereby significantly weaken-
ing the direct Marxist influ8nce in Czechoslovak politics. Over
the following years the two Marxist parties developed their distinct
policies and practices.
The aim in the following chapter is to show how the Marxist
paclies conf.ronted the problems posed by the creation of the Czecho-
I
slovak state as a basis for seeing how prepared they were to deal
with the possibilities and problems of the 1945-1948 period.
o -
CHAPTER 2: THE CREATION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK STATE
1.2.1. Masaryk evolves a Czech strategy in emigration but most
Czech pol~ticians ignore him. The Social Democrats do
not oppose the Austrian war effort.
Masaryk, a university professor and member of the pre-war
Austrian parliament with liberal and socially progressive views,
based his strategy from the start on the belief that Austria would
'be militarily defeated1• He therefore worked from abroad trying-to
win the West and Russia to support his aim which, although at first
not clear~y formulqted, was for the establishment of an indepencent
Czechoslovak state. T~ centre of this strategy was the recruitment
of a Czechoslovak army out of Czechs living abroad and prisoners of
war and those who surrended to the armies of the Entente. The great-
est possibilities were in Russia, but the Tsarist regime would not
allow the creation of seperate Czechoslovak units: that only became
possible after the February 1917 revolution. The total Czechoslovak
army reached the impressive size of 128,000 with 92,000 in Russia,
212,000 in France and 24,000 in Italy. This facilitated the accept-
ance of the idea of a Czechoslovak state in the We~t as Czechoslovakia
could claim to have fought against the Central Powers.
At first the majority of Czech politicians at home kept no more
than casual contacts with Masaryk and his associates. In this they~
1T.G. Masaryk: The Making of a State, Memories and Observations
1914-1918, London, 1927, Chapter 1.
2T•4• Masaryk: Making esp. p.265. For a reasonably good Czech
account see J. Krlzek: R!jnova revolucs a casks spclecnost, Praha,
1967. Formally speaking these troops were subordinated to the
French Army command and known as leQion~aires.
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were complying with the dominant mood among the population which
" 3
stopped short of outright opposition to the Austrian war effort.
The Social Democrats were no exception to this and, noticing how
easily anti-Austrian politicians were imprisoned and hence eliminated
from political life, they complied with the regime even to the extent
of stopping all activities of their local organisations4• The party
then existed only in its top leadership which directed its activities
into talks with bourgeois politicians while the rest of the party
went into hibernation.
There was a rational justification for this policy as the only
alternatives to the Austrian empire seemed to be Tsarist Russia or
Germany itself. The first was quite unpalatable to any socialist
while the latter would leave the way open for a complete Germanic
dominance of central Europe leaving the other nationalities of the
Austro-Hungarian empire hopelessly outnumbered. Thus there was
'scope for an Austrian patriotism transcending nationality and this
thanks paticularly to Bohumlr ~meral. He rose to a position of
received articulation within the strategy of the Social Democrats
prominence within the party precisely because he seemed able to
5justify co~pliance to the regime within a Marxist framework.
His starting point was the national question which,had gradually
divided the working class into Czech and German movements. ~meral,
like other Marxists at the time, was opposed to this process in
3r• Soukup: 2~ '!'na 1918 , Vol 1, Praha, 1928, p.283-290.
4Z• Karnik: H::1bsi2l:!k,lVl[lsflryk'ci ~meral? , Praha, 1968, p.21.
5AIl this is excellently expounded in K$rn!k: Habsburk, Chapter 1.
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principle. He rejected the aim of an independent Czech state and
favoured instead a solution to the nationalities question in Central
Europe based on progressive federalisation wiih Austria-Hungary as
the nucleus. He argued that this, involving the overcoming of
national pre judic~s, could become a state allowing full rights to
all nationalities while "balkanisation" of,the Austrian empire would
create a mass of non-viable statelets6• He warned particularly
against Czech national aspirations being satisfied at the expense
the rights of the German natio~ality7.
~meral attached great importance to the national question because
he saw internationalism as the very Qasis of socialist ideas8, so that
Towards this aim, and incide~ revealing how far ~meral was
a Central European Federation would be the next step towards a socia-
list Europe.
from Lenin's position on the state, he advocated a policy of
"conscious caution, of conscious opportunism" which was aimed at
conserving strength and winning influence for the struggles to come
after the war.' By developing contacts with other Czech politicians
and creating a united "Austrophile" front, Smeral hoped ultimately to
9become a "sfiarer'of power". Then, in conjunction with the German
Social Democrats, they would have the strength to reform the old
empire from within in the interests of the oppressed small nations.




"Sohumlr Smeral", Revue d~jin socialismu, 1970, No.1
Historick~ pr~ce 1908-1940, Praha. 1961, p.75.
8 " ,
~meral: Historicke, p.28-111. This article was originally published
in 1909.
9Speech on 1/5/17, quoted in Karn!k: Habsburk, p.60.
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The logic of this strategy led ~meral to displays of unquBstion-
ing loyalty to the Emperor, but there were still only isolated signs
of discontent within the party10. In fact, ~meral appeared as the·
dominant politician on the whole Czech scene as well as the unche l-s.
11lenged leader of Social Democracy • This however, was changed by
the course of the war itself, particularly during 1917.
I~2.2. Economic difficulties at home and the two Russian re~olutions
radically change the domestic political situation.
Divisions begin to appear within Social Democracy.
The first point was that the strain of the war~ blockade
began to tell on the economy resulting in widespread shortages and
.a disastrous drop in even the most basic foodstuffs12• This was
reflected in strikes which, although opposed by the Social Democrats'
leaders, were welcomed by Masaryk as a major anti-Austrian act that
could help his claim to represent the genuine feeling of the Czech
peopla13• In fact, rather than forming a left, opposition within
.Social Democracy, the leaders of these spontaneous strikes linked
their opposition to the Austrian empire with radical nationalism
rather than internationalism and thereby formed the nucleus far a
revival of the non-Marxist National Socialists14•
..,
10 .
K~rn!k : Habsburk , p.30-31 •
11r• Pa~outka: 8udov~n! st~tu, Vol I, Praha, 1933, p.SO" and
f. Soukup: 28 r!jna1918, Vol II, Praha, 1928, p.aS8
12 . .Stru~n? hospodafski vyvoj ~eskoslovenska do roku 1955, Praha, 1969,
p.105-107. see also·Soukup: ~, Vol II, p.925. '
13 'T.G. Masaryk: .Making, p.339.
14,; !Karn k: Habsburk , p.65-67.
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1917 was also the year of the two Russian revolutions which
deeply affected the Czech political situation. The first one greatly
helped Masaryk as, particularly after the U.S.A. entered the war,
def~at for the Central Powers seemed certain and most Czeth
politicians began shifting from their pro-Austrian positions to
15support for a Czech or Czechoslovak state • This applied even to
many Social Democrats who no longer feared lest Austria's defeat
should lead to domination by Tsarist Russia. ~meralt however, stuck
t h' ' it i th h h f it l' t 16o ~s prov10us POS1 10n even oug e was aware 0 s unpopu ar~ y •
In September 1917 opposition within the party compelled him to resign
from some of his positions but, while later ac~owledging accusations
of opportunism, he did not fully accept that his policies had amounted
17to national betrayal or had stemmed from cowardice •
It was into this atmosphere of social discontent and nationalist
!eeling that the first reports penetrated of the October revolution
in Russia. This may have encouraged the working class militanoy
displayed in immense strikes over the Austrian empire in January 1918.
Generally, however, the impact of the October revolution was complex
and contradictory. Its most direct effect was to remove one of
Austria's enemies from the military and diplomatic arena: in a sense,
15Soukup: 28, Vol I, p.422.
16He believed that 95~~of the Czech population were completely anti-Austrian; Souk~p: ~,Vol 1, p.540, quoting a speech from June
1917.
17e•g• Protokol XII f~dn~ho s'ezdu fs soci'ln~ demokratick' stran
delnicke, Praha, 1919, p.45. See also meml's account of a
discussion with Radek in B. ~meral: Pravda 0 sov~tov~m
Rusku, Praha, 1966, p.50.
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then, it strengthened the Central Powers and weakened the fight for
Czech statehood. This was even more obvious after Brest-Litovsk. It
is therefore not surprising, particularly as Bolshevik statements on
the rights of nations to self-determination were scrupulously censor-
d18e , that even Social Democrats were suspectible to portrayals of the.,
19Bolsheviks as German Agents • In so far as they felt a class sympathy
for the Russian revolution it conflicted with the desire for national
.liberation; so thOY tended to place even more hope in the west and
tl . r" ,'20consequen y In 'i3saryr" • This was the attitude emerging spontan-
eously from the strike movements among Czech workers which therefore
servod ohly to divide them still further from their German work-mates~1~
Tho October revolution appeared to be still more distant from
the Czech national struggle when the Czechoslovak troops in Russia
came into armed conflict with the Bosheviks in mid-1918. They had
been withdrawing from Russia across Siberia;aiming to rejoin the war
in france when, apparently in response to British wishes22, they
started a consciously anti-Bolshevik campaign quickly taking control
of the trans-Siberian railway. It remains unclear how the conflict
began, but Masaryk and Benes seem not to have been opposed to it
believing that it could create the basis for a powerful intervention
~ '- -
18 . 28 Vol·II, p.589-590.Soukup: ,
19KrHek: R!j nova , p.38.
20:5 " lIabsburk p.169.K rru.x r ,
21 Habsburk p.189, 196 and 197.Karn!k: .
220• Perman: ~ShapinQ af the Czechoslovak state: DiplomaticHist?ry of theOrundaries af Czechoslavakia 1914-1920, Leiden,
1962, p.34.
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from the East against the new Russian regime23• The real pOint,
however, was that Czechoslovakia's prestige was suddenly raised in
24
the West ~ Although it is more likely that the sudden willingness,
particularly of the U.S.A, to support Masaryk's aim of an independent
Czechoslovak state was primarily a consequence of the realisation
that the Austrian empire could not survive to play the role of a
counter-balance to German influence in Central Europe25 the anti-
"Bolshevik actions of the Czechoslovak troops were at the time presented'
as a major factor helping Masaryk's activities. Bene~ himself de-
scribed them as the "strongest political factor at the end of the war
26and during the peace conference" • This view found adherents among
some Social Democrats who, by accepting Benes's position
were led to outright hostility towards the October revolution.77
As Austria's collapse appeared to be imminent so leading Czech
1.2.3. October 1918. The Social Democrats accept subordination
bourgeois politicians as the Czechoslovak state is born.
politicians mada preparations for a transfer of power.
behind the plan was the Agrarian A. ~vehla28 who successfully
23
E. Bene~: My War Memoirs, London, 1928, p.370-371. See alsoV. V~vra: ."K historiografick~ interpretaci pom~ru r.G. Masaryka
vOe! sov~tskemu Rusku v race 1918", ~eskoslovenskY ~asopis '
~ historlck9, XXI, No.1,.1973 and Perman: Shaping, esp. p.38-39.
24r•G• Masaryk: Making, p.255
25r•G• Masaryk: Making, p.251, .:l. KrIzek: "Prciisov~tske vystoupen!
fs "leg11 a zmena vz tahu Dnhoc1y k cs , Zahrilnicn!mu ocjboJi v race"!'
1918", Historie a vOjenstv!, XV, 'No.1. 1966, p.1-37.
26B8ne~: ~ar Memoirs, p.368
27e.g. Modracek, Protokol XII, p.89
28 . "
for a complementary account of who he was see A. Palecek: "Antonin
Svehla: Czech Peasant S~bsman, Slnvic Review, XXI, No.4, Dec. 1962.
for a supreme "National' Committee" to be constituted out of the Czech
political parties in proportions corresponding to their votes in the
1911 elections29• The first meeting was held on 13/7/18 and produced
, '
a statement of open commitin81tto the "Czechoslovak revolution abroad,,3P.
otherwise, however, activities amounted to little more than waiting
31for Austria to collapse • Preparations were restricted to the first
32laws needed to proclaim the new state •
The Social Democrats accepted a subordinate position within this
'movement. Although there were plenty of signs of general radicalis-
atlon among the Czech people, they were in no fit state to provide
leadership, for the national movement. Instead, the idea of merging. '
with the expanding and radicalised National Socialists was seriously
33muted • In fact, although the two parties came closer together and
established:united Socialist Council on 6/9/18, the move was surpris-
ingly easily defeated by ~meraI34. It would have meant the disappear-
ance of an independent Marxist party.
De6pite ~meralts success in this, the party could not use their
Marxist principles to formulate a new policy. Instead they seemed,
in one of the most fateful moments of their history, to be paralysed
by their own confusions and divisions. They could not provide a
clear and united answer on any of the questions confronting the Czech
nation. This applied,to the question of the Czechoslovak state and
29 iJudovnn! Vol I, p.18.Peroutka:
30 ,££, Vol II, p.830.Soukup:
31 8udovanl Vol I, p.16-21.Peroutka: ,
32 l§_, Vul II, p.834-843.Soukup:
33' .Soukup: 28 , Vol II, p.890-892.-
34"'1 . k 207Karn~K: H8hstiur ,p. •
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self-determina t i on, t.heat t i tude touar-ds the Sudeten Ce rn.ans , towards
peace demands, the Ln t.erna t i onaI s oci el is t movement and the "Bolshevik"
state against which Czechos~ouak troops were fighting. The party was
contenting itself with declarations of loyalty to the state while
. 35looking to the National Committee for solutions to difficult problems •
At one time it was usual for Communist historians to maintain
that mass radicalisation was of such a form as to open the way for
socialism. It then followed that failure stemmed from subjective
cowardice or even betrayal by the leadership. It seems fairer to
"the
ascribe their inability to lead to heritage of the past and the weak
. I-
state of the workers moveme~t disrupted by serious conflicts,,36.
These subjective weaknesses were greatly accentuated by the objectiv8
weakness of Soviet Russia and hence its inability to directly assist
the Czech desire for national liberation. As the Czech opposition
to the Austrian empire definitely took primarily a national form, the
credibility of political movements was largely dependent on their
ability to ally with some international force that could secure and
1
guarantee the Czechs' national asiparations within the potentially
dangerous environment of Central Europe. Apart from a pro-Western
or pro-Austrian orientation, the only alternative seemed to be
faith in a world revolution that would destroy all existing power
blocs and rid all states of aggrsssivD intentions.
i'rnp ,11Such a notion was too abstract to~the CZ8ch working class, but
it was taken seriously in Russia where there was evon an attempt to
35A d i t J C't'" t d l' n Ka"rn1"1",ceor 1n9 0 • ~ 1v1n, quo e .
368• ~ereMak: Del nicks hnutl no jihovycl!odn.r.Morave v letecll
1917-1921, 8rna, 1969, p.25.
form a Communsit Party on a programme rejecting participation in the
bourgeois fight for national independence and staking everything on
a world revolution37• There were even hopes of winning Czechoslovak
soldiers to become the centre for such a world revolution38 •
Within this body the two socialist parties could
..Smeral's perspective of a reformed Austria seemed just as
realistic because Austria itself was coming closer to Germany and
the Austrian Social Democrats, following this trend; were advocating
a unified German state which would in practice leave no scope for
Czech national aspi rations39• There was then seemingly ntralternat-
ive to subordination to the National Committee.
bourgeois politicians from gaining a complete monopoly and they even
undertook some independent action. A generm strike, approved by the
National Committee, was called on 14/10/18 and,although not opposed
to the bourgeois leadership, it did strengthen their demands by,for
example, calling explicitly for a Czechoslovak republic. The action
did not develop into an attempt to take power and in that sense only
confirmed the 6ubordination of the socialist parties. Nevertheless,
it brought nearer Austria's collapse because it succeeded!n its
40immediate a~m of preventing a transfer of food supplies to Vienna.
Paradoxically, it may even have made the government more willing to
surrender power to the National Committee which appeared to be the
37 D~jiny KS~ , Praha, 1961, p.123.
38z. K~rnfk: Prvn! pokusy 0 zalo!en! Komunistickestrany v ~ech~ch,
Praha, 1966, p.20.
~9K6rn!k: ~~, p.286-287.
tiD Soukup: ~, Vol II, p.955.
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only reliable barrier to "Bolshe0ism" once the workers begaO taking
d' t t' 41~rec ac ~on •
In the meantime Masaryk and Bene~ exploited the degree of
recognition they had already won to form a provisional government on
14/10/18 even before they had a definite territory for th~ prop~sed'
42state •
still nervous that they might be by-passed by negotlaticini in
Prague or Vienna, they sent messages assuring the National Committee
that everything had been won in the west43• It was therefore
,sufficient to wait patiently for Austria's collapse without under-
taking any decisive action.
On 27/10/18 Austria's foreign minister Andrassy replied to
President Wilson~s peace terms in a carefully ambiguous way that was
. 44interpreted by the Czech people as conceding their right to a state •
Massive and spontaneous demonstrations began the following day which
has subsequently been taken as marking the foundation of the
Czechoslovak state. The National Committee, true to its own philos-
ophy, acted extremely cautiously and continued to look to Vienna for
"instructions". It was' still negotiating with Vienna on 29/10/18 and
only assumed full power with the implicit blessing of Vienna45•
41peroutka: Budovan!, Vol I, p.53-54. See also Berm's message to
Berthelot of 29/10/19 in: 80 0 sm~r v~vo'e eeskoslovensk6ho stAtu,
Vol I, Praha, 1965, document hence forth dok 1, p.13.
42 Soukup: 26, Vol II, p.961.
43 Soukup: 20, Vol II, p.960-961.
44 .Peroutka: Budovan!, Vol It p.103.
45See the account in Peroutka: Budovan! t Vol I, p.106-134.
Even the first acts of the National Committee after that were full
of cautious conservatism 8S the legal statement proclaiming the new
state gave prominence to the maintainance of all existing laws46•
Once successful in Prague, similar coups were implemented in
other Czech towns where local National Committee emerged to proclaim
47the new state • The Prague committee was then enlarged into a .
National Assembly with the Czech parties represented' according to
their votes in 1911. It soon elected Masaryk as President and the
first government, a coalition of these parties}was formed with the
right-winger Kram'l as Prime Minister and Bene§ as foreign Minister.
1.2.4. Summary and discussion
The Czecholsovak state was born in 1918 out of the defeated
Austro-hungarian empire. Although this was immensely popular with
Czech people, few Czech political leaders had consistently predicted
this end to the war and most were therefore forced to quickly adapt
themseives to the new situation. Masaryk won an automatic position
of leadership because he had based a strategy on the correct pre-
diction that the Central Powers would be defeated by the west.
The Social Democrats had great difficulty in facing the new
situation and divisions developed within their leadership. Some
effectively subordinated themselves to Masaryk while others, especially
~meral, were very suspicious of the viability of a small independent
Czechoslovak state. Their fears were not unjustified but they were
unable to articulate them into an attractive and convincing
46Bene~:War Memoirs, p.453.




It may have been that both trends within Social Democracy could
have made a greater impact by vigorously championing the Czech
national cause and trying to ensure that it had a more lasting
socialist content. There was, however, no simple analo~y with 1945
because of the very different international situation. In the first
place, Austria was not Nazi Germany and in second place and this·
was the decisive objective factor weakening the forces that could
advocate socialist revolution there was no great power able and
willing to defend a socialist Czechoslovakia.
The next chapter shows how the subjective weaknesses and ob-
jective difficulties led to the division of Social Democracy and
to the creation of a Communist Party.
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CHAPTER 3: THE SPLITTING OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND fOUNDING OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY
1.3.1. Working class militancy falls short of revolutionary
socialism
The atmosphere in the new republic has justly been described as
one of nationalist euphoria gripping the whole Czech population
including the working class. Although there were many spontaneous
demonstrations and strikes, reflecting the sheer desperation of the
1workers at food shortages, this cannot be interpreted as opposition
to the regime: rather it reflected the belief that such demands could
beat last met. In addition, there were demands of a clearly national-
"ist nature, for example, for the removal of previously strongly pro-
. 2
Austrian officials. Explicitly socialist demands such as the
nationalisation of industries were never linked with any direct actions:
there seems rather to have been a quiet confidence among workers that
the establishment of an independent state would lead naturally to
socialism. '
This belief was encouraged when tho Social Democrat Ministers
succeeded in passing urgent social reforms such as the eight-hour day,
social insurance measures and emergency unemployment benefits.3
Moreover, aware of the absence of an army or reliable police force,
bourgeois leaders were looking for other means to stave off what they
'Z. Kirnfk: Za ~eskoslovenskou republiku rad, Praha, 1963, p.69.
2Many resolutions are contained in Raj 0 smer, Vol I. See aiso
A. Penicka: Kladensko v revolu~nfch Ie tech 1917-1921, Praha, 1954,
p.41-42, J. Kolejka: RevoluEn! d&lnick~ hnut{ ne ~orav~ a ve
Slezsku 1917-1921} Praha, 1957, p.110 and 114 and Cere§~~k:
D~lniakj, p.28 and p~44.
~ ¥ r x v f " x !Kr~zek: R~Jnova, p.68, and Kolejka: Revolu~n , p.115.
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thought was a threat of immediak revolution. In the prevailing
atmosphere it was impossible to pose openly as conservatives so Kramar
instead urged the full exploitation of Masaryk's "unused, unwilting
popularity" which could "hold socialism in rein,,4. Statements made
by Masaryk in emigration certainly suggested that he favoured social-
ist change and all parties were persuaded to mention the nationalis-
ation of large enterprises specifically to lighten the task of the
Social Democrat leaders in convincing their membership that socialism
5did not need to be fought for. By creating the illusion that
socialism was inevitable it was also made easier for the government
to order the dissolution of the National Committees. In some cases,
generally when forced to do so by the desperation of the workers,
these had exceeded their powers as c~cived by the government and
appeared as potentially revolutionary organs6 but when thagovern-
ment ordered their dissolution by a unanimous resolution on 4/12/187,
protests were minimal. This was simply another indication of the
thinking of the working class leaders who could sea no further
.function for such organs once the state had been established and
certain basic reforms implemented8•
4Letter to Bene; loi24/11/18} Boj ~osmer, Vol I, dok, 127, p. 145-146.
5peroutka: BUdovan!, Vol II, p.543-536.
National Democracy, tha most explicitly
8udovan!, Vol IV, p.2338-2339.
This applied even to
bourgeois party, Peroutka:
6e.g. The report of the National Committee's activities in Kladno
dated 10/11/18; Boj osmer, Vol I, dok.117, p.130-133.
7Soj 0 sm;r~ Vol It dok.130, p.151.
8 . ~This was true even in Kladno as indicated by Penicka: Kladensko,
p.47-48, 51 and 52. See also Karnlk: Za ceskoslovenskou, p.47.
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Although there was undoubtedly an element of conscious man-
ipulation whereby a real socialist revolution was averted, this does
not mean that socialist leaders and many of their followers were
simply tricked. ~meral explained a de~per aspect of the problem to
Lenin saying that the Czech workers were"nationalistic because they
are afraid that victory in a social struggle is,a castle in the air U~~
that the German workers would exploit this social struggle for their
own irredentist national aims,,9.
This undoubteoj.yuas the crucial point: Masaryk and Benes could
present a fairly coherent policy following on from their war-time
activities and placing reliance on the western powers for the estab~
lishment and consolidation of the Czechoslovak state at ito centre.
In the existing world situation it must have seemed that any radical
socialist alternative would lead anI, to di9a~es~.
1.3.2. Masaryk and B8ne~ consolidate their dominance over Social
Democracy thanks to their ability to present credibJn,
positive policies.
Benel, fully aware that the new state was being established
against the wishes of Germans and Hungarians, was presont at the
peace conference which took place in a number of staQes throughout
1919 and 1920. This reflected his pragmatic assessment of the import-
ance of winning powerful friends abroad and he consciously tried to
thefit Czechoslovakia into French plan for the reorganisation of
1\
10Central Europe whereby several small states wern to take over
11Austria's role as the counter-balance te Germany •
9"Smeral: Pravda, p.306-307.
10 Peroutka: Budov~n{, Vol II, p.5S1.
11Perman: Shapin~, esp. Chapter 4.
He used all his shrewdness and diplomatic abilities to avoid offend-
ing Britain and the U.S. although they were sceptical of the plan.
The new state, then, was never intended to be internationally>
neutral but was anti-German and anti-"Bolshevik" from the start.
This had to be reflected in internal policy. Whena broad, but seem-
ingly unorganised German opposition to the state showed itself in
strikes and demonstrations, armed force was used against them. Benes/.
while warning against too much bloodshed, sent assuranc,es from Paris
that the government should "take very energetic steps" as there was
12strong anti-German feeling at the peace conference • This could
only furthor divide Czech and German socialists: the latter tried to
co-ordinate their activities with the Austrian parliament and were
still calling effectively for the destruction of Czecholsovakia in
late 191913• Leading Czech Social Democrats responded by concluding
that no conflict with the West could be allowed particularly while
, 14Russia was so weak •
At the same time Gene; exploited to the full reports reaching
Paris that "Bolshevism" was rampant in Central Europe15: He
advocated the avoidance of any policies,at home that could be a pre-
lude to "Bolshevism" so that he coulld present Czechoslovakia as an
.-
12peroutka: Budov5n!, Val II, p.777-778.
13 .." , Z J .., f k l st I k'Z. Pozarsky: aozen omunlS lC e
Gst! nad Labem, 1971, p.15.
14 .... 0 1R. Bechyne: Pera mi zusta 0, Praha, 1947, p.167.
~echach,
15 . v ,Perman: Shaping, p.71; see also Benes's memorandum to all led
governments of 3/11/18 in 80J 0 sm~r, Vol I,dok.5, esp.p.17,
and his note to the U.S. Sc.cr etary of State of 20/12/18 in Q£.J.
o sm~r, Vol I, dok.24, p.32-33.
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island of stability deserving speedy recognition and clarification
f·t f t· 16o ~ s ron ~ers • It was argued that the dangers from surrounding
states ard from an alleged "Bolshevik" army advancing on Czechoslovakia
justified a request for Western troops as the best way to consolidate
. 17
the state • In practice this did not happen but a Czechoslovak
army was built up by French offic ers and under the ultimate command
of Marshall foch.
Benei also exploited the actions of Czechoslovak tr90ps in
Russia18, but their importance was only shortlived. Once the new
state was. formed they ignored the fiery anti-Bolshevik rhetoric of
th ' d 19, '1 b th b l' d th i tItBIr cornman ers prImarl y ecause ey 8 leve e r s rugg 8 0
be over and wanted only to return home. Als~ as they tended to be
politically on the left, they were reluctant to help a fight which
20seemed to aim not for democracy but for restoration of the old order •
There was anyway no immediate sign of active intervention
the Western powers so that Masaryk and Benel, although opposed in
16Note from the Minist ry for Defence to Oene§ on 2/12/18in BoJ 0
sm~r, Vol I, dok.1?, p.28-29, and then Benos'snote to Clemenceau
'Oii'2S/3/19in BoJ 0 amer, Vol 1, dok.60, p.85-86.
17Lette~ ftom Kram6~ to Benel on 24/11/18 inBoj osmlr, Vol I,
dok.127, p.145-146.
18" •••our people continue to shed their blood in defence of our
common interest on the far away Siberian plains", wrote 8me§ to
the U.S. Secretary of State on 20/12/18; Raj 0 sm~r, Vol I, dok.
24, p.33.
1ge•g• Stef'nik, on 28/11/18 denounced "~lshevism" as "anar6hism ••
threatening our state too •• ", BaJ 0 sm~r, Vol I,dok.15, p.27.
20~oj 0 sm~r, Vol I. dok.37,p.54-55, and dok.55, p.80-82. For the
legionnaires' progammatic statement of 16/1/21, in which they de-
scribed themselves as socialists, see 90J 0 ~m~r, Vo; II, dok. 183,
p.173-174. for a fuller discussion see Z. Sl'dek: "Ceskoslovensk'
polltika a Rusko 1918-1920",feskoslavensk9 fasopis historic~i, XVI,
No.6, 1968 Dnd J Kvasnieka~ teskaslovensk~ 16g18 v Rusku 1917-1920,
8ra~tislavat 1963.
- - 48 -
principle to the Russian revolution, yielded easily to pressure from
21Social Democrats who had no sympathy for Uenikin and Kolchak and
sought a more "realistic" approach to the Soviet regime. This was
strongly opposed by Kramar who advocated active intervention believing
that the Bolsheviks could easily be defeated and a new Russian regime
Id t . ChI ki . t . d f' . t I 22wou emerge guaren ee1ng zec os ova 1a s eX1S ence 1n e 1n1e y •
Such illusions were not widely held and Kramar soon fell from power.
Nevertheless, approaches to the Soviet regime were still very
cautious and dependent on initiatives from the West: only gradually
did Czechoslovakia's isolation look so potentially serious that they
began to consider friendlier approaches in case Soviet help might
23one day be needed against Poland, Hungary or Germany •
1.3.3. SC:cial Democracy tries to adapt its policies to the siuation
in the new state
In the new situation after the foundation of the Czechoslovak'
state, the Social Democrats were confronted with the task of form-
ulating nEW policies ta accomodate to the new realities. At their
congress in November 1918 they could clear up disputss over war-time.
policy which had been made irrelevant by events themselves. 5meral
could be rehabilitated and the campaign of vilification against him,
was denounced. It had been started by Svelha in an att.empt to f:hift
all responsibilty for the earlier pro-Austrian policies of all Czech
- ,
21R• Bechyn~ speaking on 9/10/19, quoted in Peroutka: [:udov~nl,
Vol II, p.1323-1324.
22noj 0 sm~rt Vall, dok.43(on 11/2/19) and dok.44(on 14/2/19),
p.67-70.
23 ~'x XI' ,Kr1Lek: H~Jnova, p.63.
v 24
politicians onto Smeral alone • This, however, could not prevent
the emergence of disagreements ove~olicies in the new situation and
there was some continuity from Smeral's former supporters to an
embryonic left opposition 25 The logic behind this would be that•
those previously "pro-Austrian" were less easily satisfied by
national independence and less inclined to sacrifice social change
26for its defence • There were, however, now voices demanding attention
.'to "the idea •• of revolution •• " and particularly prominent among
them was A. Zapotocky, the spokesman for Kladno, who had taken no
part in war-time debates2?
The outcome of the congress was, however, a resolution approving
the leadership's strategy of participaxtion 1n the coalition govern-,
mente While it was accepted that the most important task was co-
operation "in the consolidation of the republic", the expectation was
also expressed that the bourgeois parties would "implement the most
'needed reforms jointly with the working class without having to be
forced into this by pressure". The crucial point was that, should
the demands, which were for "absolute democracy" and. for widespread
expropriations of banks, land and industries, not be met quicRly,
then the Executive Committee was to call another congress to decide.
f th t· 28on ur er se ~on •
24peroutka: OUdov6n!, Vol I, p.S1? Apparently many people honestly
bolieved that 5meral was the devil and "jokes against mothers-in-
law and a~ainst Smeral were about equally common". An Agrarian
journal promised to publish conclusive evidence that' he'was an
agent of the Austrain police; Peroutka: AUdovan!, Vol I, p.501&S19.
2S§meral: Pravda, p.307.
26paroutka: Budovan!, Vol I, p.478.
27Protokol XII, p.96 and p.171.
28Protokol XII, p.209-210.
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With the benefit of hindsight the debate appears to have been
sterile. There had been controversy within Social Democracy about
participation in a government when the issue had been posed as an
abstract problem. In 1918 practice itself had given an answer and
very little could h~ve been gained by withdrawing from the government.
Nobody actually proposed that. Nevertheless, the issue was posed in
..the blanket terms of support for or opposition to the coalition:
there was no debate around the real problem of how the Social
Democrats should use their positions in the government. They could
offer no more than the prospect of another congress if drifting with-
in the coalition did not take Czechoslovakia in a socialist direction.
It was, in fact, very easy for other parties to delay considera-
tion of "socialisations" when even Social Democrats accepted the
'. 29argument that they "would not even benefit the working class"
presumably they were accepting the view of business circles that
30.labour discipline and hence production would be damaged •
Undoubtedly the strongest argument persuading the Social
Democrats not to fight for socialisations was the belief that such
potentially controversial issues should be set aside until the state
appa~tus 9?ined the strength to withstand its enemies.31 There were
even voices explicitly counterposing socialism to the interest of th~
29 >Protokol XII, p.197.
30peroutka: Budovanl, Vol I, p.338-339 and Vol IV, p.2339-2343.
31See the speeches by A. Hampl and R. Bechyn~ in July and December
of 1919 respectively, quoted in Eere~~6kl D~lnick', p.S8.
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republic32 and nechyn~ later came close to this view by proclaiming
the irrelevance of Marx's teachings to Czechoslovakia: he argued that
socialism at once was impossitlle but maintained that it could be
reached eventually by "the development of capitalism, of industry
.. . '133and of the conSC10usness of the work1ng masses • This amounted to
an argument for indefinite subordination to Benm's strategy.
A logical complement to the coalition strategy was rejection of
the relevance of the Russian revolution for Czechoslovakia. It
seemed to be generally agreed that its "methods" were unsuitable34•
although this was later often placed alongside expressions of support
for the Russian revolution35 and com!) ined with the lasting faith
that Czechoslovakia was heading towards the same aim albeit by a
different method. An example was Stivln, generally tending towards
the right of the party, who saidi~ • there are two people whom the
workers love: Our President Masaryk and the President of the Russian
Soviet Republic, Lenin •• Masaryk is a socialist too and advocates
the notion that communism is the highest form of socialism: he is,
36however, searching for a different way there from Lenin".
In 1918 the Bolshevik's ideas were even less known than in 1920
and references to the "methods" they used often reflected knowledge
32This position was taken by Modr&~ek who, rather than waiting to be
expelled, left the party in 1919. He rejoined in 1924; Peroutka:
Budov~n{, Vol II, p.856,and Soci~ln{ demokrat, 28/2/19, p.S.
33protokol XIII. f&dn~ho sjezdu ~eskoslovensk6 soci~ln~ demokratick~
stran d~lnickd 27 28 a 29 11 2U, Praha, 1921, p.93.
34e•g• Smeral: Protokol XII, p.107.
35e.g. even Soukup, Pratokol XIII, p.78.
36His speech of 28/3/20, Raj 0 sm~r, Vol II, dok. 259, p.243-245.
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derived only from highly distortf:d press reports. The most favour-
able view at first was that the Eiolsh viks might not be responsible
for everything bad in Russia and this was suggested by one of
the most radical of all Social Democrat organisations3? This,it
soon became clear, did not mean that thero was absolute hostility
to the Russian revolution. There was at least enough sympathy to
lead to a desire for more information.
This was put to the test when A. Muna, and other former soldiers
who had become Communists while in Russia, returned to Czechoslovakia
to give eye-witness accounts of the revolution. Workers, perticularly
38in Kladno, defended their right to speak • By contrast 8ene~ warned
39how this could harm Czechslovakia's case at the peace conference
and the Socisl. Democrat leaders tried to avoid embarrassment by
asking Muna, portrayed in the bourgeois press as the embodiment of
40all evil, to quietly leave the country • Although he refused to do
this, he was aware of the limited nature of his supporf and understood
that Czechoslovakia was not on the verge of revolution: he therefore
postponed his original intention of forming a Communist Party and
41took the o,portunity to work within the Social Democracy • This'
37contribution of the delegate from Hodonin, Protokol XII, p.119-120.
38Peni~ka: Kladensko, p.54 shows that this did not mean agreement with
their views.
39peroutka: Budovanf, Vol II, p.5??
40 Peroutka: BUdovan!, Vol II, p.564.
41Z• K'rn!k: Prvn! okus 0 zalofen! Komunistick' stran v Eech~ct"
Praha, 1966, p.22-24, and Z. K~rnrk: "Zalo~eni KS a Kominterna",
Revue d~Jin socialismu, 1969, ~o.2, p.1?1-1?4.
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meant that during the first period of its consolidation the new
government was not confronted by any alternative programme on its
left.
Nevertheless, discontent among socialists over the attempts to
limit democratic rights showed itself as the state machine began to
reassert its authority with the application of the Austrian laws
restricting free assembly and allowing for pre-publication censorship
of newspapers. At first, workers' organisations had been able to
42ignore these laws, and the police had not enforced them • The
question of democratic freedoms then came to a head over the imprison-
ment of Muna on 21/6/19. A protest strike in Kladno, the town supply-
ing Prague with coal, led to the dropping of treason charges and he
.' 43'was amnestied in May 1920 • There could, however, be no doubt that
the state's power was beginning to be used against the left with the
aim of 'preventing '·8~lsheviks" from putting their case44•
I.3.4. Consolidation of a capitalist Czechoslovakia encourages
divisions in Social Democracy.
The key to the unity of Social Democracy at its first post-war
congress had been the expectation th3t a socialist society would be
allowed to emerge spontaneously. It was therefore inevitable that
problems should arise within the party as post-war consolidation led
towards a capitalist and not a socialist state. This was quickly
apparent in economic policy as private enterprise was presented by
42Kol~ka: Revolu~n!t p.111.
43p~ni~ka: Kladensko, p.B5, and
1840.
44 "e.g. Brno police report of 20/6/19, Raj 0 smer, Vol I, duk.211.
Peroutka: nudovan l , Vol III, p.18~~B-
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the govornment as a panacea. Talk of "socialisationsll were made
irrelevant when the term "nationalisation" was interpreted as meaning
transfer to Czech private ownership. In this way the financial empire
of the Zivnobanka was estaulished: it could claim genuine Czech-ness
as it had refused to give war loans ~ the Austrian empire thereby,
perhaps to its own surprise, saving itself enormous financial 10s5es45•
ParallelXing the creation of powerful Czech capitalist groupings
was the consolidation of a conservative force in the countryside.
This was of particular political significance because, despite their
economic strength, explicitly bourgeois paries could never command
mass voting strength in Czechoslovakia. Instead, the backbone of
conservatism was the Agrarian party. They built their strength on a
land reform directed against the old nobility: they sold con~scated
land particularly to larger peasants. Considerable amounts of land
also went to middle peasants orwere returned to the previous owners,
but landless labou~k received nothing46•
The right wing within the party was nervous of even this much
and was also suspicious of any participation in a coalition containinQ
socialists. !vehla, however, was astute enough to see that small
farmers might otherwise be attracted to socialism47• In practice,
despite somedissatisfaction with the slowness of the reform, the Agr-
arians were able to dominate the villages thanks to their oruanised
campaigning for land to remein in privnte ownership48: they could
- 55 -
45J• Vesel;: 0 vzniku a zalo~en{ KS~, Praha, 1952, p.79-80, and
M. Volf: Soci&lnf a politick6 d~jiny teskoslovenska, Prnha,194B,
p.238-240.
46ror detailed figures see ~. Ut&hal: l&ras 0 pozemkovou reformu,
Praha, 1963, p.196 and r.199-2UO.
47, '" I "1 / Z'" 11 1Peroutka: Budovanl, Vo II, p.gU , Hnd UlDhal: apas, p. 9- 21.
48 , 1 'Otaha : lapas, p.16LJ.
shape the law in such a way that they ultimately controlled its
. Itt' 49lmp emen a lon • The outcome was a very slowly implemented ref;or~
but the Agrarians could always claim credit for it.
In this they were indirectly helped by the unimaginativeness of
the Social Democrats who, although causing the first government crisis
in March 1919 by insisting on the need for land reform proposals,
never actively campaigned on a consistent policy50. They seemed
happy just to boast of having been the first to advocate land reform
while actually scared of its consequences. Their concrete policy
51proposals were rejected even by some of their own members (they
advocated nationalisation rather than the subdivision of estates which
they claimed would not have helped the propertiless52 they offered
nothing for the politically powerful middle peasants). The real
point may have been that they feared land reform and even opposed
some strikes because they feared the exacerbation of urban food
shortages53• This led Bechyn~ effectively to accept the existence
of an irreconcilable conflict of interest between workers and peasants
d f . l' 54so that the latter waul never avour SOCla 1sm f It was therefore
55only natural that land reform should be left to the Agrarians •
49 Budovanl, Vol II, p.865-873, and Otahal: lapas, p.171-176.Peroutka:
50 Budovanl, Vol II, p.781-798, and Utahal: Zapas, p.168-169.Peroutka:
510tahal: lapas, p.158.
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If this subnr d.i.not j on of :,oci"l UOl1locro::yto flgrarians was
most obvious in agricultural poJlcios, than it was perhaps ~ust as
important within the coalition in a more gonoral uay. Despite
. :.
enormous electoral strength, revoalod in local eJections in 1919
which gave them 30% of tho Czech vote, Sucial Democracy was incorpo-
rated as an unquestionino defender of the omerging bourgeois democratic
system.
r'larxist historians uor-a for a Lono tIme unahle to unde rst ond
the meaning of this for the creation of a political-power structure
as they tended to imply that Czechoslova~ia was simply capitalist and
therefore ruled by the bourgeoisie. A more concrete analysis revealod
a less rigid structure including th:' President, thecoalHion partios
and big business. .Tha relationship betwean theso thre8centres hnd
already assumed a fairly permanent f orr: Ly, a t the V8r~1 latest, the
end of 191956• The relationships u.i t.h.ln tho cca Lition ucr e on import-
ant part of this and were exemplified llY A S8~reta9reument between
Plasaryk and, ~vehla givi~g the right-liing ~,(1Ci31 [JBmncret \J. Tusnr
,the post of Prime ~1inistor. Far from !.e:incra step tOl:Jards"s(jcinl-
isation" this was intended only to t}ivc the gcvllrnmpnt a socialist
. !j7appearance to help withstand tho dar.qo rs of Uo lsbev i sm • Svehla
himself took the key post of the In!orior so us to dominctclhe
po Llco force which he r aqar d.vd as tiT ;.;_;ckhono 58of the statG" •
The committed soc ialIs t VrtUrl. ky l1J<S clrcprer! fror:1t+.o Quvr:rnment
r:r-,
;.J°V. r:oncl, J. I"H:nclovn"['.jilcrt p:r.SLlt;i n \/yvujo vrct.olno nfoJy
predmniichovsk6 ~es:<osloverL;;6 noccf",:.O-PD,l " .ich'i a t r ukt.ur y '",
Ce!"ikoslc)venskY ~8!"iOfJ~S : .~!},rir:::;', A\fI, f!f1.:i, 1~G~~, ISp. p.3t14.
Vd T r.~l, p.11f.J:.
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and references to "socialisations" were replaced with calls to
t i it ,,59ac lVl y • There were even concessions on '
points of principle in the prop~ed constitution60which was consciously
1\
61modelled on the principal Western examples •
1.3.5. Th~ Marxist Left is created but proves unable to formulate
a positive policy.
While the consolidation of the Czechoslovak state and the
incorporation of Social Democracy within the coalition inevitably
led to discontent within that party, there were also sources of
discontent elsewhere. Particularly important was working class
militancy which could not die down as post-war recovery was proceeding
extremely slowly and living standards were for some time well below
62the pre-war level • By late 1919 strikes and demonstrations around
these issues were merging with demands for state ownership, particu-
larly of.mines. This forced the Social Democrat Ministers to consider
the issue again, but their proposals, heralded as a start to "social-
lasat~on", did no more than confirm the existing powers of workers'
63organs in mining • further immediate action was rejected by
Masaryk who advocated a slow, step y sLep process to be started only
59V• Tusar's presentation of the government procramme in parliament
on 10/7/19, Boj 0 5mer, dok.82, p.72.,
60socialni' demokrat, 5/12/19,and f'eroutka: F-ludov8'n1',Vol III, p.1483.
61Karnik: la· ceskoslovenskou, p.149, and PeruuU(s: l1ucjovanl,Vol 11I,
p.1442.
62stru~n9, p.133 and 134. According to K&rnlk(Za ~eskoslovRnskou, p.11?
and p.148) livin~ standards in the spring of 192C were only 46~ of
the 1914 level.
63pero~tka: 8udovani', Vol II, p.1363-1365, and I<iltn!k:Za teRkoslovonskou
p.133.e5ee alas the resuluti.on of 26/11/19 from ntriking miners in J
Most, Raj 0 sm~r, Vol II, dok.224, r.2lB.
after a "precisely formulated programme" had been produced. As if
searching for the best way to evoid openly renouncing socialism but
simultaneously preventing any steps towards it he, to the approval of
his parliamentary audience, added that it had to be "agreed to Inter-
. 64nationally" •
It was£against the background of this gradual clarification of
the direction of the Czechoslovak state that the "Mar~ist Left"
emerged. At first there was only a journal, Socialn! demokrat ,
which provided a platform for discussion aiming to represent the
traditions of Social Democracy against the most open right wingers
65within the party • Space was allowed for Communists to give their
view of the Russian revolution, but the formliCaXtion of.a separate
Communist Party was vigorously opposed. In fact the left was still
close to the leadership in maintaining that "• • the methods used in
66·Russia •• ·are not suitable for the conditions in Central Europe."
Continued ambivalence to actual revolutionary struggles was
revealed during Czechoslovak intervention against the Hungarian Soviet
Republic. ,The Czechoslovak army was quickly defeated and Hungarian
advances made possible the establishment of a Soviet republic in
Eastern Slovakia from 16/6/19 to 7/7/19. This could only win the
sympathy of the poorest sections of society because the advances of
liberation were denied and private property in general was rejected.
The appeal could only be based on an abstract and "pure" internation-
alism because Hungarians were still generally associated with the ::.
64 28/10/19;i80J 0 sm~r, Vol II, dol<.104, p.87,88 and 89.on
65S ·'1" demokrat, 28/2/19, p.1 •OCla nl
66Socialn! demokrat, 27/6/19, p.1.
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previous imperial domina t i on , The resultwas/that, once Hungarian
troops withdrew, the Soviet republic diappeared without any lasting
, t th SI k 'I' t t67lmpac on e ova SOCla lS movemen • The Czech left, seemingly
embarrassed by the episode, also evaded comment ; the point must have
been that, despite a certain feeling of sympathy for the Hungarian
revolution, its development threatened Czechoslovakia's territorial
: . . 68integrity •
So the developing left was still tied to the mainstream of
Nevertheless, it took organisational form 8S a
temporary body bringing forward issues for discussion for the party's
.next congress. A strongly worded programmatic statement called for
"training the masses in mass action", developing workers' councils
and ultimately establishing the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as
the necessa~y' pre-condition for socialisation.69 Much of this
remained emptY,rhetoric as Socialn! demokrat, in deference to the
party.~eadership and presumably from fear of being condemned as
; 70 . <
!'Bolshevik", hardly mentioned workers' councils and made no at tempt
t,
to involv~itself,inworkerst struggles. Rather than,trying to add
to the developing movement, the left remained as a commentator on
events believing that, as the immediate euphoria from independent
state-hood receded, so their support would grow and the government
d.i t h i 71would c~ange without any lrec pus 1ng •
67Prehl~d dej[n KSC na Slovensku, Bratislava. 1971, p.108-110.
68Socialn! demokrat, 13/6/19, p.1 and 8/0/19, p.2. Se~ also Ceresnak;
D1Hnicke, p.34 and p.3&39, Penicka: Kladensko, p.71 and Peroutka;
Budovanf, Vol II, p.1020-1021.
69Socialn{ demokrat,. 21/1/20 I r·t.




Alongside the hollowness of initiatives from f-:rague,the left
developed in different ways in otherparts of the cou~~ry. Simple and
direct militancy, lacking in any theoretical refinemeht, was strong
in areas with previously weak working class traditions such as
Slovakia and parts of ~oravia:. organisations there were new and re-
flected war-time radicalisation. There was a different approach in
Kladno where Social Democracy had deep roots. The town was based on
mining and iron works giving it the ideal social structure for the
development of a disciplined and class consci.ous Labour movement.
Even agriculture was dominated by large estates employing wage labour
and it was therefore not surprising that the movement was understood
in purely proletarian terms without reference to the needs of peasants
or the petty bourgeoisie generally. This was reflected in the con-
ception of workers' councils which, while remaining a slogan in the
rest of 'the country, were actually formed in Kladn072•
The decisive difference between Kladno and areas ~ith a similar
industrial structure was undouutedly its location both near to the
capital city where decisions were taken and far from~ny disputed
frontier so that internal Czechoslovak polic~ questions always took
precedence over border diputes and their concomitant nationality
'. 73conflicts • Nevertheless, this did not enable the left in Kladno
to produce a coherent alternative to the direction of the state's
development as represented by Mas~ryk'and accepted by the party's
right wing.
72 Their role in relation to other organs and istitutions was never
fully clarified. See Penicl<a: KlarJensko, p.64-C6 and Karnlk: la
~eskoslovenskou, p.98-10n.
73 , . ,.,,)(,Karn!k:Za ceskoslovenskou, p.95 and li. Kana: KSL. n2 Ustrnvsku v
boj.lch na obranu republ iky proti nd;pzrec r fa~ismu 8 V81ky (193.'1-19:113)
Ostrava, 1962, ~.35.
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The logic of their position we: expressed in a conference of the
Marxist teft chaired by Z&potock; on 7/3/20. This presented in
effect the left's position for the first parliamentary elections which
were held on 18/4/20. IlJhileforcefully opposing the leadership's
coalition policy, the only alternative presented was an "oppositionist"
policy in parliament allowing M.P.s to take up a "pure and principled
74proletarian stand". This proved to be enough to persuade the party~s
leadership to adopt a strongly worded ~lection programma setting out
the need to direct all activity "to the socialisation of the republic,,?5
Social Democracy could then enter the el~tions with a united
programma and emerged with 25.7% of the votes. There was a decline
in
in the Czech lands against 1911 but a dramatic increase Slovakia.
1\
Thanks particularly also to big gains by the German Social Democrats,
the socialist parties together won 47.5% of the vote. This showed
both a growth in the desire for radical social change and that much
76of the population still remained immune to socialist ideas •
,
The left responded to these results by opposing the formation of
a new coalition prefering to leave responsibiJityfor "th~ collapsing
capitalist regime" to the bourgeoisie7? This naive belief that the
regime would fallon its own made it easy for Tusar to win the party's
representatives for a new coalition with the Agrarians without any
di tI I t th t d lbl 78con 1 ons on 1 s programme as no 0 er gavernmen S8eme pOSS1. e •
74Soci&ln! demokrat, 18/3/20, p.2.
?5Soj 0 sm~r,Vol II, dok.132, p.114.
76 .....Peroutka:Budov~n!, Vol III, p.1699-1?O?
77Soci~]n! demokrat, 29/4/20, p.1.
78J• Skalak in Socialn{ demokrat, 6/5/2IJ, p.1 •
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The left complied with this decision, but the government still
appeared to be only a provisional arrancement pending some future
t f I .f . t .( 79ac 0 c ar1 1ca 10n •.', The fundamental weakness was within,Social
Democracy as the leadership could not avoid betraying its own
;,..
policies and incurring the uncontrollable wrath of .the left.
1.3.6. The riqht counter-attacks: divisions within Social Democracy
deepen: §mpral starts to formul~te a new programmatic position
and strategy for the left.
,Tusar, increasingly aware that he faced defeat at.the party's
forthcoming congress, used. constitutionally dubious means to alter
the composition of the delegates. Even this seemed hopeless so the.~.
Social Democrats withdrew from the government and Tusar successfililly
advocatod tho creation of a "government of officials" excluding all
parties and he~ded by the conservative former Austrian civil servant
~ern1.The Qovernment, formed on.15/9/20, had no programme and was
intended only to guarantee 1I1aw and order". Parliamentary support
was ensured by secret negotiations among the leaders of the fIve main
Czech parties which gradually evolved into the lasting institution
know,",as the flpetka"(the five) whereby backs taqe menauvrdnqs could
ensure,the outcome of parliamentarydebates.80 While.in.fact happy
with this new g~vcrnment Social Democracy's former, Ministers co~ld
suddenly pose as genuine socialists again as they no longer.had.to
79Peroutka: Rudov3nl, Vol III, p.1744-1758.
80Peroutka: Rudowlnl, Vol IIIp.1937-1954 and Vol' IV,
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back words with actions81• They could also claim that there was no
longer any urgency in holding the congress as the central issue 'of
dispute participation in the coalition had been resolved.
The left was at first taken by surprise by this initiative but
soon realised the need to hold the congress even without the right.
This took place on 25-28/9/20 and was successful in attracting the
great majority of the previously ~cted delegates after which division
'ii'
congress, however, was to formulate definite policies as
into two seperate parties was inevitable.
could no longer survive o~ little more than opposition to the right.
This onerous task was taken up by ~meral whose lengthy speech domin-
ated the proceedngs. He saw the need to bring together individual
"policies towards social change, the Czeduslovak state and
.,. .I:
revolution into one coherent whole. He had to answer the central
point in the right's argument which was that the "methods" of the
'" , .Russian revolution were unsuitable for Czechoslovak conditions so
of the 21 conditions that had just been
that there was no alternative to the coalition policy; Hehad
t ,
answer arguments not only From the
advocated immediate affiliation to the (bm.intern
'". .
fact many delegates did support immediate affiliation to the Third
'. ... ,:.--
International but they seemed to understand its significance as no
81' ,,'e.g. Tusar clnimed to have resigned to avoid following Kerensky's
example and presented nationalisations without compensation as a
point of principle: he similarly rejected the idea of a coalition
with the bourgeoisie; Protokol XIII, p.105. See also the
resolutions on p.115 and 151.
82They were adopted a t the ['nn:: rtern' s Second Congress
and are rep rod ucedin J • De 9ras (edit 0 r ) :..;.T.:...h:.::e:.....:;C:.::o:.;.;m.::..:m.:.::u::.:.n.:.:i:;.:s:.;t:......~:.;;;;.:;.:..;.;:;:.:,;:;.;:;.:.:.:::..;;.
1919-1943 Documents, ~ol I, London, 1956, p.168-172.
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more than the clearest expression of a militant class position just
as their knowledge of the Russian revolution suggested that it's
essence had been revolutionary spontaneity: nothing was known of the
problems and preparations that preceded and surrounded it.83 As
before, attempts to relate allegiance to Soviet Hussia to foreign
policy led into the blind alley of abstract slaganising about
, , 84"world revolution" •
Against this position ~meral, having rejected the discredited
politics of the Second International, had to explain the lessons of
the Russian revolution for the Czech movement in the new situation
characterised by the creation and consolidation of the Czechoslovak
state.
~meral himself had declined an offer of a Ministerial post and
withdrew from active politics in late 1918. After an assassination
85attempt he left the country • The failure of his war-time policy
led him to a deep rethinking of his ideas and this took him to
Russia in early 1920. He met the Bolshevik leaders and tried to
learn from their ideas, while also suggesting some new thoughts of
his own. Although he was "not at once understood" on some points,
his ideas fitted with a condemnation of "left-wing communism" and
the notion that Russian revolutionary experience could be directly
applied elsewhere without reference t:. national peculiarities. This
83 '"c.f. Ceresnak: D~lnicke, p.131.
84e•g• Snci6ln! demokrat, 11/3/20, p.3.
85. . ,For an Bccountof his activities in this period see K. GGrovsk~
"Bohumlr ~meral", Revue dojin socinlismu, 1970, No.1.
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He started with a general characte~atwn of the situation
was also the view of some,B6lshevikleadersJ especially Lenin
86Radek • At the congress he could build on these thoughts from Russia.
Als~, although always accepting condemnations
unist" policies', he seemed to be resurrecting some of his
thinking only within a different framework.8?
He rejected claims that the left's aim was the destruction
arg~ing that capitalism was in very deep crisis so that, although re-
volution was not on the doorstep, conditions were
The main body of his speech answered the problems raised raised by
the emergence of the Czechoslovak state, the Russian revolutionary
example and the alternative to coalition policy.
the Czechoslovak state: instead, he accepted it as "the given base
and assumption of the class, social, revolutionary struggle"
would only be dis ruptedand delayed if nationalist~feelings
once more inflamed by borda:-.dsputes. He went on
of the existing state maintaining that militarism
.could not protect it: ultimately the only security for a small
in Central Europe was a"brotherhood of nations",which, ~meral,
was synonymous with a "United Socialist. 'States of Europe" •.',.The
applause this received indicates how strongly the
need to combine nationalism with an international perspective.
the same time, the rest of the J:BItyand of the population. were
86Soci&ln! demokr8t, 30/9/20, p.4. I~ccounts .
Lenin, Trotsky, Zino~iev and Radek were published in his bookj
Pravda 0 sov~tov'm Rusku, originally published in 1920. He seemed.
to have found considerable understanding from Radek; See Pravda, p.52-55.
87His full speech was printed in Soci&ln! demokrat, 30/9/20, p.1-5.·
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Communist Party which by then seemed to be
seemingly more convinced by &>..n~sapproach of placing faith in the
strength of the existing and victorious Western Powers. from
position followed opposition to the suppression of minorities
Czechoslovakia and the advocacy of a different idea on which to
the state: "the idea of socialism must triumph over
nationalism".
Smeral l~ughed at the suggestion that the left
"orders from .Moscowll pointing out that the Russian example
general blue print •. The Bolshevikiwere t~ be .f6110wed in
dedication, creativity and loyalty to the revolutionary 'cause but
not in the~etails of particular tactics: II •• in precisely this
question we are the only one among European states
our tactics from the start from the model tested
rades".
The principal divergences from Russian conditions were seen
the impossibility of staging an isblated revolution in
owing to its size and geographical position and
level of economic and social development so that,'unlike the
revolution, the winning of political power would be
positive)support for socialism'from the majority of the
from this followed a different approach to the creationofa
ultimate consequence of the division of Social Democracy.
revolution was depencent on events in neighbouring countries,
larly Germany, and on·winning support of the mass of~orkers;
SSfor his understanding of-the Russian revolution,See,Smeral: _
, p·164-168.
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As an alternative to acquiescence within the
seemed to be every justification to proceod cautiously. An
. - ..
could be made to udn over the whole of the two Social Democrat
parties rather than rushing to create a COIi:munistParty asasmall
as had been done in Russia and then in Hungary; Smeral believe~
the creation ofa mass Communist Party would be almost inevitable
the euphoria of national statehood receded: an
form a new party would go against this natural
'by hamper it. This, then, was an implicit justification for
policies of Communists who had resisted pressure fromMos~~~
speedy creation of a Communist Party and had worked 'within the M~J:'xist
Left. It was a ~olicy that had been followed, ~meral put it later,
"sort of instinct.ivelyI189•
proposed an action programme to ditect the party towards class
struggle. The central point was the8x~ropr{at{on of larg~~land-
holdings, banks and industrial enterprises while sm~11'er
be left, in private ownership. This, it ~as'hoped" would'
working class and unite the different nationalities ('it
to correspond to "•• the public opinion of t.he.immen~~
the working population of the
part in the conception of the social revolutionary
capitalism •• "
From this followed ~meral's careful definition of
ship of the proletariat.
a positive ~rooramma could lead to a parli~m~n ary majority
89From the Foundino Congress of the KsE in May
KSC, I. Svazek: ustavuji'ci'a stuccvac I sjezd1958, p.150. ~----~----~--------~---------------
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three socialist parties (i.e. C~ech and German Social Democracy and
the Czech National Socialists) and hence the possibility of a workers'
government. He thought, however, that "the present holders of power
in the state" would react like the leadership of Social Democracy
and try to impose a "dictatorship of the minority" once the basic
interests of the bourgeoisie were threatened. He then argued that
the workers. would have to "organise a firm gouernment, a dictatorship
·of the proletariat in the interests of the majority for the enforce-
ment of socialist aims.,,90 Although a parliamentary majority was an
essential part of this process ~meral did not see it as sufficient
on its own: he also advocated immediate preparation for that "firm
government" by establishing workers' councils. It should be added
that he never elaborated on the political form of the "dictatorship
ad the proletariatll although it was clearly counterposed to the
parliamentary system. He saw the need ultimately for a "dictator-
ship" to enable the planned use of resources for the benefit of all
and so as to "declare world war!' on hunger, misery, unemployment, and
prema ture mortality. 91
Within Smeral's general immediate perspective affiliation to
the Comintern did not seem to be important and he therefore played
the question down. It was left to Skalak to discuss the 21 conditions
and he, faced with the doubts of many delegates about them,
suggested that they were either being applied or were negotiable.
90In a speech a few months later, on 13/1/21, Smeral spoke clearly of
"agovernment of workers and small peasants of all nations" as the
first step towards this; Smeral: Historicke, p.145.
91 xSpeech to the Founding Con~ress of the KSL,
p.122-123.
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The outcome was a clear statement of intent to affiliate but no hint
92of urgency.
1.3.7. The left still fails to take the initiative. An attempt is
made to stage a general strike butjtE defeated. '
Although it proved possible to win the majority of Czech Social
Democrats with this policy, it was not possible to win over the
whole of the two Social Democrat parties or to'form a workers govern-
menta There obviously were still objective difficultie; but the left'
also weakened its chances by failing to make any serious effort to
implement their action programme. Before the congress they allowed
an attempt to force the nationalisation of the Poldina iron works in
Kladno to remain politically isolated: the workmrs delayed direct
action after empty promises that their demands would be discussed.93
After the congress too there was no real attempt to coordinate or
lead extra-parliamentary struggles or to create workers'councils out-
side Kladno. It was accepted that struggles should be kept out of
trade unions, shop stewards' committees and workshop meetings: this
left the right dominant in these bodies so that continuing working
class disconte~ ooemed to be quite seperate from the struggle for
leadership within Social Democracy.
Nevertheless, the left succeeded in organising the mqjority of
the old party within its ranks. They were weaker than the'right only
in a few places the most important of which were Ostrava,where the
working class was sharply divided on nationality lines, and Plzen
92soci&ln! demokrat, 7/10/20, p.3-4 and 15/10/20, p.Z-5.
93soci~lnr demokrat,17/6/20, p.7,and Penicka: Kladensko, p.109-111.'
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where many of the workers owned and farmed small land holdings94•
The inner-party conflict reached its climax over the property
of the formerly united party. Irrespective of legalistic niceties,
the real point was that the right used the power of the state
machine to defeat the majority of the old party's members and to
regain control of the party headquarters. The Marxist Left had no
choice but to call a general strike for which they had made no
serious preparations.
At first the response from the membership was one of confusion,
embarrassment and even a lack of enthusiasm as the first statements
from the leadership suggested that the action was only a protest
over specific events in Prague. This was part~y corrected the next
day when calls for big wage increases anrl the resignation of the
government were included to make the strike an affair of the whole
k· 1 dl f t 11· 95war ~ng c ass regar ess 0 par y a eg~ance • Nevertheless, the
strike remained confused, unco-ordinated and lacking in leadership.
It reached its,peak at different times in different parts of the
,country sometimes starting just before the leadership of the
Marxist Left called it off96. This makes it very difficult to
estimate the numbers participating and claims range between 160,000
d ·11· 97an one m~ ~on •
94Karnfk: Za ~eskoslovenskou, p.95, and V. Lastovka: St~le u boji:
KSC na Plze~sku v boji protYhladu, fasismu a valce, PlzeX, 1966,p.12.
95£!£.11/12/2~, p.1. The evening edition of the paper made the point
even clearer.
96This was particularly true in Moravia; Eerel~~k: D~lnick~, p.129
and p.131.
97e•g• Peroutka: Rudov~nr, Vol III, p.2098, and Kolejka: Revolu~n!,
p.209.
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The strike lacked any clear aim98, but it was attacked as "a
continuation of Smeral's Austrian policy,,99, an attempted putsch, or
a crazy attempt to follow "Russjan methods,,100. It was followed by
the imprisonment of 3,000 tarticipants and a tri3l of the leaders
from Kladno (including Zapotocky) where the strike had been under-
stood by some as a seizure of power • Although charged with
treason and threatened with the death sentence, they were eventually
sentenced only to short terms of imprisonment101•
1.3.8. After the failure of the general strike pressure mounts
within the left for speedy affiliation to the Comintern.
The strike should not be presented as deciding the question of
cpoll tical',;poweror of the charater of the Czechoslovak state.
A
Rather it confirmed the existing direction of the state and hence
1[]2also the division of Social Democracy • It also showed to the
left its own ~eaknesses and encouraged the search for new ideas. In
this it was a blow to ~meral's ideas too as his hope for a socialist
liti t d· t Li t i 103coa on governmen seeme qU1 e unrea1S 1C • Instead the feel-
ing grew for the speediest possible affiliation to the Comintern.
98Peroutka: Budovan!, Vol III, p.2100.
99El 11/12/20, p.2.
100£1, 12/12/20, p.1.
1010• Holub: Boj 0 ~tranu, Praha, 1971, ~.104-105.
102Reconciliation between the two wings seemed impossible as the
right was portrayed as going over to the side of open counter-
revolution; Soci.3lnl demokrat, 24/12/2U, p.1.
103This was accepted in Soci&ln! demokr~t, 24/12/2U, p.4.
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This grew naturally out of the Czech situation, but related to
a different view of how the Comintern could help from that expounded
v
by Smeral, who continued to fear "becoming a component of a great.
whole" if that meant that "decisions about us will no longer depend
on us •• ,,104 The alternative view was that, after the failure in
the general strike, it was impertinent to criticise or question the
21 conditions: implicit in this approach was the notion that re-
.volution was such a simple process that the application of "orders
from Moscow" could alone bring it about105•
The imprisoned Kladno leaders shared the belief that joining
106the Comintern would give them the line whereby "communism must win"
and there was also pressure from Slovakia for immediate acceptance
f th 21 dit· 107o e con 20ns • Mars important was pressure from the
German left which had developed differently from the Czech left. As
German Social Democracy was not in the government, divisions within
it did not develop over concrete questions of policy but rather over
theoretical issues. Moreover, the starting point for the left ~as
acceptance of the Czechoslovak state as a fact and this meant denial
of the national aspirations of the Germans. The German left was
therefor~ led to a theoretical position based on "pure" internationalism
104K• Gorovsky: "0 zalozen'! KSC draidimska konference v dubnu
1921", Revue dejin socialismu, 1968, No.3, p.444.
105e•g• the argument presented by "Jesen", Soci'ln{ demokrat,4/3/21,p.1-2.
106See their message to the cpngrGss founding the Communist Party.in
Protokoly sjezdu, p.83-87. They later denied having anything in.
common with those who ~pposed §meral; e.g. 8. H~la, Komunismus,
September -·October 1922, p.436 and 439.
107prehfad, p.117 and 118.
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within which all nationalism was rejected. In this they were trying
to eliminate from discussion disputes over the border and hence
108overcome distrust of Czech towards Germen workers: but a logical
by-product was suspicion of Smeral's cautious policy of respect for
the reality of Czech nationalism. So, after the German left had been
defeated at a party congress, they could sea no future as an independent
body and advocated the creation of an internationalist party uniting
.the various nationalities in the Czechoslovak state and.seeking the
speediest possible affiliation to the Comintern.
Smeral continued to argue against this even in May 1921, suggest-
ing that the Czech and German organisations should grow together
gradually as a premature merger might lead to a lateT bitter separa-
t. 1091.on • This view was not understood by Zinoviev and 8~la Kun in
the Comintern and, during early 1921, they applied pressure on ~meral
to hasten with the establishment of a Communist Party. They tried
direct instructions to Smeral110 and even mandated a seperate group
to form a Communist Party without him111• These attempts failed and
~meral was able to delay the Founding Congress of the KS~ from March
to May when he succeeded in. winning practically the whole of the
Marxist Left for the new party. This congress, however, excluded
Polish and German groups as Smeral continued to argue against an over-
hasty merger into one united party believing that instead the
108This is of necessity only a brief and over-simplified summary of
the complex argument in Po~arsk9: Zalofen!. See also K. Kreibich:
Tesn; domov - sir; svet, Liberec, 1968.
109protokoly sjezd8, p.140-142.
110Karnfk: "Zalozen!", p.182.
111Gorovsky: "0 zalozenI", p.444.
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K Lbi h f th elf t 1 ' d t hi 1 t bd' 113r e i lC 0 e erman e :)8 r evn ,I1S s owness 0 )e arnaq i nq
and the dispute came into the open at the Comintern's Third Congress
where Zinoviev and Kreibich asserted that ~meral was an enemy of
Bolshevism. Lenin opposed this and moderated their criticisms: he
accepted Smeral's argument that delay in forming a Communist Party
vhad been a purely tactical question but persuaded Smeral that there
was no case for further delay. The Czechoslovak delegation returned
home united and the KS~ was founded as an international party at a
congress held from 30/10/21 to 4/11/21. Smeral and Kreihich worked
closely together during the party's early years and the main left
opposition emerged independently of nationality questions.
So the Communist Party was finally formed with a membership of
around 170,000. It was at this time one of the largest sections of
the Comintern, but its membership subsequently declined fairly
steadily to a low point of barely ove~ 2U,OOO during the depression.
h i d 11 i d' 114After t at t gra ua y ncreBse agaln • Gehind theue figures
lies a more complex history than one of a party simply and directly
preparing itself for power. The difficult road that led ultimately
to a party able to take advantage of the possiblities of 1945 is
discussed in the following chapters.
112Protokoly sjezd~, p.140-142.
113He stuck to this view years later; VreitJich: 1esn9', p.289-2()0.
114r f'or 19LJreS see Skilling: "Gottwald", p.645.
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1.3.9. Summary and discussion
After its creation the Czpchoslovak' slate fairly rapidly took
shape with a comparatively liberal political regime, a capitalist
economic and social set up and a generally subordinate position for
t .
the German minority. Initial Czech working class militancy did not
conflict with support for the political leaders who seemed to have
won, and to be able to maintain, independent statehood. Their
strategy, as worked out particularly by Benes, was to win favour with
France as the best guarantee against a revival of Germany or Austria-
Hungary.
The Social Democrats had to accomodate to the new situation of
a Czechoslovak state containing large national minorities, surrounded
by potentially hostile neighbours and able to expect protection from
the West. In practice they participated in the government and
could ensure the implementation of some reforms. Despite great
electoral strsngththey could not, because of the interhational
situation and their.~own failings, relate the fact of Czech national
success to their socialist aims. It was this that led.to a gradual
split ,with the right unable to add any thing SUbstantive tol"lasaryk's
ideas and the left convincing its8lf that nationalist euphoria
would recede and give way to demands for socialism. It was obvious
that socialist revolution was not immediately imminent and there was
therefore no attempt tc create a Communist Party outwith the existing
Social Democrat organisations.
By mid-1920 divisions within Social Democracy had deepened and
threatened the viability of the coalition government., The right-
wing Social Democrat ministers lherefore resigned from the government
and allowed the appointment of a "goVf"rnment of officials" ll1hi(huas
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,
intended to ensure "orderll• This was followed by the definitive
splitting ~f'Cze~h Social Democracy and the ~8feat of the left in a
,
gen~ral strike in December 1920. Shortly afterwards the Communist
Party was formed by a merger of the left-wings of Social Democratic
~.
.parties of the various nation~'lities of the 'Czechoslovak'state.
. . (,"
The history of the creation of this new party was "the history_)(
;. ~..~ :~
of the failure of the old Social Democratic parties. It had,
the old Social Deomocracy to the concrete problems confronting
•however,-ifit was to be successful, to present better ~nswers
.Czechoslovak'state. A real beginning towards this was made by
within the left-wing of Social Democracy in September 1920.
. . nationsargued that ultimately only fr1endship between could ensure the
1\ . .
others in the loft had a less sophisticated
Already by
of the Czech nation. B8ne~ls strategy of Czech national
and reliance on tho West, ha believed, would
not lead the party into decisive, conscious
a serious effort to answer the dominant
. .
His reasoned internationalism led him naturally towards
which he hoped would allow scope for the
approach and, in effect, believed that a revolution
by accepting full subordination within the Comintern.
1921 two approaches were clearly visible: they were to provide the
roots for later inner-party conflicts.
Even if ~merallsstrategy had been fully accepted and implemented
'within the new party, it would piohably not have been accepted by
majority of the Czechoslovak people. It still owed a great deal
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to his war-time ideas which had been superS8d~d by the creation of
the Czechoslovak state. He still underestimated the strength and
permanence of Czech nationalist feolings.
The Communist Party, despite its size, was therefore isolated
from the mainstream of political life and this ~meral saw as a
serious weakness. The next chapter shows how he tried to overcome
that but how he was restricted by the "left" within the party and
ultimately by the comintern.
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CHAPTER 4: THE 1921-1924 PERIOD: ~MERAL'S LEADERSHIP
1.4.1. The roots of conflicts within the Communist Party and the
"left's" attitude tOLJards Smera.l and the Comintern.
Even if agreement had ueon reached on the formation of a single
united C08munist Party, this did not prevent sharp internal conflicts
over the following y~ars.The main protagonists were ~meral, who
was backed up by Kreibich and ZapotockY,who became the party's
his
General Secretary' afterArelease from prison in 1922, and Jllek who
was the party's first General Secretary from Novemuer 1921 until
February 1922. ,At the time of the party's foundation JIlek and his
6upport~rs' held a majority in the leadership. In,September 1922
the balance of strength had changed and Jilek was expelled. He
appealed against this to the Comintern Executive and his case was
. 1supported even though his actual political position was to be con-
demned at the Comintern's Fourth Congress.
This was the bed inning rather than the end of damaging strife
within the KS~. All sorts of explanations have been provided for
this phenomenon which was general to the Comintern but particularly
pronounced within its larger sections. Lne view is that disputes
.~.
stemmed from a clash between Moscow's hegemony and an attempt to
work within Czechoslovakia's specificity2. There is something in
this but it cannot be the fundamental explanation of the conflict:
1M• H'jek: Jednotn§ franta, Praha, 1969, p.4L, and E.H. Carr:
Socialism in One Country, Vol III, London, 1972, p.174-175.
2Thi~ view isimpHcit in R. Lu~a:"The Communist Party of Czecho-
slovakia and the Czech Resistance, 1939-1945", Slevic Review,
XXVIII, No.4, Docember 1969, p.561-563.
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as Smeral himself pointed out, there seemed to be far more criticism
of his policies at home than in the Comintern's Fifth congress3•
,Sefore that the Comintern leadership had definitely been supporting
him against the opposition. Radek put it very bluntly:"they could
not present any contrary line to Smeral's policy because that policy
4was correct" •
Within the Comintern there were attempts to argue that internal
strife might stem from the party's social base, but it was pointed
out that the KSC was one of the most solidly working class sections
5of the Comintern. Moreover, differont~tion among members seemed to
relate rather to when and how they had joined the party with post-
,war recruits tending to be more critical of Smeral6• This point was
accepted by Manuilsky who argued that those joining since the war
were not troubled by Social Democratic "survivals" but lacked'
important~xperiences while those who had been active before the
war had the converse advantages and disndvantages. He could there-
as
fore hope that they were not' irreconcilable the ideal solution
1\
, 7
would be a synthesis of the two •
, More convincing was ~meralts own explanation.
';Radek pointod
.". .:_ "Dut that the opposition to Smeral was entirely neoative inform.
'~meral himself was "without question the most solJer and f er-siqht.ed
stran ~eskoslovenska
4' 'Komunismus, July 1922, p.327.
5 'e.g.Manuilsky, Protokol II., p.15.





leader of Czech communism" but precisely this was interpreted as
a lack of revolutionary enthusiasmS. This was expanded by ~mera]
who emphasised that the doubts about his policies went far luider than
just the leading oppositionists whose arguments could easily be
refuted., Alongside them were many more who took those arguments
seriously or showed some measure of distrust towards the party's
leadership. Their attitude followed from a natural fear, following
their previous disillusionment with the reformist leaders, that the
KS~ leadership might not also be tending towards opportunism and
away from a revolutionary communist policy. Suspicions were aroused
as, having been saved for political life precisely by emphasising
the revolutionary nature of the period9, they saw Communist Parties
accepting a more defensive role and turning attention to the day to
day "seemingly non-revolutionary" demands of the working class.
from this, ~meral argued, stemmed a decline in the authority of the
leadership, a spirit of opposition and the generation of primitive
, 10views on Communist tactics •
So it seems quite natural that, with the Communist movement so
young and optimistic, critics of Smeral's line had plenty of attentive
listeners. Rather than two clearly defined lines within the party
based,on careful analyses of the situation there seems to have been
8 . ' J 1 1"22 327Komunlsmus, u y ~ ,p. •
9This could apply even more to those introduced to political life in
the post-war years. They were most Iiiely to expect very rr.p i.dchanqe o,
rvn!ho f~jn~ho s 'ezdu Komunistick~ stran ~eskoalov8nska
2 23, Praha, 1923, p.5>'. For a simialr view see (Vi. Haj8L:
~1I..LK-"'p-r-o-b~l~e-m~u---leviCattvIv I<omunisticks i ternac Lone l.e",
pflspivky k d~Jinam KSt, 1955, No.5.
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only one serious line which was being developed by Smeral and is
discussed later. The alternative, based on optimism curiously fused
with suspicion rather than analysis, could go along with every form
of discontent within the party11. It seemed to be united by a
completely negative attitude towards ~meral and, perhaps most
important of all, a desire "to demonstrate that they are better and
more solid communists than ~meral: 'and they want to show it particu-
larly to ~eople abroad,,12. This naturally included attempts to show
that Smeral had opposed the creation of the KSC and had always been
'.. 13hostile to the Comintern , and was even backed up with allegations
that §meral' had negotiated wi th ~vehla to Join a coaH tion government 14.
1\
", St~rting from this attit'Xu~e toaar ds Smeral, the left opposition
c'o~ld evolve some more general ideas, although they were rarely if
ever stated explicitly. The first was its understanding of what the
• ', .... ' .'" .>' ' .~Comintern was. This followed directly from the opposition that had
emerged in early 1921. The fundamental problem of revolutionary
~trategy in Czechoslovak~a, ·it seemed to argue, was the loyalty of
.th~/leadership to the revolutionary cause. This was essentially a
vary simple problem that could be solved best of all within a central-
isad Comintern structure. This view seems to have been supported by
Zinoviev but he was not the leading figure in the Comintern after
mid-1921. By the mid-1920's, however, the left opposition was in
11This was ~meral's accusation; Protokolprvn!ho, p.46.
12Sk~lak said this at the Founding Congress in 1921; Protokoly sjezdu,
p.183.
13e.g. Neurath, Protokol II, p.40.
14protokol prvnIho, p.48-50.
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f avour again in r',oscow. fine fOCls,n, ~,oing uay beyond the scope of
this work, was probably their willingness to condemn the Trotskyist
opposition in the Sovie t Union. ~m,;ral and Kreibich \I;erecondemned
very forcefully by Zinoviev and also from within the KSt for their
. 15reluctance to do so • This did not reflect agreement with all of
Trotsky's· policies but rather approval for nadek as against Zinoviev
within the Comintern and,to judge from the arguments used, an unwil1-
ingness to intervene in the internal affairs of ot~ar parties and a
hope that in turn they would be able to develop their own policies
without direct interference.
A second aspect of the left's position was the desire~to pro-
claim the uniqueness and purity of the Communist Party, again without
reference to the concrete situation in Cz£,choslovakia. This could
be seen in references to the need for a "military - political"
party with the rigid discipline of a well trained army as opposed to
16the developing mass party • Similarly, there was no interest in
maintaining united trade unions. Rather I in the docisiveperiod in
1921 when the KS~ could possibly have won a majority there, the most
.•
important Communist trade union leaders were ignoring any attempts
to win ov~r the whole movement and preferred to concentrate on
purely Communist unions. In this, Jilek, .with a majority ovar
17Smeral in tha party's Executive Commit.sE, q.ve support •
15Protokol II, p.6. See also Neurath's accusations, PrntrJlwl II, p.5i •
. (
16J.llek, Komunismus, 1/12/21, p.37 •.
17V• Dub sky ; KSC a odborov8 hnut.! v Ceskos.1ovinsku na pocatku
dvac&tich let, Praha, 1966, p.93-95.
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1.4.2. ~meral develops his earlier ideas into a strategy for the KS~.
vSmeral himself never held a position in the party above an
ordinary place on the Executive Committee. Nevertheless, there is
no d?ubting his dominance in evolving the party's strategy under
the difficult conditions created by the continual blanket criticisms
from the'left opposition which were aimed primarily against him
personally. At the same time, he was helped by the Comintern leader-
ship and particularly Radek who seems to have had much in common
with ~meral. There was as yet no complete subordination within the
Comintern and ~meral seems to have seen its' role as at most a
guiding force helping the KSC to find solutions to Czechoslovakia's
partic~lar problems.
The key point" however, was that ~meral did not believe that a
revolution in Czechoslovakia was on the immediate agenda. At times
he seemed slmost'to be waiting for the expected German revolution as,
. 18the key to change inside Czechoslovakia • At other times he clearly
stated that capitalism was not about to collapse: "•• We are stand-
ingin the middle of a long drawn out process of decay rather than in
front of an immediate catastrophe • • • we cannot say that the
tendency is only for worsening: there are also noticeable signs of
a certain partial improvement,,19. from this analysis of the situation
he could not conclude either that the revolution would be so simple
a task as to require no more than the desire to achieve it as seemed
to be the view of the opposition. Instead, he often repeated his
18~ 27/2/21, p.3,and Protokoly sjezd~, p.124.
19 'ProtokolysjezdO, p.127.
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view that it was several years away and this meant that he had to·
confront the concrete immediate problems facing Czechoslovakia
then to relate them to a possible means of transition to socialism.
1.4.3. Smeral tries to confront the problem of the security of
the Czechoslovak state.
The first real problem was, as in 1918, the security of tha
. '
Czechoslovak state which was threatened again in October 1921. by
attempted Habsburg restoration in Budapest.
Minister at the time, called for a mobilisation
went remarkably smoothly but in fact came after the attempted
restoration had failed20• This incident presented a real problem
Smeral who was unprepared for a situation in which ~ right-wing
governments should emerge in the surrounding states rather than
socialist revolutions: it was no longer a question of accepting the
Czechoslovak state as a fact, it had to be actively supported or
opposed.
Smeral and Kreibich, without time to consult the rest of the
leadership, decided to support the mobilisation.
with careful arguments emphasising that a socialist revolution was
not immediately possible so that the real
Bene~ was to stand idly by thereby tacitly supporting the Habsburg
restoration and also isolating themselves from the mass of the people21~
The opposition's position was to "utilise the chaos a~d war
20peroutka: 8udovanf, Vol IV, p.2415-2429.
21... . h r· . G f 0 t b N bSmeral's speech at t e ~erg~ng ongress 0 c oer- ovem er
Protokoly sjezdu, p.363-380.
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free the road to socialist revolutioll which DIone can really solve
the organisation of Eur-opean relaUons,,22. The extent of the
differences between these two approaches could for a time be masked
as the danger passed so quickly and the ~arty could be reunited
essentially around the left's position.23
There were atte~pts from those close to Smeral to find a
solution to this dilemma. "hraft for a party pro!Jramme mentioned
i
the need to help defend the Czechoslovak state in the event of a
"monarchist or fascist reaction in Germany or Hungary, during which
the KS~ will fight together with the bourgeois government of the ~SR
but will retain its independence and expose the imperialist aims of
its government". This was still linked with Geemingly opposite
11 Itt ttl f li t . t .. 1 ,,24 b t .tca s 0 accen ua e c ass con lC s •• ln 0 C1Vl. war ,u 1·
was definitely an advance on the party's First Congress of February
1923 which had simply condemned the Versailles system and called for
25a revolution over the whole of Europe • r',oreover,it was only Cl
short step to argue definitely for the Czechoslovak state which was.
extremely rare among Czech Communists. Perhaps the most explicit was
~verma who described the creation of the new state as " a necessary
transitional stage on the long and tortuous road to the final victury
,,26 .of the proletariat in the Czech nation Even he, hQ..9lJer,did
22J• Haken, Komunista 28/1CJ/21, p.::.' and VajLiJ(m)r, I'rotokoly sjezdJ,
p.411-417.
23protokoly sjezd~, p.4811 and [leroutka: I udovanI , Vo] IV, p.2434.
24Komunismus 4/10/23, p.393.
25Protokol prvn!ho, p.11.
26Komunisticka revue 15/4/24, p.1fl6.
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problem of national minoriti2s had to be t~ckled. At first it was
not argue that the significant expansion of democratic rights in.
new state indicated that indo pendent statehood had
progressive step.
There was also an attempt to find an
the Czechoslovak state related to the idea of a workers'
which is discussed below. As this involved setting aims
ing an international support prior toa
argued that this could be Soviet Russia which he thoU9ht:J~~
ily stronqe r than many believed and could also provide' ~'welc()'me
market for Czechoslovakia's industrial gOOds27•
1.4.4. The I<S~is still cautious on the~tionaJitiesquestjon.
Also, if theCzochoslovak state was to be taken seriously,the
sU9gosted that cultural and linguistic rights should be advocated
but that teritorial autonomy would be contrary Lo the needs of
. t i f" 28admlnistra Ive e flclen~y ~ This attitude was changed and
was directed to acompletoly new nationality problem by the
a conservative Cntholic nationalism in Slovakia represented by
.party (the HSL' S - tho l+lLnka Slovak fleoples' Par ty).
The strength of thoCCltholic church in Slovakia cannot
explain tho crystallisation and gruwth of this form of slov~k
-. I
nationalium particularly as
successful in Slovakia. Two additional important points were
unsatisfied social dem3nds of the Slovnk people
27
"
.r,omunlsmus, Apr il - f'ioy 1922, p , 2i~5-211.
28" ."ornunlsmus, 4/10/23, p.3GU-382.
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being expressed in nationalist terms2~ and the conscious intervention
into the political arena by the backward lookinG chutch hierarchy.
They saw the liberalism of the Pra~ue government as leaving the way
clear for dangerous revolutionaries and saw it as their mission to
combat this. Towards this end they demagogically exploited the
first disappointments with liberalism and Social Democracy to encour-
age anti-Czech nationalism30• They were loyal to the Czechoslovak ~
state but their political philosophy later led them to cite Poland,
Germany and Italy as examples to be followed in their policies
31towards Communists and they wanted Czechoslovakia to join "the
anti-Communist front of nations which are guided by Christian
32principles" • At first, however, their demand was just for Slovak
autonomy on terms that Masaryk had accepted in the USA in May 191833
but which had not even been included in the constitution.
Kreibich pointed to the importance of this Slovak nationalism
as, once Slovak ~ationhood was accepted and the concept of a single
Czechoslovak~nation rejected, there would no longer be any single
nationality with a majority in the Czechoslovak state. Czechoslovakia
. . 34would therefore have to be seen as a "stat.e of nationalities" •
29e.g. the response to the depression in Slovakia uiscussed by
V.S. Mamatey in V.S. Mamatey and R. Lu!a: A History of the
Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948, r:rinceton, 1973.
30Sse J. Kramer: Slovensk~ autonomistick~ hnutie v rokoch 1918-1929,
Bratislava, 1962. This is a surprisingly serious study for the time
with an English summary.
31 Prehl'ad, p.202.
32J• Lettriclt: History of r'jl:dernSlovakia, London, 1956, p.SO.
33For the text of this 50 called Jlitts:urg Agreement sae- I ettrich:
History, p.289-290.
34Komunisticki revue 1/7/24, p.321-322.
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Although welcoming this, he saw the need to take the wind out of the
sails of the clerical nationalists in Slovakia and of the Nazis in
German areas, He therefore proposed ~tJandonment of administrative
t l' t' 35cen ra ~sa ~on • He emphasised that his proposals for autonomy
were not national but territorial as lIungarians would gain too: he
no
in fact made mention of such abstract principles as the rights of
1\
nations to self determination.
1.4.5. The united front and worters' governmont. 5meral's position
is strennthened by support frem the Comintern leadership.
Smeral and his associates were h8sitant and cautious in their
ideas on the Czechoslovak state and on nationality questions. They
rarely went beyond abstract generalisations. This was not true of
their ideas on the tactical approach to the Czech working class
within a stable parliamentary democracy. In this ~meral was very
willing to develop on the Comintern's line in the period of Radek's
dominance.
"Smeral had~alreadY'at the Founding Congress of the KSt, seon
the splitting of the old Social Democracy not as a positive step in
that it led to the creation of a Communist. Party but rather as a
regrettable event which cut off direct access to those ~iorkers who
went with the right-wing36• He naturally wanted to find a way to
l&-8stablish contact and made vaqun refarances to achieving this
through a united front with working clnss eJements among ~ational
35Komunistick~ revue 1/7/24, p.326 2nd 331.
36 ~ 11Protokoly sjezdu, p.1 •
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Socialists, Agrarians and Catholics37•
'_ -. ., .. '~ ',. ,.' '.
This could be, expressed',;.;';,';,\;,
g;,: 'j~':.",,:;y?;,:1·.:<·':"t':: '. ,,,;J:,;{;" ~;-' 1: ;·,_~\.l·<T;,:·.:~
-~.. ;:,' s ;>
more definitely and more forcefully when the Comintern itsel~'::'>:;;;>
i;';'- S ,:-:.' : ;Y', ."_? __,: """~'~'~:<~:;, ,:}r<;:.,k:~'-
advocated the creation of a united front around basicanti~capital~:',
, . •....•.;;"', ,t":;~C:.;((!i',i":,:,t,:;;'e
ist demands of the working class. This wastoinvolveapproaches~;?
J';." ; """,' /':" ~. >'.:~'.'
to the lead~rships of Social Democrat organisations as,~~'~'~i.;~~br}:
·<,.,},'.·;t·";'W,;~;(\~:y·",,;r;~:~;:'"
been done in Germany although it was believed to' be, ~'almost,a" rule'~,,':
'""" ;},"",: ~~t;.,\;';,,(};;;;)~{;~'iI~;?~:'l,Hi 'i;
that the right-wing socialists would be exposed by' theirJown'unwill-:
,'.,,'?>/ .',;":'.';'!J;,,?·{."iij~~.\;,,:«,;~rt3~'
.Lnqnes s to cooperate with Communists even on,themost'basic,:issues",
'," ,',' "y, ",' '~;';-'.:,'/ '.~J.},;;'t.
The economic situ. tion seemed to Jus tH¥i~~i.; P\~~.~c~t·.1'¢">'Fii




Smeral therefore proposed to the Executive Committee on
'(I
crisis with considerable unempJoyment and employers attempting to
5/1/22 that an attempt should be made to establish a united front
d t . 39aroun hese lssues • Shortly after this J!lek was demoted and
Smeral won a narrow majority. I' I,This gave scope for furthe~
tion of the idea of the united front.
Thers were always doubts about whether the policy was understood~,
_'.,'; :;..... ,'
purely as a "tactic", i.e. Just a means to expose
whether the united front was intended to become a
./ }-,::_}.~,~';t:
answer was to argue that if Social Democracy'agreed to cooperate' on: '~,>
A '
., ,,':-.~ .:~,-)!',:,:./~·1\-:J:"··-:~t<f'
the terms he laid down then both sides of the agreement';;woufd :be'net'it ;;-,
. '~ -, -',. "~'."" -c, .;;-);
,~ ":'.,,.~
if not, then indeed Social Democracy would bs exposed as' betr!3Yi~g·1.,,:;:}·";
37 c .Protokoly sjezdu,p.132.
38Surian's report from the Cumin tern 's Third Congress quoting' tha'·,;:.}'·'·?\ . '~",'
arguments presented by f'lad€lk, Trotsky and Lenin, Protokoly'sJezdB, p'.317 ..,;;,;
{~.".: ," .•<~ :.~.,;~.\,. ~_:1,~:r
39V• Dubsky: "Utvaren! politicks linie KSC v obdob! smeralova':veden!n ~
Pr r s pev ky k de J ina m KSe, 1%7, no. 5 , p • 665 • :;' <,
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4Uthe workers' interests • Within the KS~ there were diverse answers
with some essentially rejec t i uq the idea of even the most transient
unity. Others preseMted the united front as essentially by-passing
existing reformist organisations and creating factory councils as
f .t 41new organs 0 working class unl y • ~meral~ however, understood the
united front as aiming for unity between parties within a parlia-
mentary democracy and proved this by elaborating on the idea to give
it more definite aims.
The immediate opportunity was an engineering strike in Prague
in May 1922. Previously these workers had been regarded as a
bastion of reformism but 30,000 struck after the employers contravened
a previous contract and demanded a 25% wa~e reduction. Communists
gained in prestige and influence and pressure from shop stewards
forcad tha offical leadership to call for an expansion of the strike:
this culminated in a one day general stoppage in Prayue. Ultirmtely
the strike was ended by a compromise agreement although the majority
42of workers were opposed to its acceptance •
This did not lead to the creation of lasting grass roots organ-
isations of a united front43 but it did greatly strengthen the left,
led by Urbenskg, within the National Socialists. The party's leader-
ship even declared its support for the s trike and then entered dis-
cussion with the I(SCon the possibility of leaving the existing
40At a meeting with the leaders of the S~cond International in Berlin,
2-5/4/22, quoted in Hajek: Jednotna, p.36-37.
41e•g• J. Dolezal, Komunismus, 1/1/22, p.1, and S. Ruda , KomunismlJS,
28/11/23, p.474.
42 , vOubsky: !2£, p.118-123.
43S• Ruda, Komunismus, 1/6/23, p.2G2.
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coalition if a feasible allernative could be proposed44• Although
shortly afterwards the left was expelled from the National Socialist
Party45, ~meral was led to propose the notion of a workers' govern-
ment at a plenum of the Comintern's Executive in June 1922. He saw
this as a means of transition between the demands presented by the
united front and the dictatorship of the proletariat46• This fitted
in with ideas developing elsewhere in the Comintern, particularly
Germany, and ~meral expressed the view that a workers' government
was "very probable" there and also in Czechoslovakia47•
~meral was still cautious about the possibilities emphasising
that a workers' government would be "no real strength on which we
could count for the implementation of significant measures against
o~nership and the economic order". He characterised it as no more
than "an interesting phenomenon" with "definitely a great influence
. " . "48on the subjective maturity of workers 1n Czechoslovakia • He
expandedo~this at the party's first Congress in february 1923 by
Iafe:r:1ng10 it'S workers I government not as a synonym for the dictator-.
ship of the proletariat but rather as an attempt to carry out a
working class policy within the framework of bourgeois democracy
44M• Kllr: "Ihoha B. ~merala pH vypr-acovanf strCltegicko-takticke
orientace KSf", Pfrsp~vky k dijinam KS~, 1965, No.1., p.12.
45 They continued to exist for a time as an independent force but
ultimately merged into the KSC; V. Friodich, Komunismus, 15/4/23,
p.134-137, and J. Mo~na: "Vyvoj centrismu v ~esk8m d~lnick~m hnut!
na po~~tku 20.1et," £f!sp~vky k d~jinam KS~, 1~67, No.5., p.74D.
46, "-KI~r: "Dloha", p.13.
47Komunismus, August 1922, p.37B.
48 .Komunismus, August 1922, p.37b.
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,~9and with the proletarian mass movelllent •
In the following months the idea of a wurkers' government was
taken ever more seriously with more attention to working out the
concrete details of what it could mean in Czechoslovakia. Zapotocky
pointed to the urgency of this because he believed it to be an
imminent possibility50. This was followed by articles recognising
the enormous complexities of the economic tasks that would confront
a workers' government and hence the impossibility of achieving every-
thing by one revolutionary act. Instead a process of "revolutionary
evolution" was visualised during which the government would announce
measures from above while factory councils would implement them and
control production. It was left open when the decisive struggle for
: 51power would arise •
I.4.6. ~maral's hopes for socialist unity prove unrealistic both
because of the unwillingness of the other socialist parties
to un!l:tewith the Communists and because the Comintern begins
to change its approach.
The KSC could go nd further than this in developing its own
conception of a road to socialism. Its ideas were still very fluid
and there was plenty of scope for debate, clarification and further
development. From the autumn of 1923, however, Zinoviev gained
greater influence within the Comintern and started to play down the
49Protokol prvn!ho, p.12.
50At the Comintern Executive on 14/6/23, quoted by V. Dubsky:
"utvaren! politicks linie KSC v obdob I smeralo:a veden!", PHspevky
k d~Jinam KSC, 1967, No.6, p.831-832.
51J• Choraz, Komunismus, 15/8/23 and 4/9/23. ~ee also the draft
for a party programme in Komunismus, 4/10/23, p.391-393.
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significance of the concept of the ucrkers ! government. At the
same time, Smera l' s posl tion within tt1EJK~)t was weakened hy the
adamant refusal of the gov:rnment socialist parties to contemplate
leaving the existing coalition. This meant that talk of a workers'
government inevitably retained the appearance of abstract sloganising.
The Social Democrats had re-entered a coalition in 1922 having
shown no serious opposition to the governments of officials before
that. They had indulged in a great deal of talk about socialisation
but only in the context of general and programmatic statements where
52
it did not worry capitalists at all • At the seme time they were
regaining their self confidence after a victory in the trade union
movement which was achieved often by clcarly undemocratic means53
including a thorough purge of the unions in the engineering industry
after the important strike in Prague in 192254• This proved to be an
extremely important success for the Social Democrats as Communists
were never able to establish viable rival trade uniors. They lacked
experience in such work, and, more importantly, regarded it as
entirely subsidiary to political struggles. They therefore created
a highly centralised union organisation suitable rather for calling
a revolution than for the day to doy defence of workers' interests.
55This weakness was fully exp loi ted by the Socj_al Dernocrats •
In general,relations between the two parLius were dominated ly
52 Peroutka: Budovanl, Vol IV, p.2349.
53 .-Dubsky:
54 .,Dubsky:
vKSC--' p.g? and p.1D?-1[,9.
KSC-' p.123 and p.126.
55 L I' KC-Cv 132 11::r]Du's<y,~,P. -:J'-.
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extreme bitterness and a mutual expectation that the other one would
soon collapse and therefore did not need to be considered in long-
, 56
term plans • The Social Democrats became ~ committed to partici-
pation in the existing coalition.' This was said to be only a
tadacal questionS7, but in practice they never challenged the right-
wing dominance within the coalition. They still seemed to have no
interest in seeking any alternative to the existing coalition and
accepted effective subordination within it. They opposed any idea
that could involve using extra-parliamentary strength as a counter
to the right~ backing from big businessS8• They still claimed to be
loyal to the principle of class struggle but in practice never
showed any desire to join with Communists in leading any such
struggles. Instead they placed great emphasis on what divided them
from the Communists and, alongside an extremely distorted presentation
of the Communists' united front policy, they vigorously took up the
defence of those persecuted in the USSR. This was obviously an
embarrassing point for the KSC but was combined with sweeping condem-
nations of the Soviet regime culminating in its characterisation as
absolutely nothing more than a brutal dictators~ip59.
56e.g. references to "the period of definitive disruption" of Social
Democracy, H~la and Van~k, Komunismus, September - October 1922,
p.432. From the other side was the counterposition of "the decline
of communism" to "the new, great and imposing rise of Social
Democracy", Protokol XIV fadneho s '8zdu ceskoslovenske socialne
demokraticke stran delnicke 19-22 2 1924, Praha, 1924, p.59.
57A• Meissner, Protokol XIV, p.38.
58 . ~., k'" , 1 "d k' v ~ ..Z, Hrad1l~k: "Ceskoslovens a SOC1a n! emo raC1e a zmocnovac~ zakon
v race 1933", Pf{sp~vky k d~jin~m KSC, 1967, No.1, p.29-30.
59Protokol XV sJezdu ~eskoslovenske soci'ln~ demokraticke strany
a~lnick~ v Praze 1927, Praha, 1927, p.1? See also Protokol XIV,p.49-50.
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This does not mean trial the :..,ocialUemocrats or the National
Socialists made no difference to the ~overnment's policies by part-
icipating in the coalition. Rather they defended the status quo
against ~ alternatives both a shift to the right and a shift
to the left60• Apart from a short spell from 1926-1929 they were
permanent features in the coalition but still made no attempt to use
those positions to press for the socialist changes advocated in
their programmes.
1.4.7. Summary and discussion
The early years of the KSC were a period of searching for now
ideas on which to base the party's policy. It found itself shut
off from the actual centres of power and also from the other Czech
socialist parties which were content to re-enter a coalition with
the right-wing parties. It had to reconcile itself to the continuing
consolidation of the Czechoslovak state plus the lasting possibility
of an external threat ••
Divisions within the party must have roduced its.general
attractiveness while also hampering its ahility to work out and
practise definite policies. In fact, the "Jc f t " seomed unaware of
the need to confront Czechoslovakia's concrete problems and concen-
trated instead on attacking ~meral who was trying to develop a
serious revolutionary strategy. His ideas were close to those of
Rad~k and the Comintern for a time supported his concerltion of a
workers' government. ~m8ral, however, was unablo to win for the V!:t
60 )('." t . " ,c s f , J. Harna: "EaskosLcvanst.ri st rar.a socl(]lisUcl,:lve v13cle a v
par laments (1918-1922)", (:r!~3:,oslov:!rl'kyc:,sopJs hid.or icky, XX,
No.3, 1972.
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a place in the centre of political life. The two principal, funda-
mental reasons for this probably were, first, that the great majority
of the Czech people still expected national statehood to be the best
guarantee of their social interests and, secondly, that the KSC
attitude tow~rds the Czechoslovak state was still only one of tacit
acoeptancerather than firm support •
., . .Even if the KSC faced such obJectlve obstacles as to make success
impossible in thst early period, it could still have been working
out ideas in readiness for a favourable situation later. Unfort-
unately, as is shown in the next chapter, the experiences of Smeral's
.-leadership were never built upon. The KSC was never ahle to recap-
ture the level of theoretical sophistication of those discussions
on the means of transition.
Thete were still important ambiguities on ~uestions that inevit-
ably arose later. Although the means of transition evidently
involved respect for the institutional framework that had grown up
.
since 1918 - especially the parliamentary system - nothing concrete
was said about the ultimate forms of political power in a socialist
society. This was not purely an abstract question as both their
suggestions that Social Democracy might soon disintegrate and the
realities of political power in the Soviet Union could serve to
devalue offers for cooperation between parties. The KS~ nevor
clarified the role of political parties within its conception of
democracy and it was undouhtedly a u;e.si:nessLa ier that it did not
develop beyond those of Lenin's polemical pamphlots wllich pointed
only to the class nature of political power.
This, however, was nol the pri.ncLp.sl reason for the lack
of success in the early 192U's. Their wc~kncss Jay r~ther in their
understandable reluctance to embrace any particul~r single nationalism:
their very concept of a workers' government and of the alliances
they wanted to create was not to be based on the existing Czech
national development. Instead, it was to be explicitly socialist
and unreservedly inte~nationalist thereby demanding a fundamental
change in the direction of the thinking of most Czechs.
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CHAPTER 5: BOLSHEVISATION
1.5.1. Difficulties of formulating a strategy and u~iting differHnt
attitudes within the party are aggravated by Comintern
ir.tervention.
The Comintern's Fifth Congress (17/6/24 to 18/7/24) saw the
victory of Zinoviev's position and the propagation of the new slogan
of the "bolshevisation" of the Communist parties. It was made quite
clear that the slogan arose in the stru~gle against the danger of
"right opportunist" interpretations of the united front tactic'.
Radek's views were over-ruled, the~ide~ of a workers' government was
equated with the dictatorship of the proletariat and an armed uprising
was presented as the only means to reach that dictatorship2. This,
it was implied, amounted to "utilising the experience of the [lolsllevik
Party. • • in its application to the concrete situation of the given
country,,3. It looked more like a denial of thet experience part-
icularly because of its extraordinary inflexibility and also of
the preceding few years of Comintern activity.
There was ready support for Zinoviev's position within the
but is still could not win without (,reatly increased intervention
from Soviet representatives within the Lomintern. Thus at the KS~
Second Congress in late 1924, where a self criticism for "right
oppor tun.isrn''had to be made after the par t y hacj baun corrdernnadbj/
'At the fifth plenum of the CominLern'u EXBcutive, J. Osgras (odiLor):
The Communist International 1919-194:5 :iOCLJrnf'nts,\/01 11, london,
i 1960, p.189.
2Hajek: Jedndha, p.91~93.
3Zinoviev at the Rus eian CO:'ir;,uni~3Lrart.y's Fourteenth Conqr aas ;
Degras: Communist, Vol II, p.18B.
the Comintern, the most authoritative speech was made by Manuilsky.
This was, as he said, the first time t.r.a t a representative of the
Russian Party could speak at a KS~ Congress4• He did not press for
a complete victory for the left opposition but did want a great
strengthening of their position up to at least half the new Executive
. . 5Comm1ttee. There was opposition to the implication that anyLody
had the right to intervene in the Congress's conduct of eJections6,
but Smeral later explained how the Comintern's intervention "reached
,,7.. .the character of an ultimatum
Tension continued within the party between the two groups in its
8leadership and ECCI discussed its problems agMin in "'larch1925. This
time it was Stalin who produced an analysis of the party's ills.
He saw the problem in purely political terms with the party divided
into three trends. ~meral was said to be in the centre but taking
a 90ft line against the dangerous right. As his goodwill was not
questioned,the way was still clear for a compromise whereby he could
stay in the leadership~.
Following this ECCI meeting the KS~ held its Third Congress in
September 1925. Thete was a strong tenrJency there, and ECCI
4Protokol II, p.14.
5Protokol II, p.19.
6e•g• A~ z'potock;, Protokol II, p.27.
7Kommun~istichesk internatsinnal, April 1925, p.37, quoted in
V. Plevza: eskoslovensk~ ~t§tnos~ a s]ovensk~ ot~zkav politi~k8
KS~, Bratislava, 1971 t p.':'9.
8see ~meral's account at the ICL Third Conr.r ass, in Protoi<o] III
r~dneho s ezdu Komunisticl;e sLrclny i':n::;konlovRnska2Cl-28 fat! 1',:'5,
Praha, 1967 new edition;, r.120.
9Protokol III, p.131-132, and
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encouraged it, to play down internal ~issonsions in view or an
imminent general election. Calls for much stronger condemnations of
~meralt particularly from Slovak delegates10, were rejected.: Never-
thelesi, the trend was clear enough as Jilek was re-ele~tedgeneral
secretary. The, shortly after the general election in NovemBber in
which the KS~ r8~ived a creditable 13.2% of the vote which was more
than any other'socialist party, ~meralleft Czechoslovakia to work in
There were still plenty of weaknesses and unanswered
the Comintern and was followed shortly afterwards by Kreibi~h.
. . the equivalent of demotion, kept the two of them away until the
1930' s •...
. "
1.5.2. , Bolshevisation leads to an attempt by the KS~ leader";
ship to formulate new policies •
in the ideas being developed by ~meral and his associates.'
-;' ..
therefore not surprising that criticisms were made. In this new
situation, however, they amounted to a complete concdemnation of
whole approach rather than a development from and improvement on
b~~ls that he had been laying. In practice, far from overcoming
faults in the KS~ strategy, the trend was to divorce it further.from
•
th~ needs of Czechoslovak society by the underlying sectarianism
the new approach. An important example was the development of "
4 ~_ .
nationalities policy which was based on propagation of the abstract
.principl~ of the right of national Delf-determination up to separa-
tion.. This was said to be the best guarantee of the coexistence of
, . 11
nationalities within one federal state j and it led to greater
105e8 the contribution of L~onorovics of,~ilina, ~erven of Vr~tky and
also Pisek's report to EeCI after the congress in Protokol III,
p.168-169, p.173 and p.4S9 respectively.
·11 .Manuilsky, Protokol II, p.20.
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attention to the Slovak question. The KSC in Slovakia started at
an extremely low educational and ideological level': ~o that its
cadres were largely of Hungarian, German or Czech nationality: there
was a conscious policy from '923 of sending Czechs to take over from
the non-Slavonic nati~nalities13. This internal structure of the
KS~ in Slovakia, reflecting as it did the absence of any independent
Slovak socialist traditions, was inauspicious for appreciation of
the relevance of the Slovak national question.
The issue was forced by hints from the Comintern and by the
success of Hlinka's party in the 1925 general elections. Unfortunately
the Communists so grossly over-estimated their own strength as to be
unable to formulate a policy relevant to the realities and political
diversities of Slovak society14.
"Bolshevisation" was also associated with the view that the
party should broaden its activities beyond the working class. Al-
though there had been a real ~eakness in this before, condemnations
of Smeral brought no real improvement. In fact, he had repeatedly
pointed to the need to win over much of the t'intelligentsia" while
. 1Sothers had referred to the importance of winning the peasants •
In practice, not very much was done throughout the 1920's. More-
over, condemnation of ~meral's general ideas meant that approaches
to peasants had to be based on the notion of the dictatorship of
12Prehl'ad, p.13S.
'3 II:F. Beer, A. Ben~!k, B. Graca, J. Kren, V. Kural, J. ~olc: O~Jinn~
kfi!ovatka, Praha, 196~, p.23, and Plevza: ~eskoslovenska, p.91.
14Prehl'ad, p.1S4.
15e•g• Friedich, Komunismus, 1/8/23, p.283.
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the proletariat. This amounted to iynoring lhe presence and perman-
ence of non-proletarion social ~iroups or of other pol.itical trends
and had little chance of finding genuinely broad support.
Another element in "holshevisation" was attention to raising
the political level of the party generally and increasing its ability
to provide leadership in particular actions. This involved replacing
the traditional organisational structure of Social Democratic parties,
based on local branches, with a structure of factory cells;' This
corresponded to a shift in orientation away from elecLion work to
organising factory workers for the defence of their immediate intGr-
ests and then for a revolutionary u~rising.
Such an organisational structure would have been extremely use-
ful in 1920 and Zapotocky aeems to have been perfoctly willing to
accept this reorganisation f:ut wanted to take time to ensure that
it would b~ done seriously and systematically16. fie thought it
would be possible to convert the whole party into a "801shevik"
organisation and this cqntrasted with the ~usire of some, including
Slansky, to greatly reduce the size of the party down to a "pure
, 17nucleus" •
1.5.3. Stalin's trium hover Bulharin. Divisions withjn the
KS are accentuated by Cumint8: n intervention until
the party is brought to the hrin!, of d isas t.e r,
Ultimately the real lest for the p~rtyls now leud8rship was
not Just its ability to formulate gener~l pulicies but rather its
16Protokol III, p.48 and p.67.
17 Z.. , ' 1 I I "I.A. apotoc~y, Protoko ,p.'~.
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ability to make a political impact in practice. It was for a time
given plenty of scope to show its capabilities as JIlek seemed able
to master internal differences and to consolidate his authority.
Those supporting ~meral evidently could see no point in a direct
confrontation within the party which would also be a confrontation
with the Comintern. A lrrotskyist group emerged and was expelled
from the party. It did not seriously challenge the leadership
either. It made no attempt to develop Smeral's earljer ideas and
Trotskyists lat~ condemned him from a position similar to Zinoviev's18•
Those in Czechoslovakia evidently did not understand the need to
develop a policy relevant to their particular conditions and concen-
trated rather on publicising struggles within Soviet leadership
claiming that Trotsky was the "natural successor"to lenin: They
pointed to the Comintern's failures only in very general terms and
saw no need to pose an alternative pOlicy19.
Jilek, however, came under pressure through 1928 from precisely
the eame 80rt of positi?n from which he had been supported against
§meral. The stimulus was a series of abysmal failures in a number of
strikes followed by a fiasco in a "Red Day" on 6/7/28. This was
intended to demonstrate the party's revolutionary strength and
willingness to defy increasing legal restrictions. I~ failure
brought into the open once again the deep crisis within the KS~.
It seems that the JIlek leadership was ultimately bound to face such
18 .For a summary of the Trotskyist view see L. Trotsky: The First
Five Years of the Communist InternationAl, Vol I, New York, 1972,
Second Edition, p.355.
19v~stnIk komunisticke oposicp, 24/9/27, 25/10/27 and 12/11/27.
problems: it has been accused, probably with justification, of
combining bureaucratic methods and inadequate mass work with radical
phrasemongering that could only encourage impatience20•
Changes within the KS~ leadership were not based on such an
analysis. Instead they followed changes within the Comintern
generally associated with Stalin's defeat of Bukharin. This involved
a further lurch to the "left" with the failure of socialist revolu-
tion everywhere apart from the Soviet Union attributed to the
failure to eliminate the danger from the "right". This could give
grounds for optimism that, given the correct policies, there could
.0
be a revolutionary upsurge. Moreover it was claimed that capitalism,
far from becoming more stabiliseclj was in fact becoming less stable,
Retrospective support for this was provided by the world economic
21 o·
crisis but, in fact, the belief had been thatinstabllity would show
itsslf in inter-imperialist rivalries and war: nobody predicted the
22immensity of the economic crisis •
The belief that revolution was imminent was associated with a
number of further axioms. There was it was said, to be no inter-
mediate stage within the advanced capitalist countries before the
dictatorship of the proletariat and the revolution itself was to be
an armed uprising. Any united front "from above" was completely
rejected and Social Democratic parties condemned: the term "social
20 "," , "J. Koudelkova: 'Rudy den 1928', Revue dejin socialismu, 1969,
No.3, p.390-411.
21 i . I" . t ·'1 ' I j 1(e.g. Program Komun stlcce In ernaclonay a usnesenL V • s ezdu KSL,
Praha, 1931, p.59, and Outline History of the Communist International,
Moscow, 1971, p.295.
22Hajek: Jsdmma, p.144-145 and p.166.
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fascist" was gradually used to characterise them. All this was
presented as a policy of "class against class". It had, of course,
always be~n the belief of Communist Parties that their policies were
based on the principles of class strugg]e. The distinguishing feat-
ure of the policy in the -1928-1934 period was rather that it presented
capitalist society as rapidly polarising in such a way that only
Communists could represent the working class while all other political
trends were condemned together as representing the bcurgeoisie. As
the capitalist crisis was believed to be becoming more intense, so
increasingly repressive measures were being used against the re-
volutionary movement and these were said to be leading towards
fascism.
Oespite the inaccuracy of this position it could have an
appeal within the Communist movement. It included an explanatjon
for past. failures and hence an articulation for the hope that success
was imminent. Its blanket condemnation of all other political move-
ments seemed to give a ~lear and unmistakable justification for a
separate existence. It appeared to be thA sort_Df policy most in
line with the thinking of the left opposition within the KS~/which
had been SO suspicious of 5meral's attempts to work out a line which
was more complicated but more realistic Hnrl which had conflicted ~ith
their hope that a revolution could come At once.
Nevertheless, intervention From the Comintern was again essential
to ensure J!lek's defeat and then to install a new leadership. This
happened at the KS~ Fifth Cungress hold From 18/2/19 to 23/2/29.
Gottwald was elected General Secretary with partjcularly strong
support from Slovak, German and UI(r~inian areas. The new Central
Committee was largely working class dominRted by yauns and little
- 11]5 -
known individuals whc were Ql:nerally founding mombers of the party
but lacked experience in the old Social Democracy. This made it
easier for them to condemn the old leadership and ~meral in particular.
In factt from the ~arty's originQI leading group, only Z&potock~ was
still elected to the Central Committee.
Very quickly it became clear that, even if there was widespread
acceptance of at least some criticisms of JIlek's leadership,
Gottwald was not universally accepted as the answer. He was unable
to dramatically improve the party's position and was very soon
attacked from a "left" position. These attacks, parUcularly strong
in Plzen and Slovakia, were easily defeated23 as they were not
supported by the Comintern,hut there were more serious criticisms of
the leadership after the congress from B different position. Charges
were made against Gottwald for "ultra-leftism" and these were support-
ed by a number of leading trade unionists and by the majority of
party's M.P.s and senators. After sOnJe hesitatiun, perhaps becausE)
the inner-party crisis ~ooked so destructive, the Le ade rshi.p
t .l 24responded with expulsions 0 reassert lS supremacy •
Not surprisingly, there was a catastrophic drop in mem' ership
and a decline in the party's vot8 in ueneral elections on 27/10/29 to
10.2~,. Although this still indicated a significantt ody of support,
it was behind Social Democracy ~!ndcould suggest to itG enemies that
)( "d d tIt . . .f' . "25the KSL.would soon be con ;,fTlne 0 COIllP e -0 ans i.qru r.cance •
2~K. Gottwald: Spisy, II, Praha, 1~J5;, [;.20-29, Las tovaka s SUlle,
p.48 and Prehl'ad, p.171-172.
240~jiny KsE, p.266-267, and Na~e do' a, 1929, p.5S1.
25Na~e doba, 1930, p.91.
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1.5.4 The Gottwald leadership i180ins to furmulate new policies in
line with the sectarian position of the Comintern.
"Gradually, though, the KSC did reccver and cievelop new policies.
These contained grave errors but it seems impossible to completely
condemn Gottwald's leadership26. It seemed to be more competent
than its predecessor and gradually did win back a body of support.
At first, however, an application to Czechoslovakia was developed
of the Comintern's condemnation of the right deviation. It's
central theme was a denunciation of "~meralism". This involved
ascribing to ~meral many views that he never actually held so as to
prove that he represented "left social dnmocratic" ideology27. It
was also felt necessary, as it was Jilek and not Smeral who was
being defeated, to make the farfetched assertion that a bloc had
been formed with a "merging" of their two ideologies28• Un this
basis new policies were worked out towards the Czechoslovak state,
the .national minorities, the peasants and the socialist parties all
as a direct antithesis to policies ~meral was said to have advocated
.and all within the concept of "pure class strugglell and the expoctat-
. . 29ion of an early armed uprlSlng •
The KSC attitude tow:::rdsother political movements was, in line
with the Comintern, one of condemning them totally. Masaryk was
26For assessments sep. Protokol V. rar.lr-ieilo sjezdu I(omunisticke strany
CeskosJovenska 18-23 unora 1929, I·:rciha, 11)71, (new edition) p.7,
and Hajek: Jednotna, p.1S9.
27p• Reiman, Protokol V, p.66[:.
28Protokol.V, p.352.
29See Plevza: Ceskoslovensld, esp , p.1US and p.1E,-123 for this and
for discussion of developrn,-nts in S'lr.vakLa uhe re, for tho first
time, an all-Slovak KS~ or0anisatiunal structure was estai,lished.
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condemned as playing "the leading role in fascisation of the slate
30apparatus" and Social Democracy as "the main implementer of the
fascisation of the state apparatus'! and as "social fascist"31.
Despite the complete incorrectness of labelling all other
political parties as fascist there certainly was plenty of scope for
criticising Social Democracy which, after rejoining the coalition
in 1929, made no attempt to press for the implementation of its
socialist programme. In fact, a new programme was even produced
packed with strong statements of principle and proclaiming the
d f th k' It' I' t' I 32nee or e wor ~ng c ass 0 Wln po 1 ~ca power • They argued
that the fact of the economic crisis made the arguments for socialism
, '33even stronger ,but still consistently opposed any working class
actions against the dreadful social consequences of the crisis.
Having previously justified class collahoration on the grounds that
capitalism. could be stabilised, the argument seemed to be reversed:
workers and capi~ists had a harmony of interests in their aim of
, t .
Gechyne in fact argued that the worse things
•overcoming the crisis.
became, eo the more justification there would be for staying in the
government and holding on to their positions as the only defense
against fascism34•
The contradiction within their position was not exposed by the
30 ~Procram Komunisticke, p.73.
31Program Komunisticke, p.72.
32protokol XVI sjezd~ ~eskaslovensk~ 80ci&ln5 demokrAticke strany
~iHnicke v Praze 27-29/9!3[), Praha, 193[], p.182-203.
33 ",,.. 1'j 14/2/31 1 P t 1 I 12e.g. VecernJ.k Pravo IC u , or A. HarnpL, ro ako XV t p , •
34Protokol XVI ,p.43. See also HradiHik:"Ceskoslovenska", p.33.
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:'.:'Communists' b Lariko t Insu l U. to which the Suc La L Democrats responded
..by almost equating tho I<SL with f asc iam vind the Snv ia t' Union with
the fascist states35• They often preaen t.ed the I<se as opening the
way to.fascism36 and the resolution of their Sixteenth Congress
portrayed the Soviet leadership I1S facilitating th'S victory of
f'ascLs t counter-revolution 37. Cerier-aLly , howev'or; they saw'Do
icular need to answer the KS~ policios; being confr6nted'~it~ emp
insults they could respond in t;-IOSame way'b~lieving' the < KS~ t'o
disintegrating aa shown by its internal crisis an~ a smallb~t
. , ' ..' 38nificenttrickle of members across to Social Democracy • They were
only compelled to tal:c the Communists mcreseriouslywheri Communist~
Alongside blanket condemnations of other parties,
{" .1
succeeded in taU.ng the offensive
39mass movements '.
1.5.5. ~waldts leadership'shows surprising 'comp~tenca
formulating a policy for the economic crisis.
,.
try to formulate its own policies .on the".issuDs.confr~nting
:, .';
Czechoslovakia. There scorned to have been a chanqe since the
920' s with tho Czechoslovak statebecomillg more firmly estab.lish,ed
~. _<
so that the question of it possible defence
35n• Cechyn~, Protokol XVI, p.38 cnd p.42.
36A• f'i,oissner,rrotoknl XVI, p.94.
37prot~kolXVI'P.139.
3°/1• Hamp l, f;rotokol sedmnnct6ho rac1nr<hoa jubilejdho· sjezdu cs.
soci~ln~demokr2tick~ strany d~lnick~ 26 az 29. fIjna1933 ve
Sm8tanov~ s!ni Obecn!ho domuhlavn!ho m~stB Prahy,'Praha,~1D33,
p.1D-11.
3r. .~La§tovka; St5le, p.01.
"."
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Instead, the new KS~ line seemed to go te the other extreme by
4Dmaintaining that it was a fully imperialist state in its own right
with the'Czechs suppressinG the other nationalit~es. Although the
KSC was accused of wanting to dismember the Czechoslovak state and-
supporting Nazi expansionism, and that would certainly be the
implication of continued insistence on tho rights of minorities to
secede, no practically reali~blu alternative to the existing state
was posed. Kopeck~ was the most explicit defending "the right for
the joining of all parts of the German nation into one whole". He
added that this was "not at all possible on the basis of the im-
perialist expansion of German capitalism •• but only by proletarian
41revolution" • It seemed then to i~dicate renewed illusions of a
coming German revolution.
Perhaps the real point was that, for part of the population
at least, issues like the Fate of the Czechoslovak state were pushed
into the background by the acuteness of the economic crisis. This
could provide something of a social base for the new KSC line al-
though, as has been argued, its actual origins ar~ to be found
elsewhere. Nevertheless, ,tere was scope for the KSC to become
actively involved in struggles on sccial issues and Lhis helped to
shape the development of its ideas. 1his was becoming clear at its
Sixth Congress in 1931 when, rat.her than i ut t Iriq scc ialLs t revolution
on the immediate agenda, the emphasis was placed on Actually
40~meral had not been concerned with classifying CZ8cll0slovakia as
an imperialist or neD-colonial state. This became a~ important
part of Comintern thinking in the latet 192U's and a first attempt
had characterised Czechoslovakia as "politically completely
dependent on French Impa ri.eLi.am'", I-fi,to;·,olII, p.21.
41V. KopeckY:.Vlast v nehezrRcl?, ['rDhat 1931, p.24.
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organising struggles for the defense of the daily interests and
42demands of the working people • This was the meaning given to the
Comintern's policy of creating a united front "from below" whereby
..,
unorganised and organised masses could be won for the KSC policy.'
A major success in this was the movement of unemployed workers
.,
which was led effectively exclusively by the KSC around a minimum
43
demand of proper unemployment benefit to be paid for by the state •
Most oth~r parties rejected any government responsibility for the
unemployed. The Social Democrats took the safe course of minimising
comment on the demands raised but, once the movement became really
powerful, they clearly opposed any form of extra-parliamentary
activity.
G
They tended to condemn Communists for calling demonstretins,..
rather than the police who opened fire killing or wounding
. 44demonstrators • At times even they did indicate indifference
towards those workers who failed to qualify for unemployment benefit
by sneering at the Communist pre~ for becoming "the organ of the
, 45I,Inorganised", •
1.5.6. The Most miners' strike. The Communists try to adapt some
of their sectarian ideas.
The high point of the unemploY8d workers movement, possibly
the most organised in any capitalist country46, was reached in the
42 Program Komunistick6, p.80.
43K• Kotalkova: Hnutf nezamestnanych v Ceskoslovensku v Ietech 1929-1933, Praha, 1962, p.S? At the time ~enefits were paid only to
'iTi8mbersof recognised trade unions and then th union had to pay So~G.
The system had been worked out by right-wing trade union leaders in
1920; Kofalkov&: Hnutf, p.21-22.
44l1., ,5/2/31.
45A. Hampl, Prdokol XVI, p.132.
46., , ..Koralkova:llnutl, p.320.
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winter of 1931-1932 particularly in the strike hy miners in Most
47when the strikers tock up the demands of the unemployod • This
strike was of deeper significance fer Communist strategy as it
seemed to reveal both strengths and weaknesses in the party's previous
positions. The point was that among unemployed workers or even
poor peasants there was generally no other political organisation
apart from the KS~ so that it did notyresent immediate problems if
other parties were indiscriminateJy and totally condemned. Amana
employed workers the situation was different and no serious action
could be undertaken without involving the memLers of other parties
and trade unions. This meant that a more tactful approach was
requited and this could appear as a first hesitant step towards later
. ft· f . t ..t 48ldeas 0 an 1- ascls unl y • It must be emphasised that only a
beginning was made and that in some respects the experience of the
Most strike confirmed the party's sectarian lino.
The strike began on 23/3/32 against attempted sackings in one
mine. Tha Social Democrat trade unions opposed strike action from
the
f .
start butt "unde/pressure of
stoppage then spread rapidly
149the f18ople" ,gav8,tacit support.
Tha thrc,ugh the whole coalfielcJ: leader-
ship went to elcted committees dnminat~d by Communists but also
47Koralkova: Hnut!, p.260.
48r or' discussion of this see J. Pokorn!!: "K t akUC8 "tr {eiD pro t i. t (. ide"v hospod~fsk;ch toj{ch ~eskoslovensk~ho proletari~tu (1929-1932)",
Pr!spevkY k deJinam KSC, 1%4, No.1; Z. HrF,dilak: "Trign{lJoje
~eskoslovensk~ho proletQri~tu v ruce 1933 a taktika KSC",
Pr!spevkY k dejinam KSC, 1%4, r,:o.!.; Z. Hrad Ll.akt "Josnf Guttmann
_ konflikt rozumu a svcdomi",nllvU8 clejin soci;!li~;mut 19GO, r:o./q
z. Hrad~ilak: " Un the JJrocoss of tileCunstitution of the '[Juflnitive,
Form of the Communist Party of Czochus1ovakla (192~-1936)" in
Histcry of Socialism Y8ilr~nok 19613.
49pL 25/3/32._,
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and even seemed to be spreading. The government therefore decided'
'.
including Social Democrats and even Czech and German National
. i 50Social sts • The strike was still violently opposed by the Social
Democrat leaders who saw it as "an irresponsible action of Communists
, 51and Nazis" • They used the argument that the mine~s' case was just
but that a strike was unnecessary as their own government ministers
could win th~ demands 52. They even tried to sound partic~larly
radical with talk of presenting that long awaited draft for a law
nationalising all coal mining53• The strike, however, remained solid
to use repression to break the strike and succeeded in killing a
54number of miners • Finally work was resumed after the official
union leadership had negotiated a compromise. Although at first
only a few miners answered their call for a return to work the
effec~ive strike leadership cbuldsee no alternative as otherwise the
the owners, the government, the trade unions and
increa$ing section of the work-force to055,
course of the strike could seem to indicate the correctness
the miner§ wet~ "not involved only with the
coal-owners, the soldiers and the gendarmes" but that they Had "at
their backs an enemy f~r more dangerous, because more treacherous:
50p~,'_ 6/4/32,' p.2
.,.:~-,1967, p. 8-1 0 •
51£h, 2/4/32, p.1.
and z. fr~hlichovi: Mostecki st~vka 1932, Most,





The new ideas were presented to the Central Committee which met
the social fascist leaders!,,56. I: would appear also that the united
front "from below", spanning nationality and political allegiance,
had come into being. There was, howev8r, a difference: this unity
had been established by playing ~ references to "social fascists"
and by concentrating rathei on the immediate demands of the strike.
This led to certain adaptations of the KSC approach which brought it
57into closer harmony with reality while not challenging the fundamentals •
on 9-10/7/32 in a mood of optimism at the remarkahle recovery of KSC
influence in the preceding months. It was concluded from the experi-
ence particularly of the Most strike that there was hidden
This cautious and hesitant proposal fer Cl united front "from above"
revolutionary potential even within the workers influenced by
reformism but that this potential could be used only for their
gradual conversion on the basis of their own exrerience. While still
regarding the socialist leaders as agents Gf the bourgeiosie within
the workers' ranks, .the term "social fascist" was no longur under-
stood as equivalent to"n~tional fascism". Gottwald even exrressed
the view that, as a means to influence the ordinnry workers more
easily, a dialogue should be opened with thH socialist leaders.
response to von Papenls putsch in Prusci.a, Soon af te ruards , the
as well as "from below" was pubLishnd in PlJtie pr6vo on 24/7/32 in
broadening of KS~ thinking teyond ju~)t "socia]" issues and the
possibility of unity against the threat uf fascism was presented to




On 21/8/33, after Hitler's victory in Germany, the Comintern's
for which Gottwald was severely reprimanded and staged a partial,
5[3but not absolutely complete, retreat •
Political Secretariat searchingly discussed the situation in the
KSC and insisted that there be no further criticism of the KPD line.
Inside the KSC there was a hunt for and condemnation of alleged
opportunist errors and Gottwald, Sverma and Reiman made self-
criticisms. Guttmam, the Rud~ pr~vo oditor, rejected the Comintern
line and was expelled from the KS~: his application to rejoin in
mid-1934 was refused, even though he could argue that changes in
the Comintern line amounted to a recognition that he had been right.
There was some justification for the return to the "social
fascist" position as repressive laws5~, aimed and used to a certain
extent against the German fascists, were combined with i~creaing
repression of the KSC making le~al work extremely difficult. During
1933 and early 1934 there were long periods when all KSC publications
were banned, some M.p.s.were removed from parliament and the activities
of many organisations associated with tho party ue ra 'stopped. There
were discussions in respectatlle circles suggesting that dissolution
of the KSC might in the long run even .!2.:.:l£. relations with the USSfl,
now being looked to as a possiblo nlly against Hitler60•
58HradiHik: "On the Process", p.~i1-53.
59 ."... k"c.f. Hr adi Lak s "Cesl<oslovens 6".
60Nale doba, 1934, p.548.
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I.5.? Summary and discussion
In the later 1920's and early 193r's the KS~ went through a
number of important changes which stemmed from both its own internal
problems and the increasingly direct interventions from the Comintern •
...The Comintern's Fifth Congress led to the removal of Smeral and the
condemnation of his ideas: then, in the Comintern's so called "third
period", the condemnations were strengthened still further and a new
KSC leadership emerged around Gottwald. Internal strife seemed to
threaten the party with disaster and the Comintern's sectarian line,
which involved completely rejecting all other parties and advocating
an armed uprising as the means to achieve socialism~ did not allow
it to formulate ideas relevant to Czechoslova~ conditions.
This ~as a crucial formative period for the KSt as the leading
group that was eventually to take power in 1948 was created. Those
"hostile to the KSC have often tried to present the period as if it
.' ~61revealed the real essence of the KSC ,while Skilling argued that
it amounted to the destruction of the ~arty that had been created
by Smera162.' Both these views are exaggerated as ,there had been
~ery sectarian attitudes within the party before and some of ~meral's
ideas seemed to continually reappear.
There was a certain continuity in KSC history but it would be
naive to search for a simple "essence". The point was rather that
the party had set itself very ambitious hopes and aims but thon had
to reconcile them to the complex realities of Czechoslovak society.
61e.g. Zinner: Communist, Chapter 3 effectively argues this.
62Skilling: "The,Comintern", p.24?
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There was always a tendency to subordinate analysis to a simple
proclaimation of Communist identity, of exclusive loyalty to the
Communist Party and hence of opposition to all other parties. This,
in practice, meant concentrating only on advertising the aims and
led consequently to political isolation and impotence •
. There was also always a tendency to grapple with the changing
complex reality and to seek a political strategy within the existing
society. Gottwald soon began cautiously working out ideas that were
not identical to the Comintern line. later, as shown in the next
chapter, the notion reappeared of a government of socialist parties.
This, seemingly a logical step within any practical strategy, was
repeatedly condemned as a non-revolutionary p01icy. The Comintern
was decisive in ensuring its defeat and perhaps restricted the
elaboration of the idea even in later yaars Ly providing a theoretical
veneer to sectarian ideas. This proved to be a real restriction on
the ability of the KS~ to formulate theoretical concepts r81evant to
its own political practice right throuGh to 1948.
In a sense, then, 801shevisaLion was noL important primarily in
directly shaping the KsE ideas but rathlr in preverlting the develop-
ment of a more sophisticated approach. This was th8 case even in the
Popular Front period, discussed in t.henext chapter, t.uhenthe
Comintern to some extent encoLJrngcil,Gut also held in check the
"deveopment of KSC policy.
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CHAPTER 6~ THE POPULAR FRONT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
1.6.1. Attempts by Czechoslova~ia's Communists to apply and
develop the Comintern's new policy are restricted by
the Comintern leadership.
The victory and rapid'consolidation of the Nazi regime in
Germany CQuid not fail to have a deep impact on Czechoslovakia's
political life. Henlein's Sudeten German Party grew to win the
largest number of votes in the Czech lands in the elections of May
1935. Many on the right of Czech politics, especially within the
Agrarian party, looked admiringly towards Germany. Masaryk and
Benes did not share this view and sought better relations with the
USSR against possible German expansion. 'The Social Democrats
responded to the new dangers by sticking ever more firmly to their
coalition policy: given the President's opposition to a fascist
dictatorship, they maintained that it was safest to stay within
the government so as to dissuade the right from attempting to
establish fascism1•
There were also changes in the KSc following.Oimitrov's rise
to prominence in the Comintern and exposition of the Popular front
st~ategy. Gottwald was in Moscow from September 1934 after he had
been threatened with arrest on a treason charge inside Czechoslovakia
for a leaflet accusing Masaryk of working toestablis~ a fascist
dictatorship. He quickly became an enthusiastic supporter of
Dimitrov's ideas.
1e•g• The contributions by Meissner and D~rer to the Seventeenth"', ~Congress, Protokol sedrllacteho,p.53 r.nd p.6CJ.
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This left Sverma, Slansky and, from early 1935, Smeral as the
vmain architects of KSC policy. Their first attempt to apply the
more flexible approach developing in the Comintern involved a
reversion to the idea of a government of socialist parties and they
even definitely proposed this to the Social Democrats in November
1934. The government was to implement policies generally in the .;)
interests of the working class but it was left ambiguous, and
the Social Democrats picked on this as a reason for rejecting the
proposal outright, whether the government was to support and defend
the Czechoslovak state2•
Paradoxically, it was the Comintern leadership that prevented
the further development of this line. They insisted that there had
,been no retreat from "class against class" pOlicies3 and reaffirmed
that a workers' and peasants' government was synonymous with the
I
'dictatorship of the proletariat4•
The Comintern's line was further clarified by Dimitrot's speech
at the' Seventh World Congress. This needs to be interpreted care-
fully as it has often been presented as a renunciation of all past
revolutionary policies and their replacement with direct subservience
to the immediate aim of Soviet diplomacy which was to create an
international alliance against Germany and JapanS. This may have be~n
one part of the reason for the Comintern changing course but even
2Hradil&k: "On the Process", p.65.
3Hajek: Jednotna, p.240.
4Hradilak: "On the Process", p.66-G7.
5e.g. F. 8orkenau: World Communism, ~ichigan, 1962, p.386-400.
Trotsky, a major critic of the Popular Front, ultimately admitted
6that the true situation was more complex •
More realistically, it would appear that the new line emerged
·as a compromise in which advocates of the "old" position still held
influence and were willing to concede only so long as they were not
roundly condemned? It could also be left ambiguous whether the new
·poUcy represented a real change in strategy or was just a "tactical"
change i.e. an attempt to find a new and more subtle way of
"exposing" the reformist parties and hence b£ingi~g about their
deSru~tionB. Dimitrov's speech contained soma of these contradictions,
butessentiall~ it ieft·no doubt that, with tha basic aims of
.Communist Parties unchanged9, the situation required restriction to
. .
unity '''againstfascism, against the offensive of capital,against the
10threat of war, against the class enemy" • Although on the one hand
~uggesting that this should develop into a movement "steering towards
·theorganisation of a mass political strike,,11. Dimitrov also
present~d the idea of a workers' united front, broadened by'other
social strata into an anti-fClscist "Popular front", and leading to
6t• Trotsky: Writings of Leon Trotsky, (1938-1939), Second Edition,
New York, 1975, p.62.
7Hc1jek: "K problemu", p.715.
i: Bfor a thorough discussion of this see "n!sto VII Kongresu, Kominterny
", v dejinach mezinarodnIho a c:eskoslovenskeho delnickeho hnut!",
..." Pf!spevky k dejinam KS~, 1966, No.1, p.24-105.
9 .G. Dimitrov: For a United and Popular Front, Sofia, undated, p.18?
100imitrov: for a United, p.136.
110imitrov: for a United, p.140.
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a government that might be supported by Communists.
' ..
Again, even within the conception of this govern~ent, there
were signs of the contradictory idea of it being no more than a
spring-board for a revolutionary uprising. It was still denied
that there could be "a special democratic intermediate stage lying
between the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of
. 12the proletariat" • ,So the crticisms of Smeral' s ideas of the early
~These contradictions and ambiguities in the Comint~rn line
1920's still remained.
were'soon to show themselves within the KSC. The party's leaders
inside Czechoslovakia were understandably reticent to commit
selves on controversial issues like the possibilities for a
government of socialist parties. Nevertheless, they did open a
'discussion on how the new line should be applied with the hope that
-. . 13wide sections of the working class would express their views •
Socialism was not mentioned, even though Dimitrov had called on
individual'parties not to be afraid to seek new means of transition
i . 14
.to socialism , as all the emphasis was placed on the fight against
fascism and the need to defend the republic - an aim which was now
openly proclaimed.
To admit their inability to answer in advance all of Czech 0- .
slovakia's problems, and therefore to try to initiate eo wide a
o.
discussion, did indicate a major change in the Communists' approach.
12Dimitrov: Fo; a United, p.175.
13J; ~verma"Plamen 15/11/35, p.4.
14 ; 175e.g. Dimitrov: For a United, p. •
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This was also reflected in their involvement in the immediate
problems of Czechoslovak politics and, in particular, in their
support for Benes's Presidential candidacy. Masaryk had abdicated
to leave,the way open for his natural heir, but the Agrarians tried
to organise support, including Henlein's party, for an alternative
candidate. The KSC then decided to support Benes,not as part of a
definite Popular Front strategy,but rather out of fear at the dread-
.f~l consequences that could have followed Bene~sdefeat. This fitted
with Dimitrov's advice to become an active agent in political life
capable of influencing actual events.
"In fact, the KSC made a significant impression in national
politics by,aloneamong parties, taking the issue of the Presidential
el~ctions outside,the parliamentary arena. They held meetings in
ma~y parts pf the country involving other organisations. ,They defied
the~grarian controlled, Ministry of the Interior which banned all
meetings on the subject and even proposed on one occasion a one hour
15general strike • All this activity played a certain role in
disintegrating the Agrarians' right-wing bloc and in preventing the
formation of a new coalition excluding all socialist parties. It
did not, however, lead to a Popular Front government as the other
parties supporting Benes had no interest in such a chamge. Instead
the old coalition was restorod and Denes was elected by parliament ,on
, 161s/i2/35 with an enormous majority •
It is impossible to say how the KSC line could have developed
15K6na: KSC, p.135-136.
16c•f: J. Novak:"Prome~kana pHleZitost", Pr!sp~vky k dojinam KSC,
1966, No.5. p.643-681.
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from there. In February 1936, when ideas were still in a flexible
and formative state, Gottwald returned from Moscow. The partyts
forthcoming congress was delayed and he closed the discussion that
~verma and saUisky had initiated by roundly condemning their inter-
; 17retation of Comintern pol~cy • He made no mention of the Presidential
election and the political crisis that had developed around it18
and concentrated his attack on the party1s support in parliament for
parts of the budget and for strengthening the armed forces. This
had been advocated by O. Synek who claimed that the army could be
filled with "the idea of anti-fascist defencell19• Gottwald, however,
regarded this as an "opportunist"'position and ridiculed the
suggestion that an army commanded by one of Kolchak1s former generals
. ' 20could embrace genuinely anti-fascist ~deas • The criticisms were
""accepted by Slansky and Sverma but the Rude pravo editor Bud!n was
expelled from the party.
It seems that, criticism of the KS~ line originated in Moscow
"in response to sectarian elements within the Comintern and Trotskyists
who had been using the KSC as an example with which to condemn the
, 21whole Comintern line • To answer these criticisms, which Stalin's
purges suggest wera taken with the utmost seriousness by the Soviet
17RP, 13/2/36 and BP., 29/2/36 in K. Gottwald, Spisy, Vol VII, Praha,
., 1953, p.11-38andp.39-51.
18Kopecky, who h~d been in Moscow with Gottwald, evidently ~id faal
. that Benes should not have been supported and wrGngly attributed
this view to Gottwald too; V. Kopecky: ~SR a KsE, Praha, 1960, p.168.
'9ill:" 1/11/35, p.2.
20Gottwald, Spisy, VII, p.24-28.
21HradiHi'k: "On the Process", p.78-79.
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leadership, Gottwald seems to have wanted a clearer clifferentation
"bourgeois democracy".
of the party's position from Social Democracy so as to leave no
scope for the view that there had been a change to full support for
So Gottwald could probably even find some reassurances in
acusations from Social Democrats and others that he was returning
to the Ksf policy of bId and that the offer of a unjted front was
just another tactical manoeuvre22• Gottwald insisted that any new
policy would still require a fight against the reformist leaderships
as the Social Democrats, he claimed, could not be won as a whole for
23united action • This gave the opportunity for the Social Democrats
to overcome their first bewilderment al changes in the KS~ and insist
that there had really been no change at all: the aim was apparently
'11 th . f th t' 24st~ e destruct~on 0 0 er par ~es • A similar feeling of
reassurance probably replaced earlier bewilderment within the KS~
too as many Communists had been unwilling to apply the new line in
25 26practice ,but had been strangely silent before Gottwald's return •
1.6.2. Gottwald clarifies the C~JlTllliunis.t~olicyat t.heparty.·s
Seventh Congress.
The KS~ congress was finally heLr:in April 1936 and, not
surprisingly, was dominated by Gottwald's exposition of the party's
22J• Thelen, pfltomnost, 11/3/3h, p.14H-151; J. MartInek, Eh, 14/2/36,
p.1, or Nase dabs 1936, p.361.
23Gottwald: Spisy, VII, p.3U-33.
24 " ., "vCe.g. O. Berger: Nova polltlkA ;<5:, rraha, 1936, p.!I.
25Kana: KS~, p.124.
26Gottwald: Spisy, VII, p.46.
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policy. He made it clear beyond any doub t that the KSC had adopted
the
the defence of the Czecholsovak state as central aim. This no
A
longer needed to conflict with friendship with the USSR or with
support for revolutionary struggles in Europe because, .under the
actual conditions prevailing in Europe at the time, defence of the
Union was militarily more powerful than ever before and Gottwald's
republic meant opposition to Nazi expansionism. Moreover, the Soviet
faith in the Red Army was such that he could even advocate a
foreign policy of almost exclusive friendship with the USSR27.
The central them6 for domestic policy was the strengthening
of the republic's defensive capabilities. To this end Gottwald
opposed any alliance or compromise with bourgeois parties and insisted
instead on class struggle against the bourgeoisie. This was to be
conducted around four sets of demands which Gottwald claimed wero
attainable without a socialist revolution. These were; first, the
social and economic cemands of the working people of town and
country; secondly, greater democr~tic rights and freedoms; thirdly,
equal rights for the different nationalities and fourthly democrat-
28isation and purging of the army • The issuo of the KS~ conception
of democracy proved to be the most controversial and is therefore
taken last.
It was hoped that, with cnr.uqh "p res ure from be l ou" around
these demands, the government socidlist parties could be persuaded
to abandon the existing conliLion ani] f'orma government of the left,
following the examples of Fr[,nce and Spain. The desirod new align-
27 .' l(Protokol VII sjezdu '<ornlinistlL~kesirnny U3skos 1overiska, l-r-aha ,
1936, p.:54-35.
28Protokol VII, p.32-33.
ments were already emerging in a few localities as a "socialist bloc"
and the KSC hope was that they ~ould adopt clear programmes rather
than remaining little more than electoral alliances29•
Although particular demands were not outlined for the working
class it was repeatedly emphasized that economic struggles, which
the KS~ should encourage irrespective of any agreement from other
. 1 h I k . 1 di v i 30part1eS
l
CQU d e p overcome war 1n9 c ass 1V1S1ons • r'iuchof
the congress discussion was taken up with suggestions for achieving
this unity outside parliament. There was to be unity in factories31
and an effort was to be made to unite the trade unions on the basis
32of class struggle • ZapoLocky made definite criticisms of previous
KS~ policy insisting that, rather than trying always to sound the
most militant and insulting other political parties, the Communists
should try to prove themselves as the best trade unionists. Only
then could they hope to challenge the reformists' strength33•
There was plenty of discussion uf nationaliLies policy and
particularly of the German questiun. Incorporation of the German
areas into Nazi Germ~ny was still complelely rejectod: nevertheless,
it was hoped that the granting of full naLional ri~hts alongside the
other anti-fascist policies of social adv~nC8 could win the German
minority for loyalty to the ClFJchoslovak state. There was also an
29)(. ~t~tka, Protokal VII, p.157-15~.
30e.g. Protokol VII, p.153.
31Protokol VII, p.165.
32A• Zapotocky, Protokol VII, p.111-124.
33Protokol VII, esp.p.12U.
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On military policy Gottwald changed dramatically from the
attempt to formulate a clear policy for Sl8vakia; the fight against
national opprossion there was to be linked with the fight for the
34economic betterment of the working people •
Sverma leadership advocating defence of the republic, in coordination
with the Red Army, by the liquidation of the regular 3rmy which was
to be replaced by "Jacob in" defence35• So much importance was
attached to this that Communist loaders even suggested that they
would be unable to join any government that tried to strengthen the
existing armed forces as they might at some stage he used against
36the working people •
The issue of democracy was felt by Gottwald to centre on
special laws for the protection of the stAte. New po~ers had boen
introduced in 1934 and, although the cJocial {'emocrats had reaLfsed
37that they could be used against democracy ,they were accepted t,y
the government parties in the interests of strengthening the repuh.1ic.
The K5~ felt themselves to be the main sufferers particularly as
workers' p~litical freedoms were restricted in fa~tories related
, 3B
to military production •
There were also general admi.nls t r a U vc methods agains t 'the KSC
which,although not as serious 85 in 19'53 and 1934, were still being
34K. Bac!lek, Protokol VII, p.5~.
35Protokol VII, p.33.
36J S.., , I' t 21/'/'1'-' t.or: r t k 1 1/11 '117• verma ln par l.amer>' 'I..JG qUe} .or: In -TO _l.l 0 , p•..J •
37pratokal sedmnacteha, p.4S-Sfl•
38Contributions by the lUmina de leqa t.e arid by 1/. Siroky, Protoku] J!.ll,
\'\p.16C-161 and'2CB.
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supported by the other socialist parties. As an alternative the
KS~ proposed a conception of democracy that would give maximum
freedom to all who opposed fascism but would allow no compromise
with those who supported fascism.
This, of course, does not exhaust the problems surrounding the
,.Therewere·clear indications that, in so far as it had
its ideas at all, the KSC saw the Popular front as no more.than a
tactic, or as a b~ief introductory period before a socialist
revolution which was understood just the same as before - as the
exclusive affair of the KsE. Any references to a~ armed uprising
Communists' conception of democracy •. They had indicated their will-
ingness to defend the bourgeois democratic Czechoslovak republic
socialist parties still within a parliamentary framework. At;the
'a~d they advocated the creation of a new coalition government of
same time they assiduously avoided suggesting that such a government
could implement truly socialist measures and indicated considerable
distrust towards the other socialist 'parties and especially towards
, 39Banel and the so-called "left-wing of the bourgeoisie".
or the creation of soviets were enthusiastically received by the
Congress, particularly if it was suggested that they were on the
agenda for the very near future. Sverma was thunderously applauded
,for criticising his own failure to understand "that we are building
a party that has to lead an armed uprising and revolution ,in
40Czechoslovakial~, and Sl&nsk9argued that "the era of reformism is
39,e.g. Kl!ma, Protokol VII, p.?1.
40Protokol VII, p.82.
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Perhaps it was only with such rad~cal sounding phrases that
ending41". There was appLa..s e forLhl3 f ns i stcnce that defanca of
bourgeois democracy ~as onl~ a very temporary aim b~the working
class would not stop at at national defonsive war but only at the
cJef~at of both the CzechoslDvak Clnd German bourgeoisies42• In
.~.other words democracy, ot the defence against fascism, could very
v the
soon become the exclusive affair of the KSC rather than joint
"
affair of a number of parties.
the position of "sectarian dogmatism", ur.Lch simply took an automatic
analogy with the Bolsheviks' position of 1914-1~18, was reduced to so
small a size. Gotiwald answered their claim that no wsr should be
supported by pointing out that Germany was quite indjsputa~ly the
aggressor t~r8atening small nations nnlJ, above all,the U5SR43•
Even though the Popular Front in czcch6slovakia was adopted as
a policy containing ambiguities and contradjctlons with no precise
conception of what form it would tc,~(e, there can he no doubt about
the serious desire of t~e KS~ leadership to achieve some sort of~
"','Popular Front; Got t.uald anne:.ncad s ". • COnlB uha t n'ay B uni ted front
of the workers snda popular of all ll!CrUnf]peopJe must he och iave d,
Crime w~a~ may so as \0 defen~ peace, touIn road and freedom and to
<'14protect the republic against fascism" Fur t l.ar prospects, houevar ,
depended ultimately on the response fr'~1 lh8 leRders of the govern-
ment socialist parties and they remained remarkably lJnmoved.
41 Protokol VII, p.151.
42 .V. synek , Protol~ol VII, p.'7C-77.
44Protokol VII, p.243.
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1.6.3. The poeular Front in practice. The Communist Party
makes a greater political impression than before but
fails to chanoe the oovernment.
It was soon clear that, irrespective of the ambiguities in
their. pos~tion, the Communists were making enough of a political
impact to force comments from socialists and from those clos~ to
the yresident who had previously been content to dismiss them as ir~
relevant. There was a sudden spate of articles and pamphlets
trying to discredit the KS~ by guing either that it had completely
capitulated to Social Democracy and hence had no further justification
45for an independant existence • o~ that it really had not changed its
policies at al146• There was even an extraordinarily bitter attack
form Peroutka in an article that he must have later regretted, in
which he firmly rejected any thought of co-operation with Communists.
Perhaps forgetting that the world had not heen quite perfect before
November 1917, he descr ibe~ Communism as ",. • the bacillus behind
everytring that is ba~and horril)le in Eurcpe .t oday , Communists, .
if we take ~ good look,stand.at the root of all comtemporary evil,,47.
There were a very few attempts to argue with~KSf'Policy by
picking on what must at the time have appeared to be a basic contra-
diction. The Communists, it was claimed, were arguing that ". •
first of all the Czechoslovak people must be divided and only then
can its effecti~e defence ~e guaranteed •• " while the ques tion
45 ''; /e.g. P. Vilemsky, pf!tomnost, 1 6/38, p.3~f-348.




apparently had to be tIthe defence of this existing state"48.
Generally, then, none of the other parties showed any interest
in abandoning the existing coalition. The Social Democrats, al-
though willing to drop their earlier bitter attcks on the Soviet
"Union and to seek any help that could be available against Nazi
49Germany , still stuck to their policy of coalition with the
Agrarians. 8echyne, in a rare exposition of his party's assessment
of:the situation, argued that such a coalition remained the "lesser
evil". The alternative of "fierce class struggle" would, he
believe~~ force the right-wing "to threaten th~ very existence of
~ 50the state by an experiwent of,the fascist type" •
'Uninterested i~ joining with the KS~ either to implement
tradi'ti~nal socialist policies51 or to oppose the fascist threat,
the Social Democrats demanded that unity could only be achieved once
the~6mmuni~ts ~dmitt8d all their past policies to have be~n erroneous
and effectively ~~cepted in full the practice of Social Oemocracy:
n~;~bope was left for any unlty at a Loue r 'J evel - in trade union
activities OT in localiti~s -until these basic poi~t~had been
r • 52clariffud •
48 " !Pritomnost, 22/4/36, p.2!14. This was very similar to'" the Social
Democrats' argument and, although it must have appeared .to many
at the time to refute the KSC position, ten years later it could
not even be mentioned.
.4ge•g• Protokol sedrriC~, p.S1.
50Pfftomnost, 2/10/35, p.610.
51 • ',,' ' .Bechyn~ actively opposed talk of state takeovers of industry main-
C'taining that socialism would ultimately coma on its own as "a sLate
and economic necessity", r;-rlt.nmnnst, 2/11)/35, p.65().
52Cerger: ~,'p~19 and p.40,snd J. f<uudelka, PI, 16/4/36, p.1.
i
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1.6.4. The Communists develop and adapt their ideas as the
Nazi threat grows.
So, although political life was deeply affected by tha ideas of
the Popular front, thera was no move towards the desir~d changes in
this view and Gottwald in response
'government. Censorship and repressive measures against ·the
continued: from 23/10/37 all political meetings in Slovakia
banned and no direct mentions were allowed in any of the press
the danger of a German attack
1~"'.' 53:.it by KSC M.P.s •
' ..:. .
this mean that the Popular front exhausted itself:
6hange th~ir poli6ies7 Oimitrov enticised the KS~
without Agrarians as the
, 54;popularfront government • At the same
;d~veloped further and in mora detail •. '\
55tetreaton the policy of "radical social reforms" ,
fact given a more concrete shape.
to the republic become
i,"unrealisticnotion of.Jacobin defence and called
56'military training 0' the population • By ~uly,
oraganising strikes, they opposed the attempts of
. '
:53prehllad, p.234·and p.235~
54Hr~dilak IS' contribution in"~1!sto VII",'p.91-92, and Gottwald : Spisy,
VII,p.232.
55e.g. K. Gottwald: Spisy, VII~,Praha, 1953, p.157.
56V• §irok1, RP, 28/5/38.
, -
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to misuse strikes for the destruction of the republicS?
Developments in nationalities policy came mOFe quickly par tic-
ulatly with reference to Slovakia where the need for "Slovakisation"
of the party there, i.e. the training of genuine Slovak cadres,
was at last appreciated in-early 193653• The id~as from the Seventh
Congress still failed to inspire a united opposition to the growing
influence of the HSL'S,so a conference was held in Banska'8ystrica
in May 1937 to present and publicise the so-called "Plan for Economic,
Social and Cultural Advancement of Slovakia". The right of national
minorities to secede was no longer mentioned as they contained large
fascist separatist movements. Instead it was argued that Slovaks
" ," .:~ e· .' ,.
and Hungarians should support the existing Czechoslovak state along
a.s
with much of its political centralism ~un ati-fascist bastion in
Central ~uropa.
It was argued that for these national, minorities to accept and
defend,the Czechoslovak state under these terms maJor,reforms would
be needed. The central de~d was for the industrialisation of
Slovakia with the aim of attoining the same level"6fidevelopment
as the Czech lands. There was also to be a land reform based on the
distribution of_land holdings over. 50ha t~ peasants and agricultural
;, .' 59workers • The po~icy proved inade~uate to win over the Slovak
and Hungarian minorities md t.re K!"l~votedeclined in local elections
58. Prehl'ad, p.226.
s9in v.. ~iroky: la ~t'astn8"§loven5ko v socialistickom ~eskoslovensku,
Bratislava, 1952, p.R-27.
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in mid-193860:the idea was then propounded of giving autonomy ':'.
1~ such a form that political power would go·to "democratic Slovaks"61.
Even.this could do nothing against the Slovak and Hungarian separat-
ist movements of 1938.
foreign'policy 'could not remain static either particularly •
whenfthe KS~ started to link defence of Czechoslovaki~ with active S'
, .
,help in the defence of republican Spain; There was open obstruction
:of all ~orts of help, .Lnc LudLnq mere collections of mone,Y,'and Benes
- ,
'even.turned a'blind eye to arms from Czechoslovakia reaching Spanish'
;\: .,!
Czechoslovakia's prestige internationally and par'ti~~larly
German~62~ ~ The Social Democrats' behaviour was
fascists; The argument for this, pro~agat8d particul~rlyby~th~
'"",
" '\;jA~rarians but also echoed by Social Democrats, was the desire. ,
. . ",
only passing references at their Eighteenth
-struggle lIIasapparently proof that a small nation
military pressure of the fascist states •
:i~the final local elections in the 1938 the Ksf
Czech areas while the Social
for the latter it lIIas
:: .
,'per~od as they had consciously suspended pressing for their
.,
, ' ... " .. ' - ,'~.
" ' "
60 ' ., _Plevza: eeskoslovenska, p,150-151,and 8eer,et al: __~ _
all D~Jinna, p.25., t
"
.62r• Kru~!k: "Odjezdy ~s dobrovolnik~ do ~panelska 1936-1938",
) Pf!sp~vkY k d~jinam KS~, 1966, No.4, p.533-554.
~~
:". ~,' .~- ;' ~:'~i ~."',. -,' ~- (.63 ..... ". 'A. Meissner, Protokol osmnact~ho fadneho sjezdu ~eskoslovensk~
Boci~ln8 demokraticke strany delnicke 15-17Kv~tna 1937, Praha,
",1937, p.140.
",-',
~_"~"' ~ ~ ~_~1~3~4~--------- ~ ---
programmatic aims in the interests of defending the republic. With
the imminent demiso of tho republic they were left, .as a party, with
little to point to by way of aChievernents64• Seemingly aware of this
their very last appeal in local elections was that voters should
remember all the articles in which they had criticised some feature
of internal political life: they did not point to what they had ~
achieved in the past or to what they hopod to achieve in the future65 •.
The crucial change was in the,international situation.
1.6.5. Summary and discussion.
, . .
With the policy.ofthe Popular Front some
the KS~ policy of the war and post-war periods began to take shape.
The Comintern's role was both to encourage and at times to restrict
the development of KS~ ideas: the restrictions were not based on
actual assessment ~f the situation inside Czechoslovakia.
threat to Czechoslovakia could have been interpreted as proving
correctness of ~merai's earlier internationalist ideas but, instead,
.the KS~ felt it both possible and necessary to ad~ocate defence of
Czechoslovakia with Soviet help against the Nazi threat.
that this required a numher of important internal changes
a possible cDalition government of the socialist parties.
Although by seeking unity with other parties the I<S~ indicated
a considerable change in its approach, there was no general condem-
nation of its oalier secta~ian policies and the other socialist
64Hradil~k: "~eskoslovensk"', p.51.
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parties could find grounds fordou~ting the Communists' sincerity in
offering unity. Although the KS~ did seem to be trying to broaden
its notion of democracy to include all those who opposed fascism, it
also seemed unable to relinquish the perspectives of an imminent
armed uprising associated with the decompositiion of other parties and
I
leading to a "dictatorship of the proletariat" understood just as
it had been before.
So the change in KSC strategy should not be exagge~ated and
This was how the KSC stood in 1938, on the eve of the destruction
it did not lead to the accomplishment even of the immediate aims
set. Nevertheless, it was adequate to move the party back towards
the centre of Czechoslovak politics.
.of the Czechoslov~k state. Looked at in the abstract, its history
",,'
can appear uninspiring. It had been gripped by internal strife
with wild accusations and condemnations against various pf its leading
) "
figures. "It had destroyed a number of its leaderships and seemingly
almost itself. For a 'time it seemed to have pursued extremely
'~8ctarian policies with relevance only to the nee~s
of Czechoslovak society. Then it suddenly reversed its approach ,to
one of supporting the state that it had been attacking. Viewed
in this' way it would sacm incredible that the KS~ could have main-
tai~ed a fairly steady body of support and then eno~mously increased..
it after World War II.
Evidently, KSC history has to be viewed differently. l~faults
. have to be compared with those of other parties and, in particular~;
'the other socialist parties. It often seemed to be the only party
defending and fighting for the interests of many industrial and rural
workers and maintaining the promise of a better, socialist future. It
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probably maintained a reputation and a degree of respect as a workers'
party among more than just its own voters.
The real test, h~i~er, was in the dEfence of the republic.
Despite the weaknesses in its policios, histor~ was to suggest
that the KS~ had been right to argue that the Soviet Union was
militarily strong enough to save Czechoslovakia from Nazi Germany
and that it was the right-wing parties of the coalition rather
than the KS~ who wera lukewarm in their defence of the Czechoslovak
Republic.
So, as the'downfall of the Czechoslovak state approached, the
KS~ already had almost two decades of development behind it.
Plenty of people were totally opposed to it because they rejected
all it stood for. Others may have been made cynical by the way
how it conducted its internal life: some of those who had been
expelled in various periods were already active in other parties,
but some were to return to the KSt in the changed circumstances
of 1945.
Alongside these attitudes tho vsC had huilt itself a body
of support and above all a reputation GIJfficient for many Czechs
later to forget its mistakes and fail inns. It had also developed
a body of ideas which were flexirle ~nough to form a basis for a
fairly cleat strategy in the lator years of the war.
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PART II
WORLD WAR II, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK STATE





At this point the narrative has to be broadened. To understand
the political and social set up that emerged in May 1945 and gave
such a strong position to the KSt, it is quite inadequate to
concentrate only on the developments within, and the strategy of
,-
the KS~. The Communists were strong as part of a broader unity which
involved effectively a compromise between themselves a~d Bene! whci,
for reasons that will have to be explained, was led to seek unity
.with the KS~.
The relationship between these two was one of rivalry within
a shaky unity which can only be understood against the backgr~~~d
of the common fight against Nazi Germany and of the s~cialand
politicalc~anges taking place within Czechoslovak society. This
wa~ the basis from which they shaped their ideas and found areas
of common ground alongside areas of continuing disagreement.
For the purpose of this work, a full andbalanced assessment
(' ',' " "-'"
,rf Cz~choslovakia during the war years is not necessary. Instead,
I'. . ,: '. the" - .the account starts witnAactivities and strategy of the Nazi
occupiers 'in the Czech lands to show how they created the obJect-
.ive c'onditions within which the Czech polltical trends evolved'
'their various general ideas and strategies.
Particular attention is devoted to the process of Czecho-
slovakia's liberation during which those ideas were tested and'
shaped in practice. It was then that the relative strengths of
Bene§ and thi KS~ were revealed thereby deciding the political
form of Czechoslovakia after May 1945.
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CHAPTER 7: THE NAZI OCCUPATION
11.7.1. The Czechoslovak state is dostruye~.
On 29/9/38, following a summer of strong pressure from Nazi
Germany co-ordinated with the activities of Henlein's Sudeten-
German party, Chamberlain, Dalad ier, lIitler and i"'lusso]ini met in
Munich and agreed on an ultima tum dau.and i nq t ha t the Czechoslovak
government should imm~diately abandon all areas where Germans were
more than 50% of the population. Gene§ himself considered resist-
Ing and would have received massive support from the Czech people,
the left-wing parties and the armed forces. Nevertheless he
decided to acquie&~ although it later emerged that the Nazis them-
selves ware vary cautiou~ of entering a military conflict'. He
also ignored the possibility of Soviet nelp partly because he
2thought it might notbe adequate, but also bacause of its internal
and international political iilipllcations3•
Some months after this 08Sy succe~ t e Nazis, although t~e
Munich agreement guarenteed the existence of a truncated Czecho-
slovakia, used strong threats to persuade the Slovak leaders to
proclaim an independent state. UsjnS tlw pretext. that Czecho-
slovakia had ceased to exist, the Czectl lands were occupied on
15/3/39 and the "Protectorate" was established.
\J. Churchill: History of II,orldIllar11, Vol I, London, 1948, p.246.
2 v . ,; d" h .v' .J. Kren : Do emlgrace: zapanl za ranlcnl odboJ 1930-1939, Prehn,
1969, Second Edition, p.4E.
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II.7.2. The political aim~3 of the r'i-.zi occupiers. How they
ensured Czpch ccmpli nCf.l lJJith their authority.
At first there was no clear Nnzi plan for t~e Czech lands:
the immediate rationale for the sudden occupation had been the
desire to pre-empt any anti-German action from Czechoslovakia at
some point in the future. Gradually, through successive changes
4and modifications, they evolved a definite strategy. Their first
consideration was ensuring control and this was achieved both by
exploiting the unwillingness of many Czech leaders to actively
oppose the occupation and by progressively strengthenjng the
position of specifically German institutions. They were willing
to allow a Protectorate government powers that atfirst appeared to
be greater than those enjoyed by any Czech institution within the
Austrian empire. They even allowed a single CZEch political party,
the "National Union". This could appear to Czechs to be leading
some sort of resistance but in practice it haIred in the repression
of real political opposition and could do nothing against
"Germanisation" pOlici€S5. Th~se involved giving marked privileges.
to the German minority while denigrating the Czech language and
culture. The most dramatic anti-Cz2ch measure was the closing of
Czech universities on 17/11/39 and the execution of student leaders
following street demonstrations on 2C/10/39. Although presented
as if a response to political opposition, this was also p8rt of a
plan to eliminate Czech education and tilasfollowed by instructions
4 Accounts in English are V. ~Iastny: The Czechs undDr Nazi Rule:
The Failure of r'!8tionalHesistcmr.e, FIY'-1942, Lew York, 1971,
and J. DoLef aL, J. Kr:en: Czeoholsovakia's Fight ,'i3[l-1Cl45, Prague
1964.
5Cdboj a revolucl' Fi3'l-1945, Praha, 1')(;5,Part I, Charter 3.
for the gradual limitation even of Czech schGoleducation6•
The eventual aim was to "Germanise" t.heCz ech lands by per-
suading most Czechs to accept German nationality: the more stubborn
7ones were to be executed or forcibly removed from Central Europe •
Solid refusal from Czechs to renounce their nationality forced
8the occupiers to postpone their plan. ~'L'vertheless, the necessary
research for such a project was startod whenever the Nazis thought
victory was at hand particularly after the fall of France and to
some extent also when ~oscow's fall seGmed imminent.
In the autumn of 1941 the wur situation, the activisation of
Czech opposition to the occupiers and the refusal of the Czech
nation to accept voluntary "Germanisation" all contributed to a
shift!n Nazi st~ategy. This was personified in the appointment
of the ruthless Heydrich as Protector in 1941. liedid not anti-
cipate rapid "Germanisation" but tack a far tougher line with
active opposition so as to maintain political stability and
steady military product~on. He dissolved the Protectorate govern-
ment and ordered the execution of Prime ~inister [1i&l. Even
though terror was never far below the surfece, he did not unleash
the barbarity used in Poland, Yugoslnvia or parts of the Soviet
Union. There.was always space left for compliance so that active
6[)okUmenty z historie ceskoslovenske politi~, Vol II, Praha, 1966,
dok.438, p.602-603.
700cumentary evidence of Nazi plnns is collated in Cht~li n~s
vyhubit, Praha, 1961.
8APparently only 300,000 Czchcs nnd Slovaks ctlose Cerman or HunQarian
na t Lona Ldty during the LIar. lha ; inc lud S trw arv.e s occupi.ed imrllE)d-
iately after 1"1lmic~1;v. f']of3ek, .tU::., 1/2/46, p.1. In the Protectorate
itself the numt.ers uere probabLy very sms Ll,
Iresistance neve/~ppeared as the best r-ear.s of survival.
Moreover, there was always scope for believing that things
could be worse and this feeling was fully and subtly exploited.
So, when on 27/5/42 Heydrich was assassinated by parachutists sent
of 9from London as part Ben8~'s ~lan to win international recognition,
"the response was one of carefully cont.r olled ruthlessness. Active
resi$tance organisations were demolIshed so that, with a few
exceptions, they dissappeared or had to be rebuilt from scratch
again afterwards. The mass of the people, however, were terrorised
into passivity by these widespread executions and above all by the
massacre of the villages of Lidice and le~~ky. These were not the
usual Nazi atrocities, ordered by a local commander to avenge a
local partisan attack, but were centrally decided and widely publi-
cised acts deliberately accompanied by rumours of the impending
liquidation of the Czech nation10• Although this may have dis-
couraged active resistance it simultaneously encouraged a feeling
of helplessness leading to grim hatred for Germans in general who,
11in the Czech lands at least, actively applauded thB.-set •
9See below Section 11.8.2.
10Cht~li, p.161.
11Cht~li, p.159 and p.187-188. The Nnzis' success in forcing
compliance from the Czechs was demun~r8ted by their ability
to leave much of the administrative appar::tus in Czech hands.
For everyone German administrative worker there were 790
Czechs: in France and Denmark the comparable figures were 5872
and 42696; J. Dolelal: Jerlin& cesta,rraha, 19~6, p.25-26.
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11.?3. How the Nazis exploited the Czech economy.
, As the Czech economy became more essential to the Nazis, so'
The property of
their economic and social policies changed. At first the impact
on'the, economy was less striking than the attack on Czech nation- c
hood. Many capitalists could even have welcomed greater opport-
12 .
unities for profit from Germany's expansion . and larger
could take comfort at the land reform being definitively
W~rkers' living standards probably dropped at all times14
dramatically at least until 1941. Moreover, conscious
made t~ win over th~ working class, which the Nazis thought
be"the easiest section of the population to "Germanise" 15.
favourite Nazi tactics were ~emagogic assertions'of their
.~~r~dentials and appeals to anti_intellectualism16: some
could be given to this as there was a tendency for
, 1?among workers to decrease •
striking immediate social changes were
the occupation, about 60,000 Czech peasant~
ware ousted by Germans and converted into landless labourers.
was part of a policy of complete "Germanisation"
-
12V. Kral: Otazky hospodarskeho a socialn!ho vyvoje v'~eskYch
.,,'zemlch v letech 1938-1945, Vol I, Fraha, 195?, p.134-138.
13Kren: 00 emigrace, p.1?1.
"
14e.g. the report by the Protectorate Interior Ministry on 10/6/41 t·
Dokumenty z historie, Vol Il,:dok. 445, p.610-612.
15Cht~li, p.4?-48 and p.?2.
16MastnYI The Czechs, p.??
17V• Kral: Otazky hospodarskeho a socialn!ho vyvojev c9skych zem.lchv Ietech 1938-1945, Vol III,Prahaa, 1959, p. 156 •
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but started with the creation of strategically placed German
islands in the Czech interior18•
Gradually, however, as the war set greater demands on the
economy, central controls were strengthenrd and the whole structuF8
of the Czech economy was changed and distorted. The central ~azi
aim was, quite simply, to raise military production. The Czech
lands could help them In two ways: the first was by providing
labour for German industry thereby replacing Cerman workers who
were needed in the armed forces. The second was by raising the
military output of the industries within the Czech lands. The first
becameaim,.._soImpar a tIve after the Cerman defeat at Stalingrad that all
young Czechs born within a particuJar year were drafted into
Germany: this probably affected in all 600,000 Czehcs and 200,000
19Slovaks who returned home with evsn less love for Germany • The
second aim, which increased in importance from late 1943 as bombing
affected industry in Germany itself involved, as soon as August
1942, the compulsory lengthenIng of thu working woek to 60 hours20.
and then the expansion of the labour force by drafting in peasants,
the urban petty bourgeoisie, the intelliuentsia, office workers,
housewives, former stLdents, the old ar.d even invalids. As these
sources were exhausted, so Inbour was trnnsferred from useful
consumers' goods industries. In August 1~44 all production not
directly related to the war was prohi~'ibd.




TaU;ln! nasClzenf, Br no , 1'.1711, p.95-96. FDr higher
suggesting that the re uo ro that number in Germany fit
the war alone, se~ helow Vnl II, p.52.
20K '1ra : otizky, Vol III, p.333.
11.7.4. The policies of the rJi1zi~;~)ccupicrs holBed creAte the
"objective" t.asIs for the SUIE;fjr:IJ8ntrevolutionary chan90s.
Nazi economic policy, with the progrossive proletarianisation
of the Czech nation and concentration of workers into bigger
factories, could appear like the econumic prelude to a socialist
revolution leading to a planned economy. This, however, cannot
be concluded from the situation in the Czech lands. Conce~{ation
was associated entirely with mili tary produc tL.n and hence dec lin-
ing living standards: onG of the first post-war tasks would have
to be a reversal of this trend. Moreover, to judge from the nature
of Nazi repression and how it was most widely felt, the objective
ra thf~r
conditions were being created for a nationalAthan a socialist
revolution. Although social or socio-economic aspects of repres-
sian became important particularly towards the end of the war,
they could never take precedence over or stand independently from
national repression. Czech historians have therefore argued that
"the basic contradiction of society •• was •• between the majority
of the nation and the occupiers plus thoee who linked their social
and individual destinies with them,,21.
To refer to national repression in this way raises the question
of how united a national resistance could be. Simple opposition to
the Naz i occupa tion could Ir.c rease through tho war and, with the
widespread social consequences of the occupati.on, could serve to
bring the nation together. At the same tine, and particularly
those trying to develop an active rosistAnce movement at the time
had to re~ognise this, it did"not nocessarily point to anyone
21N~rodn! fronta a komunist~,Praha, 1~6P, p.]1.
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alternative. A natural possibility was a restoration of the
Czechoslovak state and there was a widespread longing for this.
There were, however, necessarily reservations as the Czechoslovak
state had in fact collapsed so that the desire for its restoration
~lone could not be enough. It was a common feature of all active
led only to disaster. It is
political trends thatthe~ tried to supersede the old ideas on
which the state had been based i.e. its inclusion
>minorities, its dependence on france and its capitalist'system.
; , . - . .
This ladt point was potentially divisive even though tha nati~n
draw~ c'loser together against the cccup Lar s, The point was
those who had suffered from a socially subordinate position
to reconcile themselves to the realities of the
becau~e of the threat to the state. l( seemed,
sacrifices made by them and by their
that ideas about the restoration of the
often associated with fundamental changes in its
system and corrections of its earlier failings.
a strong tendency among active resistors to seck the
Czechoslovakia's collapse in its internal social and
•
systema. wall as in its nationalities policies and
orientation. At the same time, there was a rough division
.,
resistince organisations over the degree to which
" economic relationships in the new Czechoslovakia were to be a
return tOtor a revolutionary rejection 0; the old
So the Nazi occupation created the objective conditions for ~
a very broad opposition, covering almost the whole Czech nation,'
which could not be completely united in its aim, Nazi strategy
~ ~ -__14_7_- .~ __ ~ ~
was also such that oppositiun tended not to take ac:.ive forms.
The obvious centre for resistance activity would seum to be the
armamenLs factories where largo numbers of Czechs were forced
together and could hopefully even find some way to acquire arms.
The Nazis, however, were extremely severe with strikes and ast~~y
combined this with better rations to worl ers in armDmerlts factories
as a reward for acqurescencs , f'iore,lv8r,tl,8 s ocLaI divisions ltd thin
the Czech nation were present even within the working class as those
who had been fcrced into the factories from more prestigious work
tended not to accept their new social role: there was therefore
. d bl t' duc i h f . t d t i 22conSl era e enSlon re UClng ~ e scope or unl e aClon •
Consequently, even in big factories resistance rarely went beyond
individual sabotage acts: it is unclear to what extent they
d t i .t 23contributed to declining pro uc lVl Y •
The general picture, then, was of a Czech nation which deeply
hated the occupiers but shollledthis primarily in small individual
acts of defiance.
11.7.5. Summa~y and discussion
from mid-1938 the Nazis set ahout destroying lho Czechoslovak
state: the Czech lands were incorpora led into Ger-marlYwhile Slovaaa
was given formal independence. This chapter concentratos on the
developments in the Protectorate where j'Jazis Lrat.eqy evolved
gradually throughout the war. Up to the autumn of 1941, repression
22v. ~8ncl, C Slgdek: Dny odvahy, pr~ha, 1966, p.137-13G.
23Comapring 194{1 with "'3'.:i.nrJustI'i<11rrcduction was HIi' up, 8Illp)OY-
ment 355-:up and productivity 13~_ down; ~:tr!jcny,p.273.
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was comparatively mild. Then, ir'rtcsponseLJoLh to a more active,
Czech opposition and to the need for s0curity in tho interests of
increased military production, they took a tougher. line against
active resisters. This was always part of a wider strategy for
ensuring political control ~nd they therefore did not resort to
unrestrained savagery. There was always scope for Czechs to
acquiesce before their au,.hority.
The ultimate aim was the "Germanisalinn" of the Czech lands
and steps towards this led to a Czech foeling of national oppression.
As the demands on the economy increased, this merged with a wider
social oppression so that the Czech people felt the effects of the
occupation in a number of ways.
From this followed the wider changEs in political thinking
and consciousness which creC1t,d the basis for the post-war
revolotionary changes. Oespite some similErities, the situation
was very different frcm that of 1018. Two important differences
were, first, that the Nazi occupation represenled a f8r more serious
threat to the Czech nation than had the repressive measures used by
the Austrian authorities, and secondly, that this lime the Czecho-
slovak state had existed for twenty years and thereby won for itself
a firm place in the Czech national consciousness.
A number of consequences followed from these facts and they all
tended to strengthen the h~nd of the KSt. This Limo acceptance of
Nazi authority was impossible for any ~arxist and the KS~ was not
confronted with ~meral's lilemma: instead it was the Czoch right-
wing who were more confused in their attitude towards the occupiers.
Further consequences of thn ~azi Occup8tion WerE! throe general and
widespread feelings which had no preci~e analo~i8S in 1918; first,
_ 1tJ
there was a deep hatred for the occupiers and for Germans genetally
and this led to a determination that measures would be taken to
prevent for ever a repeat of the trogic events of 1938 and 1939;
secondly, there was a craving for unity to bridge the differences
~ .within the Czech nation as they seemed trivial in comparison with
the Nazi threat; thirdly, there was a tendency to seek real at
imagined failings in the pre-Munich republic which might have
weakened its ability to withstand Nazi pressures. This last point~
was likely to strengthen the standing of those advocating revolutio~-;
ary changes while the other points to some extent restricted and,
defined the direction of those revolutionary changes.
~_. __....__... __.-_1_50-~----------------------
CHAPTER 8: CZECH POLITICS DURING THE NAZI OCCUPATION -
COLLABORATORS AND 8ENE§
.As a more comprehensive study is not possible within the
context of this work, Czpch political thinking will be divided
into three trends reflecting orientations towards three power
blocs - Germany, the West and the USSR. All could claim to provide
a way forward for the Czech nation with the first regarding German
hegemony as a fact which had to be accepted.
There were many and diverse resistance organisations that
developed at diffeLent times within the Protectorate, hut they
are not discussed seperately here. They were subjected to continual
repression and disruption by the occupiers and ultimately were nut
decisive in creating Czechoslovakia's post-war political and social
system~ Rather it was the organised uroups in emigr8ticn that
created the first post-wnr government. Resistance o:ganisations
and activities were important in influencing the ideasof those in
emigration and also ultimately in strengthening the position of
the KS~ in Moscow relative to 8ene~ in London. They are therefore
discussed within the sections on those two emigration centres.
11.8.1. Elements of the CZGch ric,tt'c-'tling_..:,cept t.hestrat(~9Y of
acquiescence to the Naz j nccu[nti or.,
The phenomena of acquiescenco onc: col1al;oration evolved
slowly alongside the changing strategy of the Nazi occupiers.
There was some support for this approach at first from the Agrarians
and their allies but graclual~y the Nazis hael to rely on an ever
narrower base among Czechs. At first, however, the Agrarians had
risen from a nos t t L.n of strengt.h within the pro-hut.ieh republic to
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still greater dominance L,,,furcthe uccu;JiJtiollencouraging the
trend towards "totalitarinnism" by b,lnnint]the I<S~,"forgingthe
right-wing parties - including even the ~ational Socialists -
into a party called Na tional Unity, and allowing SocLaI Democracy
to transform itself into the non-~:arxist rJational Labour Party which
played the role of a docile opposition. This period was important
later as so many politicians and journalists who accused the KsE
of "totalitarianism" could never answer for their own statements
and actions. At the time, though, there was considerable
di;:3illusionmentwith the former multi-par ty sys tem so that many
saw the~end towards "totalitarianism" as an advance.
Following the Nazi occupation the same political currents
tended to comply. This very rarely amounted to actiVB collaboration1
and many of those who for a time complied with the occupation later
went into emigration or were imprisone~. Particularly after Heydrich's
arrival it became harder to argue that, by staying in office, one
was preventing a still worse fate. Nevertheless, after Stalingrad
the Nazis, seeking every possible method to win acquiescence from
the Czechs, gave freedom to those Clech right-wingors who were
willing to propagandise the likely horrors stjould "Bolshevism"
triumph.
As collaboration changed through the occupation and at first
(
seemed to merge with resistance, it is difficult to qive any precise
meaning to tha term. This became an important issuo after the war
10espite Nazi backing, uncompromisingly pro-fascist movements never
commanded the support of more than 1~ of the Czech population;
T. Pas'k "K problematice ~esk~ kolaborace a fa§ismu za druh~ sv~tov~
valky", Pf!spevky k dejin5rn fasizmLJ v Ceskoslovnnsku a v filadfJfsku,
Bratislava, 1fJ6':, p.137.
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when a definition was needed for legal purposes. "Arguments were
then produced suggesting that, as so few had been"involved in
dramatic displays of resistance, effectively the whole nation
collaborated by its passivity. This ignores the very w~despread
ways in which the population did oppose and frustrate the occupiers'
the 'contradiction between the occupiers and the nation was more
hopes: for example, they convinced the Germans that no Czech army
could be allowed even to fight the ~SSR. It must be em~hasised
complex than a simple question of organised resistance. There were
all sorts of ways in which the Nazis' hopes and plans were frustrated
2 .or restricted. The argument also has a political significance as
it means that collaboration was nothing special: this could 'excuse
those few Czechs who actively helped the Nazis achieve their aims
, or who made profits out of the Nazi war effort and were punished
after the war.
The pro-western trend was led by Benes who was pressurised by
Germany into resigning the Presidency after Munich and then went
8ene~ establishes his supremacy and formulates a
strategy for ~he eminration and for the domestic
resistance.
into emigration. He began political activity again only after the
.. ;
J establishment of the Protectorate and then gradually won a position
of dominance within the expanding Czecholsovak emigre community.
"
His strength was based on his standing as the former President,
2
C
•f• J. Sprysl: 11K problematice postaven! c:eskeho rolnictva v,letech 1939-1941", Historie a vOjenstv!,1967, No.4, p.593-630,
in which the blanket condemnation of peasants for allegedly
"collaborating" is fittingly rebuked.
1,;i_3::__.~ ___; _
on his claim to te the only leading non-Communist Czechoslovak
emigr' to have opposed ~unich and on his ahility to formulate a
definite plan for the re-establishment of the Czechoslovak state3•
His plan was derived from the experience of lJiorldWar I .and centred
on the notion that the Czech6lsovak state, as it .was destroyed by
external forces, still legally existed and that he was still
le~al1y its President. He resolved to create in emigration the
trapping$'of a constitutional state including a government, a
4
parliament, called the state Council, ministers and an army •
To Justify to the western powers the restoration of a Czecho-
slovak.state, ha had to explain why it had failed. His answer was
tha7;t;he)riciPal reason was betrayal by its Weslern allies and he
hOped.,.th~tthe outbreak of war would convince them that they had
miscalculated in 1938. He therefore based himself in Britain,
where thel'e;had been opposition to I'lunich,and se t about persuading
. . .. , .. ~...
",', '~'? .;\infl.uential-'circles that he should be recognised as the legal
• .. :",-:''' -"' .•-,';' j:;~"-;.
President"ut Czechoslovakia. A logical consequence of this was
.' ".<;'; UJ.:.;:~.' .•hia'8,xtrame'sensitiveness to suggestions that Czechoslovakia should
hav8)!o~g~talone in 1938: that would have implied that he was not
,,'1,'
"fo~ced" t~cresign and that Czechoslovakia's downfall was partly
his own fault.
Convincing the West was a slow process and ultimately it was
only after the soviet Union had been brought into the war and taken
3J• Klen: ~Ben81 _ prObl'm politick~ho v5dcovstv! (1939-1940)",
Revue dejin socialis~, 1968, No.2, p.182.
4For a succinct account· of Bene§'s aims and activities in emigrntion
see E. Taborsk~'s chapter in Mamatey and Lu~a: A Historx·
.'
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the initiative in recognising 8en8~15 Government in exile that
Britain followed suit. Then, a year later, Urita!n was behind
the Soviet Union again in categorically renouncing the Munich
agreement. Prior to that there had [Jeuna degree of recognition
from the western governments and this greatly helped Denel establish
his supremacy in emigration. He had rejected the democratic means
of a congress of emigr~s because, owing La the predominance of Jews
and Germans amon~ Czechoslovak emigres, he feared that Communists
would have dominated5• Instead, he created a government in exile
specifically excluding all political pnrties. By carefully man-
ipulating the governmsnt's composition he managed to incorporate
d t
.t i 6an hereby eliminate most oppOSl lon • This still excluded some
on the far right and also some Social Democrats and the Communists.
Considerably later he was willing to include the latter in his
government even without demanding the dissolution of their
organisation.
His aim in establishing these constitutional structures was
essentially that they would return home as the recognised supreme
bodies at the end of the war. This meant that, despite occasional
7claims to the contrary, he regarded the domestic resistance as
subordinate to and a servant of his own emigration oction. In turn,
domestic groups often saw themselves BS supplements to ~enells
activities and concentrated on sending back messages of value to
5Kren: Do emigrace, p.489-493.
6See J. Smutny's account of 22/3/40, ::ukumenty z h ist ori e, Vol I,
Praha, 1966, dok.69, p.g?
7e•9• his speeches of 11/12/40 and 25/11/41 in E. Llanos: Sest lolexilua druh8 :wet-m/a valky, Praha, 19LiC" p.27lJ and p.291 rospectively.
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Western intelligence services or helping individuals to emigrateS.
,One important group based on former officers in·the disbanded
Czechoslovak army went beyond this and formulated a completely
,unrealistic plan for an uprising to be staged once German power
6egan'to collapse. Even those activities were restricted to~
for~a new state. In practice, although they
conspiratorial preparation and did not involve any attempt
extend mass political influence9• '
Bene~ wa~ happy to maintain contacts with the
government ~nd particularly with Eli'I.Seemingly
I' ..'
at the decisive moment, they would transfer allegiance tO'him so
that the existing organs of the Protectorat~ could form the basis
a "two irons" policy - basing themselves on
'politicians during World,War I when compliance had
d.isaster::ngven professed allegiance to Bene~, they
, '
subordin~ted themselves to Nazi iuthority as the cours~
madeliberatiorifrom the West seem less likely10.
Union ~as brought into the war 8ene~, fearing lest
11'Protecto~ate should alienate Soviet sympathy , ordered the
8,V. l<raJina: "La"resistance tchecoslovaque",
la guerre,No.1, february 1950. See also
by R. Lu~acin Mamatey. and Luie: AHistory~
9J• Kfen: "Vojensk9 odboj na po~dtku okupace ~eskoslovenska (1938_J
1940)"tHistorie avojenstv!, X, No.2, 1961. Throughout the course
of the war a number of groups were formed which understood the re-
establish~ent of Cz~choslovakia as a purely constitutional process
and worked out in punctDlous detail how they thought,this could be
achieved. As anexa~ple,see the account of Derer's activitiesJ
M. 8ou~ak, M. Klimal, M. Vart!kov~: Program revoldcia , Bratislava,
1975, p.167-169.
10 .'Kfen: Daemigrace, p.183-190, and OdboJ a revoluce, Preha, 1965,
p.110-111.
11Dokumenty z historie, Vol II, dok.446, p.613.
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Protectorate government to resign. Despite these.instructions only
Elia~, perhaps the most genuine resister in the government12,
refused to accept complete subjugation to the occupiers. Even then,
8ene~ made excuses for members of the Protectorate government until
, .'




Despite such equivocations, Bene~'s activities in emigration ~
wo~ him popularity at home. An image was created of.him as the
I,
,13 0,''legendaryfuture'liberator of the Czech lands' 0 and this spread
beyond those who accepted his strategy. Most interesting was
,"Petition Committee We Remain Faithful" ...which developed out
, 0:: ' " . 14organisations of left Social Democrat intellectuals •
sources of Czechoslovakia's failure was bread.
by the large German minority and pointed also!
such as the mass unemployment of the·1930,~15i
~ontes~i~~ Bene~'s right to be President
"
o o.a~solute.supremacy by formulating a
" ' t".' • ,To,; 16"
Czechoslovak state, •
is an enormous amount of evidence
12H~ prob~bly maintained contacts not only with 8ene~ and former
army officers but even with tte KSC; J. Elia~ova, T. Pas~k:
~k(8eue§ov9m kontaktdm s Eli'lem ve druh~ sv~tov~ valee",
~ ;:'avojenstvi, XVI, No.1, 1967, p.108-140.
" .....13 ".,
l' ",:' Kren: U8ene~", p.188-189.
14ror its origins see J. l(ubHk: IIPeticni vybor verni zOstaneme
~ 'obdob! Mnichova a za druh~ republiky", ~eskoslovensk9~asopis
historicki, XVII, No.5,1969• ,'\ ,,'
S~dm rok~ na dom~d front~, Praha, 1965, p.40~41.
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of France, national morale revived with faith being placed in the '
,Soviet Union. This could have surprising consequences with hopes
that Soviet expansion, as in Bessarabia and 8ukovina, would
continue, and bring liberation to the Czech lands. Even many
,capitalists were hoping for this as the only way to
nationhood'? In this situation, the only way to withstand
"Bolshevism", feared by PVVZ as
, 18well as the right ,seemed
t~ adopt a radical socialist programme while
~ship of the west19• This meant that even right-wing Cz~chs f~l
, 20" : },:'
obliged t6 accept the PVVZ programme ,while PVVZ itself, called
. ,.
Benes to adopt more forceful policies implying a break with
Protectorate government.
Bene~ works out the policies fora new Czechoslovakia:
revolution is to be held in check by radical reforms.
While message. from clandestine groups were indicating the
defeat Nazism, Benes
":.,'
would be a danger of revolution for a
at the end of the war. To weather this
~< " •
.',,'?see the messages to London of Juiy andClctoLJer 194o','''!:~~;..;..;..;;.t.-';:;'
'historie, Vol II, dok.411, p.553-554, and dok.426,' p.
f'; Also revealing is 8. Reicin's account to the KSC leadership in
;Moscow in October 1940; "Situ8ce a odboj v Protekor~t~ v.letech
1939-1940", Z pocatkiS odboje, Praha, 1969, asp , p.104~'
18 . " (-;,,'Message to London PVVZ, 19/4/40, Dokument~ z historie, Vol
397, p.536.
19 to London dated 1/10/40, Dokum8nt~ z historie, Vol II,, Message
423, p.573.
20See K. Vesely-~tainer: "Odbojoua organisace Obrana' n8:roda",Z poMtk~, p.201, and V. Kural: "Cesta,k programu nacionaln!ho
,cdboje", Revue d~Jin socialismu, 1968, No.1, p.72-73.
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re-establishment of a stable parli~mentary uemocracy the idea of aI
.military C~ Presidential dictatorship was afton proposed, both in
emigration and among resistance organisations. Oene§ himself, unlike
some of his cloaeas t associates21 but lil(e rvvz, also emphasised
the importance of implementing far-reaching reforms. This left
Marxist historians with problems in defining Bene~'s position as
he sometimes appeared as a radical socialist. Perhaps fairest was
the characterisation of him ~s sti1nding "on the extremE) left of the
bourgeois campH22 indicating his willingness to bring forward ideas
on social change when confronted with the possibility of a
revoluti6nary situation. Crucial on ~ll points, however, was his
belief that'these reforms would simulataneously limit further reforms
i b
. f ~ . 23and eliminate the object veaS1S or l~rXlsm •
This is most striking in his idea to restrict the number of
political'parties to two or three. According to Taborsk~ this was
24the most important of his proposals and responded to criticisms of
the excessive fragmentation of pre-f')unichpolitical life. It was also
intended to incorporate and thereby silence tho KS~ within a broader
21e•g • .J. Smutny and J. stransky's views of 2/11/40, DClkurnentyzhistorie, Vol I, dok.1CJ9, p.139. TalJorsLy seems to have shar-ed
their view in E. Tiborsk1: CZ8chos'?vak Democracy at~ork,
London, 1945.
22.:1.K~en: HO 6loze baneAovskfiho kf!dla burfoazn! emigrace v obdobf
valky", CeskoslovenskA revalucD v 18t.och.1.9;'!4-194D,Praha, 1966.
Bene~ presented his own ideas in his book Oemokracie zItre a dnes,
Praha, 1946, Second Edition.
238enes: Demokracie, p.245.
24[. TaL.orskY: "The political lnstit.uti ona of Czechoslovakia",
.Jacques M~tadier (editor): Solij~rlli, London, 1943, p.161.
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left part/5•
Land reform, which 'ene~ insiste should he completed this
time, was to create a mass of peasants resilient to Communist ideas26
and nationalisations of considerable large-scale industry would)it
was hoped, create a sociuty ~n which Communists would no longer have
27any relevance • r:uch of this fJeno~ hopod to achieve thr cuqh
measures against Germans. He Even formulated the notion of a
combined national and social revolution 28.
In fact, his nationalities policy originated primarily in
the need to convince the Western powers that Czechoslovakia could
be recreated as a viable state even though nationalities problems
had been so important in its previous duwnfall. Gen8~ therefore
advocated expelling most of the German mi~ority29: this was
dependent on the agreement of the great powers as it was effectively
an international question. Britain showed some reluctance, a9ree-
ing only in June 1942 when renouncing the Munich agrerment. The
USSR prevaricated until the middle of 1943.
Contrary to some cl~ims30, this policy was very popular with
255ee Benes's discussion with Ripka on 8/5/42, Casta 1.<8 kv~tnu,
Praha, 1965, p.44-45.
26His comments of 9/6/42 and 4/7/43, i!u:,urnentyz historie, Vol I,
dok.221, p.271 and dok.28S, p.344.
27His comment of 5/7/41~ Dokumenty i historie, Vol I, dok.195, p.23U.
20E• Bene~: r'lemoirs:From ['unlet!to [,:B!!l \,Iar and NellI Victory,
London, 1954,p.212 and p.21S.
29It was never stated how many alt.houqh (lanes sunqe st.ed that 8°7[. ofthe Germans were pro-Nazi; r:en8~: [,c;n101rs, p.21!,. lhe best accounts
of how he dave laped U1C idea of maa s nxpu Lsi orie re in his own
memoirs and in R. Lu~a: The Tr2nsfer uf the ~ud8t~n Germans,
London, 1964.
30 .Q.~.Y. Gluckste~n, stillin's sE1telli;,e~,jn i=urOpf],Lannon, 1~;52, p.1·~n-1'1/4.
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non-Communist domostic resist~nce ;<;;H:ions. Ev(;nFVVZ
d.emended it indepenrJen tl Y from V r y ('(' r J y j n t.hs war and,
particularly after Lidice, i~ was effectively a universal demand.
Only. the domestic I\S~ evaded any COnll!8nt.
The Slovak na t Lona I que s t i on uas fur L:en()~ less f or tunn t e
..' '
.!._ .•• and led eventually to conflict wiLh th2 d008stic resistance. He
firmly adhered to the "CzechoslOv8kist" position whereby only a single
"Czechoslovak" nation was recognised. This, he argued, was the only
way to convince the great po~ersthat a Czcchosloval~statB could be
viable: admission of a separate Slova:,na t.j on would either justify
a separate Slovakio.or a CZ8ch:,slovak state w.ith no naUonal majority
and consequently no justification for donying equal rights to all
the minor! ties 31 • So, to jus U fy r enunc i;l t jon 0 f. f'iunidl t OenEl~
reqLlired an~admission of responsilii 1.1 t, for Czecho s Lovak La t s collapse
from the Slovaks and a proclamation ef loyalty to himself as
President. He even claimed that this uJ()uld Le the only way f'ur the
Slovaks to avoid being r~gardcd oS n r:ef"',itecJ nation at the end of
, 32the war • Not surprisingly, he Dntillls;;lstical1y i nlie\lf}d reports
reaching him inearly 1943 BU' gesUng that the great mass of Slovaks
33
accepted his authority •
31 " ~E-. Bene~: Uvahy 0 S]Dv8m;Lvt, Pl"[lh;l, 1'·''17,S,!concJ Ld i t i.on , p.33:j.
Gene~ evon regretted the oovc]op"ent o f the separ at.o SLuvak
language.
32See h'is ·c'om'ment of 2C/2//:3, :Jl (Jv'~n'",h6 f"l<1T'udn6povstnnie: dokumanty,
( b
. t d h F t f to 'T P )' , .-"1' . r- 1a va 1(\ - c: "-I· k .a rreV18 e anee 01'.1 ~,; re "'_ .• ' , "D,', Ct) .'1. ," •
33SNP, dok s Tl , p.7~.. The t.~Grlg1y Il)t t;1'vernment statEm~nt mnde on
this basis.in fact prDvided valL!;"t.le <1:;;rIlm~Ucn for the Dratlslav8




11.8.4. Benes hopes the USSR will help him re-establish a
Czechoslovak repuhlic.
8ene~'s attitude towards and relations with the USSR were
crucial to his whole strategy. The existance and possible rola
of this new power made an exact repeat of his World War· I strategy
impossible. following Munich the Soviet Union appeared as the
only state in Europa at all sympathetic to Benes's cause34
·even during the September 1939 to June 1941 period, Bene~ tried to
avoid a final break. He kept some distance from the more vigoJ:'ou~
propaganda campaigns against the USSR in late 1939 and never if~i,.i\';:.;,,,,:
~.' .',"',;_ ,~-;; -'-, : ,> _- !:~;".,;1
ft
seriously'doubted that the Nazi-Soviet pact was a tactical nece~sity
Bene~ always had mixed feelings about the
f d t . tu' 35orce on he Sov~e n~on • Unlike the British government,
believed that tha USSR would play a role in defeating Nazi
and therefore tried always to keep the door
"
operation: contacts
37fell of france •
speaking he understood their foreign policy as either a
expo~t revolution, which he naturally feared, or as the
actions of a great power, which he could understand or even
welcome. The Nazi-Soviet pact and then the desire for cooperation.
~ 34K!en: Do emigrace, p.315-318.
" 35 ,Particularly revealing is Smutny's study of Soviet foreign policy
of April 1941: Dokumenty z historie, Vol I, dok.166
36 ~8enes: Memoirs, passim. See also R.H.B. Lockhart: Comes the
Reckoning, london, 1947, p.72 •
. 37J• Kren, V. Kural: liKe stykBm mezi ceskoslovenskym odbojem a
SSSR v letech1939-1941", Historie a vCJenstv!,XV1, No.3, 1967,
esp. p.732-733, ~nd KraJina, ~ 876747, p.12.
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with the ~est seemed to indicate tho ~upr8macy of the latter
element but 8ene~, particularly du ri riq and after ~;oviet military
successes in mid-1943, feared the possil!ility of the US~R defeat-
ing Germany alone and deciding the fal8 of Ceni.raI Europe38• To
avert this danger Bene~ firmly advocated East-West cooperation
hoping that it could continue even after the war, giving the West
a say in Central Eur opo , He hoLi eved, and he hod supporting ev idcnce ,
that the USSR would see a strong, democratic, anti-Nazi Czecho-
1 t . t 39s ovakia as being in their own bes In erasts •
alleged inapplicability of Communist I da..s to Czechca) ovak La and
.I~Ustill needing the cooperation of the Uest to rebuild their economy ,
the Soviet leaders might see the puintlessness of trying to force
/11revolution onto Czechoslovakia • He tried to reassure himsolf that
changes in Soviet foreign policy urou.l r: be reinforced by chanqes
inside the Soviet Union in the direction of his own concoption of
of democracy. Often he seemed optimistic but at other times he
<'12acknowledged that no basic chAnges cuuld be expected.
38Lockhart: Comes, p.269, and C. r':ac:crlLie:Dr. F\end;, t.oncton , 19:;6,
p.261.
39Mackenzie: Or. Oene§, p.296,
Vol II, Praha, 1948, p.101.
Democrat who Bene~ appointed
his strategy for winning the
and Z. F .ierLi nr.er r Ve sluZll<3ch(~,R,
Fierlincer was Cl left-wing Social
arnb assadur in the W)~';H as part of
trust of t.l.a ~)ovll:tleade r-ahi.p,
40~lackenzie: Dr. r:em,s, p.29'J. anc C. T6LlJfSky: "nene~ and Stalin:
r~oscow 1943 and 1945", JOI!rr,al of Lontrfl] European Affai.rs, XIII,
No.2, July 1953, p.~S5.
41e.g. his comrnent.sof" 28/9/43, [lul;tir,·,pnty z hi~jlnrie, Vol I, do:,.:J1I.;,
p.378.
42 F' I'e. g. 1.e r 1.nc)!:)r : \Ie sluz~.rch, p.? G.
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During 1943, as his hopes of liberation and fears of its
consequences mounted, Denes began discussions on a treaty of
friendship with the USSR. This caused considerable suspicion in
British government circles43 but approval was finally given. 8ene~
could eventually travel to Moscow after the leaders of the three
anti-Nazi powers had agreed to meet in Teheran, His aim was, as
a part of and further encouragement to East-West cooperation~ to
ensure that the Soviet leaders firmly recognised the restoration
a Czechoslovak state with him as President as one of
this he described as "non-interference" in Czechoslovakia's
44affairs •
The outcome of his discussions with Stalin and Molotov left
,him in a state of elation: they seemed to regard him as a basic
45 "part of their plans for Central Europe • Denes also held discussions
with the KSC leaders during which he generally gave non-committal ;"
or subtly flattering replies to suggestions for resistance strategy~
46and measures in post-war Czechoslovakia • His main conclusion
in fact uas that the Comll,unists,albei t with some reservations,
43Bene~: ~est let, p.357, and Memoirs, p.243.
44ror a discussion of 8ene§'s aims and reactions, see E. Taborsky;
"8ene§ovy moskevsk' cesty", Sv~dectv!, It No.3-4, ,1957. He had,
on 12/7/41, expressed fears of a possible Soviet backed alternative
government including the KSC,Fierlinger and Nejedl9; Ookumenty ,
:z historie, Vol I, dok.198, p.241.
45raborsky's record of these discussions appeared in svedectv!,
XII, No.47, p.479-489.
46A record of these discussions from the Communist side was
published in Cesta ka kvetnu, p.4U-59.
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acknowledged his right to be President47• This recognition meant
that the London government could make detailed preparations for •
returning home and governing48 thereby effectively ignoring the
different ideas of the KSC. Benes even completely ignored the KS~
ideas on Czechoslovakia's future political structure - as outlined
in Section 11.9.5. - and proclaimed that the National front
stretched from left to right49 and that there should be three
f t· 50parties - Ie t, centre and conserva ~ve •
The major concession from B~es seemed to be advocacy._gf
. ,
, it. 51armed struggle aga nst he occuplers • This~however, did not
,represent acceptance of its correctness or a concession to KS~
pressure. The reason was rather pressure form the Soviet, and
p6ssibly also British governments,so that Benel felt obliged to
some ges~ to consolidate his internal recognition52•
Even promises to the Soviet leaders of important internal
53changes and co-ordination with Soviet plans appear
47 ..Bene~ regarded the actual content of these
so trivial that he gave the meeting only a passing reference as
as the twenty third point out of twenty four in a London govern-
ment circular of January 1944 assessing the outcome of his
to Moscow; ~, dok.39.
48Speech to the State Council on 3/2/44, Sene~: ~est let, p.394':"
395. for the preparations see Ripka: Czechoslovakia, p.26 and
B. Lastovi~ka: l Lond9nl za v'lky, Praha, 1960, p.367-368.
~.
49sroadcast from Moscow on 23/12/43, Bene~: ~est let, p.241.
50 )(Speech of 3/2/44, Oene~: ~est let, p.389. Apparently he felt
confident that the Communists would win only 15-20% of the votes
in post-war elections, so that they could only wield more power
than him with the help of direct Soviet intervention; V. Kral:
Osvobozen! Ceskoslovenska, Praha, 1975, p.20.
51Bene~: ~e9t let, p.222 and p.385.
525ae his statements of 10/7/44 and 10/10/42 in ~, dok.91, p.226,
and Dokumenty z historie, Vol II, dok.502, p.702 respectively.
53fierlingera Ve slu~bach, p.191-192.
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unconvincing as tradG with the USSRI was only expected to be 15-20%
while Benes's Finance [',inisterwas neg,!-iatingagreements in the U.S.
54and Canada for post-war Czechoslovakia • Aore likely, and this
was'a crucial consid~ration, Denes thought the economic strength
of the USA could help restore Western influence in Centtal Europe
even after a Soviet military victory.
Bene~'s confidence was further raised in May 1944 by an
additional treaty giving power to a "government delegate" rather
than the Soviet authorities in Czechoslovak ~territory as
liberated55• The delegate appointed was the right-wing Social·
Democrat f. N~mec and he left for Moscow in August 1944
by an advisory committee of the Slovak Communist Valo, the Social
Democrat Lau~man, Uhl!f of the National Socialists and H'la from
56the Peoples' Party • On the eve of Czechoslovakia's liberation,
-r-: to be set for a restoration of the republic in the
desired by Benes.
11.8.5. Summary and discussion
One possible viewpoint on the Nazi occupation was that it
had to be accepted as the Czechoslovak state had not been a
proposition for the Czech nation. This was the justification for
those, generally from the right, who helped the Nazis achieve
" their aims by willingly acquiescing or even actively
54Kr'1: Osvohozen!, p.202, SeG also the massage from Ripka to the
Czechoslovak ambassador in Geneva of 1/11/44 quoted ,in Kral:
Osvobozen!, p.401-402.
55 . 'This treaty was reproduced in ~enel: ~est let, p.475-477.
56Bou~ek,et al: Program, p.109-110.
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At first they foHoti/Bd the dominant Czech Pl1licy of tns 191/1-1918
period, but the consequences for them were far worse because of
the nature of the occupation.
Benel set about trying to restore the Czechoslovak state
by relying on the West. He too followed his World War I strategy
and hoped to be able to convince the Western powers that they
had made a dreadful mistake at ~'unicfl. He was flexible and far-
sighted enough to see that, if he was to return bome as President,
there would have to be major reforms in the new Czechoslovakia
to prevent socialist revolution. These included nationalisalions
and land reforms and he even advocated expulsion of the German
minority which was widely accused of actively aiding in Czecho-
slovakia's downfall.
The most controversial aspect was his policy towards the Souiet
Union. Ha visited Moscow in 1943 and signed treaty agreements
with the soviet leaders. This, howover, in no sensa represented
a full commitment to the USSR. Rather it was am insurance policy
(or in case the Soviet armies should dominate Central Europe. As
an exercise in purely diplomatic manta uvring, Henes's uar time
strategy was well thought out and probably achieved as much~es
was possible. Chapter 11 shows how Ocne~ was forced to move closer
to the USSR and it appears very distorted to suggest that he was
excessively trustful of Stalin.
Oenei, hcwever, did ultimately fail to achieve his political
aims so that he must have wrongly assHssed the situation someho~.
His error can he summarised as a goneral failure to undersland how
wer,~different things fram 1~1U. In particular, he was 0reatly hHmpered
(\
by his underestimati:Jn of the development and st.rength of SlOlJilk
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nationalism ~nd he still held a stereotyped view of what a revolution
was so that he misunderstood the basis and nature of the strength
of the KS~.
Had he recognised more accurately how Czechoslovak society
was changing, he would have needed to fundamentally revise mahy of
his ideas. This, however, would hardly have made him ~ conservative.
political strategy.
He was, of course, always restricted by his desire to win favour with
.the British government so that he was scared of appeating
,
be too radical. Thus his expertise on the international diplomatic
arena restricted his scope for formulating a fully satisfactory
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CHAPTER 9: COMMUNIST STRATEGY DURING W(Jf1LD ~JAR II
While Cenes was evolving his ideas or: the future shape of
Czechoslovakia and preparing to put them into practice, the KS~
too were forced by the objective situation to work out new ideas.
These followed a tortuous path of development from the time of
Munich through to the spring of 1945, when the Communists could
propose a programme for Czechoslovak society which was adopted by
the first post-war government.
The narrative omits the important question nf Slovakia, which
is discussed in a separate sBction later, but follows the develop-
.,ment of KSC thinking througholJt the whole period from September
1938. This is necessary partly :-,Bcauset.l.a war-time record of
the various part~s became a major issue after liberation so that
vthe question, for example, of KSC strategy during the period of
the Nazi-Soviet pact was an issue in the 1946 elections. It is
necessary also so as to reveal the internal consist~ncy and permanence
of KS~ ideas in 1945: the aim is to show how complete and how
deeply rooted aspects of that strategy were and ~lso how, and to
vwhat extent the KSC can be seen as the "leading force" in Czecho-
slovakia in 1945.
11.9.1. Tho Communists respond to ["Iunichand tho ncc"pntion by
fumtJling to~~h8 iciBilof a f:ational Front.
vAt first the KSC, like the whole [zoch natinn, was disorienled
by nun lch, They had centred tneLr r.ct.Lvi t y on tho willin~jnoss of
the government socialist parties to resist and, when they 8nd denes
capitulatod, there seamed tu be nu ,:;811:-;' in attemptinq ItJacubin"
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1 vdefence. During the Second Republic the KSC tried to develop
unity to defend what was left of pre-Munich democracy, but this
proved to be an illusory hope as political developments led instead
vto the banning of KSC. Communists were again surprised by the
sudden Nazi occupation and many were quickly arrested2•
v 'Nevertheless, the KSC alone among parties held out against the ~
rather than governments and ruling circles.
right-ward, pro-German trend in Czempclitics while its leaders
.'sought safety in emigration. Only a few went
3because of the Soviet leadership's fear of foreigners, and most
went to France. Work in emigration was organised from the
and indicated how important the KSC believed "the great
states like france, England and the USA" would be in deciding
slovakia's fate4• Unlike Benes, however, they directed their
activities towards the anti-fascist and working class movements
~ctivity was regarded as the party's primary work so that a
task for the emigration was the formulation of programmatic principles
for domestic work as well.
By mid-1939 the KS~ in Paris, led by ~verma and obviously
1R• Vetiska: Skok do tm~, Praha, 1966, p.63.
2Tha party later became self-critical of its inactivity in this'period, but did not pinpoint sp8cifi~ errors. Probably ~verma
initiated the suggestion that the KSC should have created authori-
tative organs among tha people rather than relying entirely on
bourgeois democrats during the Munich~crisis; OdboJ a revoluee,
p.63, Narodnl fronta,. p.22~, and J. Sverma: Za socialistickou
vlast Vybran6 spisy, Eraha, 1949, p.276-277.
3J• Novotn1: "KS~ v ilegalit~ (1930-1939)", Z p06'tk5, p.42-43, and
Kfen: 00 emigrece, p.494-495.
4KS~ directive on work in Paris, June 1939, Za svobodu teskfiho a
slovenskeho naroda, Praha, 1956, p.84.
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maintaining good contacts with Moscow, had formulated their aSS8SS-
ment of Munich. They argued that Czechoslovakia should and could
be restored within the international context of a world-wide anti-
fascist front with the USSR wielding a powerful influence in
5Europe •
from this followed the tasks for the emigration and for'the
domestic resistance which, for both, was to create broad national,
6unity, the term "National Front" even appeared. Leadership within";;,
,;this, it was argued, could be taken only by the KS~7.
, . :.:\.:.,·.~T .: /(
. ",,;., ;: ;,.\
, -.'. <'>" ,~




of Czechoslovakia by its Western allies but also an activebetrayal)a~~
,-. ' :~'-~':;;'<'.'.,-
by the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie in line with their own class" intere~t~.
I:,
They were wrong in believing that Benes had
Even the "democratic wing" of the bourgeoisie, as representl;ld
8ene~, had vacillated and capitulated so that,
"orily'the working class is competent and able to lead
struggle for liberation"S.
credited himself and also unduly optimistic in believing that:
,Protectorate was completely isolated at home from the
Nevertheless, the KSC's solid rejection of any
could well have won them a position of genuine leadership in
"SZa svobodu ~eskehot p.92-93 and p.103.
,.
~ 6 .D. Jane~ek: "Zrod politiky Narodn! fronty a Moskevske veden!
Revue d~jin socialismu, 1969, No.6, p.SOS-812, quoting an
written by-§meral and intended for publication in Paris.
7Za svobodu ~esk~ho, p.99-100.
8from an article originally published on 10/7/39, ~verma: Za
socialistickou, p.27D-277.
. .
9Kren: Do emigrace, p.177.
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nation as the Protectorate government gradually did become isolated.
Instead, the start of World War II, for which the KS~ in Paris had
11been implicitly working, brought a sudden switch in ComiternA
strategy amounting to a subordination to the tactical needs of
Soviet foreign policy.
course to World War I. This would enable the USSR to intervene in a
revolutionary way when the warrin~ powers had exhausted themselves10•
Perhaps the dominant aspect of KS~ activity fully in line with
The Nazi-Soviet pact. Disast~rous sectarianism reverses
the development of KsE policy towards a concept of
national unity.
At first the KSC domestically and in Paris seem to have
the Nazi-Soviet pact p.urely as a tactic and even seen its revolu-
tionary potential as the war would, they presumed, follow a similar
such a perspective - was waiting, trying to learn the methods of
underground activity and conserving an organisation "in deep illegal-
ity not only from the German police but also from the nation,,11.
This was encouraged by the savage repression of demonstrations in
October and Novembe~ 1939 after which immediate mass action was
regarded as being too dangerous both by Genes in London and by
It: 12the KS~ in Moscow •
..
10 v t" th [ v. th t fe.g. Sverma's conversa 10n W1 'snes 1n e au umn 0 1939,
8ene~: Memoirs, p.140-141.
11J• fuc!k: Report~z psana na opratcs, Praha, 1957, p.134.
12 Vol.e.g. K. Gottwald: Spisy,,,IX, Praha, 195/1, p.36. For' f.Jenes'sview
of 3/12/39, see Dokumenty z historis, Vol II, dok.374, p.391.
- 172 -
There seems to have been cunf usLon 13in Moscow as well as
at home but, albeit qr adua ll y, there lJJElS a ciefinite acceptance of
increasingly sectarian attitudes within the K5~. Depsite claims that
x 14the KSL collaborated:· , they never held even a neutral attitude
towards the occupation. Nevertheless, alttlough some contacts were
maintained, the K5~ leadership in ~oscow denounced any sort of
unity with Benel or with those who accepted his leadership. They
eveded anything that could give preference to one side or the othor
in the war and, on the grounds of fi~Jtltinganti-German "chauvinism",
effectively isolated themselves from Czech nationalism. In practice
the KS~ cut itself off from the nation's main hope of liberation
15which remained 8ene~ and the illest • Activities were restricted
16to workers' economic struggles •
It must be said that the Communisls could find considerable
justification for the Comintern's line n0t from its own strength
ot consistency but frem the weaknesses of possible alternatives.
It was impossible to choose an anti-fascist war instead as the
West lUas involved in "phoney war" associated llJi th the most Forceful
anti-Communist propaganda since the Russian revolution. 8eneM.
13There were long delays be:ween messages from Moscow to the
domestic KSC and important aspects of the line were clarified
only slowly. The radio messages wore put } Lshe d in "Depe~e mez i
Prahou a Moskvou 1939-19/~1", Prr~"r8vky k d~jjn5rn K~)~, 1967,
No.3.
14J• K'ten: V emigraci: zapadnf zahranicnf odlJoj 1CJ31l-1940, Praha,
1969, p.541-542. The story probubly originated from the Gestapo
as is argued in F. Jana~ek, J. r.;cvoLnY,A. Hajknva: "Nova or-ientace",
Historie a vojenstvf, XVIII, No.4, 1969, p.657-65C.
15neicin: "Situace", EISp. p.99.
16FO:D more information see "I·)epe~ell,the re le van t
Za svobodu ceskeho, arid I<:ral:C tazky, Vol III.




although cautious towards the USSR, was very cutting about the KSC.
Moreover, Soviet territorial expansion seemed to suggest greater
progress for Communism than the strategy of anti-fascist unity had
yielded17•
.nThen the Com~l\ternLeade rship was shaken by the easy fall of
France which upset their most basic prediction on the course of
18the war • This was followed by a growing awareness of the import-
the revolutionary working class movement, so it was claimed,
ance of national liberation struggles by the Communist Parties in
G d Y Lav i ft th t . . d
19 dreece an ugos ~a a er ose coun r~es were occup~e ,an
as fears ~ounted in Moscow that a Nazi attack was imminent20.,
In this new atmosphere the KSC leadership in Moscow held
ranging discussions on their strategy. According to Kopecky,
undertook a reassessment of the 1918-1920 period on the basis of .~,
Lenin's works on the 1905 and 1917 revolutions. It was
the left's strategy had been for an Lmured i.at.e socialist revolution
while the concrete tasks confronting them made possible only a
national democratic revolution, analogous to the bourgeois demo-
era tic revolution discussed by Lenin. By ignoring broader
allowed itself to be isolated from the peasants and was therefore'
defeated in the 1920 general strike21
17Kren: V emiqraci, p.558-56D, and F. Jana~ek,et al:"Nova".
18E• Fischer: An Opposing Man, London, 1974, p.354-358.
198eerl et aI, Dejinna, p.84.
20w• G6ra in Narodn! franta, p.364.
21V. Kopecky: Gottwald v Moskv~, Praha, 1946, esp. p.16.
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Such ideas undoubtedly did develop before the end of the war
vand the view outlined by Kopecky became the orthodox KSC position.
A sim.ilarnotion ofa two stage revolution was, in fact, being proposed
by Smeral in mid-1939 and again in late 194022• Nevertheless, in
published documents in late 1940 and early 1941 at least, the re-
emphasis on national liberation was linked very directly with
socialist revolution and there was no mention of a definite sepa-
ration or of the process of "growing over" to which Lenin had
referred. In a message to the domestic KS~ in early January 1941
Gottwald argued: "Our line in the fight for the national liberation
of the Czech nation remains the same. At the same time the
connection between national and social liberation, between national
liberation and socialism, stands out ever more clearly. The
working class, led by the Communist Party of Czechoslovkaia, has
today a great chance to gain leadership in the national liberation
23"movement •
II.9.3. The Nazi attack on the USSR: the KS~ suddenly switches'
its strategy.
Whatever changes may have been taking place within the
~ in early 1941, the decisive change in June and July came not from
any rethinking of revolutionary strategy but - just as had been the
) .
~ case in 1939 - as a sudden and empirical reaction to a major world
event. The Nazi invasion of the USSR meant that all else was
suddenly subordinated to the aim of preventing the defeat of the '
22Jane~ek: "Zrod", p.BOB-812. Interestingly, Kopeck9 specifically
mentioned that ~meral took part in the discussions; Kopecky:
Gottwald, p.18.
23Gottwald: Spisy, IX, p.35-36.
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USSR. A more complete policy only evolved with time particularly~
as the Soviet Union's position improved in 1943. Major landmarks
for the KSC were a Comintern resolution of 5/1/43 and then the
dissolution of the Co~intern, although direct advice to the KSC
The KS~ naturally followed the Soviet government's policy
leaders from Stalin and Dimitrov was still very influential. Then,
roughly coinciding with Benel's visit to Moscow, the journal
~eskoslovensk' listy started publication in Moscow. It was not
exclusively KSC publication, but it did provide
programmatic articles, which enabled the KsE to
that were eventually to become the basis for the first post-war
government.
At first, howevor, the KS~ leaders were cautious. They
ally raised their own prestige by a conscious evasion of any···
reference to proposals for the post-war republic
24of the maximum immediate national unity • This
·exact return to the popular Front policy of the late 1930's.
appeared rather as aiming for a two stage revolution: the first
was to be victory in the war and only then could the question of
socialism be raised.
avoiding actions likely to cause misunderstanding in the West.
Benes was seen as a likely proponent of East-West cooperation and
24e•g• Gottwald's speech to the Czechoslovak army units in Buzuluk
on 27/5/42, K. Gottwald, SQisy, X, p.39-50. Czechoslovak units,
ultimately under the command of 8enes~w8re formed bo~h in the
West and in the Soviet Union. The latter were at first extremely
hostile to the USSR because so many of the soldiers had been sent
to prison camps there. Gradually, however, KSC influence grew and
the Czechoslovak units fought actively in the war: this was contrary
to Bene~'s original conception as he had wanted lightly armed units
that could be flown in to keep order in Czechoslovakia on its lib-
eration; 0, Jane~ek: "Boj 0 hegemonii v ~s vojsku v SSSR (1942-1945)",
pfrsp~vky k dMJingm K5~, 1964, No.2, p.199-227, and OdhoJ arevoluce,
p.184-185 and p.270-281.
- 176 -
Dimitrov therefore insisted that no pl~tfDrm should be constructed
aimed against him - for example with left ~(Jc!al Democrats25 -
and the re-estalllishflmnt of the Czechosluvak state was clearly
recognised as a war aim.
Nevertheless, it wo~ld be very wrong to present VS~ policy as
.th Lav i d P 1 d 1 tt l' t26Wl Yugos a an 0 an r avea i s 11e rea po i nt • In those
a simple compliance with the needs of Suviet diplomacy. Comparison
countries, although for different reasrns, unity with London emigr~
the wishes of r.cscou, began adopting ['rol]rammesccn tairu nq consider-
governments proved to be imposc3!ble. Lornmuni.sts therofore, aqa Iris t
able although different degrees of social radicalism. In some parts
of Yugoslavia this even appeared as the essential basis for an activo
resistance movement as the idea of restoring the Yuguslav state was
27actually unpopular • In the Czech lands the situation was very
different: Benes commanded Lmmanse pres tige and was much more friendl y
to the Soviet Union and Communists generally than others in the
west. I"loreovef,national. liberation aLorie was the obvLous first
demand from the Czech people and that mnant, in practical terms,
restoration of Czechoslovakia with i~8no~ as President.
25Jane~8k: "Zrod", p.832.
26At a conference of historians from the throe countries in 19G6
they could not even a.qraa on a def in! t i on of the term "national
front". See the contrihutions in ~.I8.roclnl f ron ta, Also reveaLlno_1
is Opat's conclusion in V. Kotyk (rditor): stferlnf R jihov9chodn!
[vropa vs v~lce a v revoluei 1Q3f:-1n45, Preha, 19G7.
27AcCording to ~1. Apostolski and P. ;Idmjanovic, ~:f:1rmJnr f ron t.a,
p.462 and p. 523 respectively.
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There could, then,be no serious resistance movement rejecting
Benes and all his diverse followers. The domestic KSC therefore
enthusiastically followed the line of establishing the broadest
possible national unity. They even claimed, in October 1941, to
,
have established a united central organ including themselves and
pro-Benes groups2B. This is denied by' all non-Communist sources and29
seems unlikely as the programmatic statement would have been un-
acceptable to Benes.
This does not mean that there were not serious disagreements
between Benes and the KS~. In fact, the latter disagreed so strongly','
on questions of, resistance strategy that,they refused to join the
London government even when it would probably have boosted their
own, prestige. There was a wider significance to this as, by
avoiding too close an association with Bene~ and by refraining
from comment on possible future forms of the republic, the ~S~ were
keeping their options open. The war could have ended by revolution
inside Germany or by complete Soviet domination of Cemtral Europe,
in which case Benes might have been an irrelevant embarrassment to
the KSC. Later they insisted that the London government should
never return home in office and this greatly worried 8en8s30• At
first, however, the Communists' sole concern seemed to be with
resistance strategy. Their line was transmitted in radio broadcasts
which started shortly after the USSR was attacked: there was
28Rude prevo 1939-1945, Praha, 1971, p.228.
2ge•g• l<raJina, .§..§. 8/6/47, p.11.




probably no direct contact with the domestic KSC organisations so
that this was their only external source of political advice.
11.9.4. The Communists insist on the need for an active
resistance.
The essential point was that the KS~ presented
ones confronting the emigration. The london government,'it
argued, should regard developing an active
their first task. Three main reasons were given for this;
interests'of the Czechoslovak people in a rapid victory in
the duty of the London government as
~lth Nazi Germany and the likely
future international standing on its role within the common
, 31effort •
The methods to be used changed at different periods
but'the KSC always present.ed the repsonsibility for resistance
as a generaf one for the whole population. At first, showing
avidly the population had been awaiting Soviet entry into the
\ .~
~ there was an outburst of strikes in the late summer of 1941 which
lei to Heydrich' s arrival in' Prague and the use of "severe ,ruthless" "
32 ~measures • Nevertheless, this led the domestic KS~ to
.,,1
the idea of a sudden mass general strike as the prelude to en
31 Vol.K. Gottwald: Spisy,~XI, Praha, 1955, p.259-260.
,
32Heydrich's words; Dole~al, Kren; Czechoslovakia's, p.52. for an
account of the strikes see L. Lehar: Pra~~tl kov8ci v boji za
svobodu (1939-1941), Praha, 1965, p.98-111.
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d ., 33arma uprl.Slng This view was noL st.a red in r':OSCOW uhe rs 8n-
couragement was given to individual sabotar,,8 acts. nft.or this there
was to be development into sabotage groups and eventually partisan
units.
This last point wa~ particulaly controversial as London
government circles insisted that partisan warfare was impossible
in the Czech lands. Even Gottwald was sceptical but he finally
succombed to Soviet pressure after Lidice and adopted the Comintern
line which was for the immediate formation of partisan units34• In
practice this met u.ith immense difficulties. AlthOl!gt-there were
some beginnings both from KS~ organisatiuns and around groups of
escaped Soviet prisoners who had no contacts with und6rground
political organisations35, it proved impossible to develop any
serious parti~an activity. The pMncipal obstacles were the lack
of erms _ the Czech resistance had shortly !)8forehand been complet-
. 36ely disarmed - and the Nazi occupiers' strategy which g8ve plenty
of scope for passive acq~iescence.
Nevertheless, the Comintern's argunlEJntscould not be faulted.
Subsequent experience showed that armed uprisings could only be
serious when preceded by part Lsan Be t i nno , It also proved impossible
to maintain a permanent and lasting political leadership relying
only on underground methods: it had to Le protected by the armed
3311Vojensko poli ticka linie KSC a dOl1l8c!oduo j ova f runt.av
okupovan9ch ceskich zem!ch (rervcn 1941- duben 1944)", Historie
a vojenstv!, 1974, No.4, p.71-72.
34 Jane1:ek: "Zrod", p.8:51.
35001e~a]: Jedina. contains Lhe ~,8St account.
36I"lencl,Slade:; Dny, p.49-5: and p.6S.
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on post-war Czechoslovakia. The starting point is
The Communist leadership in Moscow develops its
strength of partisans, as in Yugoslavi~. The KSC found itself
defenceless before the Gestapo who were able to penetrate its
organisations with informers, reaching at times the very top:
without armed units the KS~ could do nothing to prevent this
paralysing their activities.
The Moscow KSC hoped to be able to overcome the
difficulties. They emphasised their
partisan warfare would involve unnecessary sacrifices or
Czech nation would vanish if the Nazis w~re noi
In the interests of encouraging broader participation in
activities, they called for a stronger propaganda line from
against collaborators. This included the
passing a law against collaboration so as to frighten them37•
notion of political leadership in the resistance.
Gottwald always believed that collaboration and resistance
primarily political questions. The Protectorate leaders were
not only displaying cowardice but also making a definite choic~ and
presenting their policies as the best possible way forward for the
Czech nation. Got twalJ argued that their ideas did find a degree
.of·acceptance as shown in the strength of "attentism" - the
~
j. philosophy of waiting. passively until everybody else was willing
take action - and from that followed his view that there had to be
" 38conscious and active political leadership to encoura~e. resistance •
37 . ,. Gottwald: Splsy, XI, p.261. SEE .also the Comintern's resolution of
5/1/43, ~ , dok.1, p.40.
38cottwald: Spisy, XI, p.294; from Ceskos]ovenske listy, 1/2/44.
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This could be provided only by those who had never betrayed the
nation's interests and who had the social base and political past
to differentiate themselves from collaborators. He argued that
this pointed to a bloc of socialist parties whith should be seen
hot as the representative of the left, but as the representative
The KSC even argued that right-wing parties, which wetS
of the whole nation. Gottwald added that this bloc should also
1 d i th bl' 39ea n e new repu 1C •
judged to have betrayed the republic in
should bs allowed no legal existence at all. Slansk; presented .
,the case for banning the Agrarians with the optimistic claim that
the peasan~had come to see that they had no conflicts with the
towns so that they could be politically represented by the socialist
parties. The Agrarians' basic philosophy of a separate peasant
40interest could no longer expect any support • This did not mean'
that all the former members or supporters of right-wiMg parties
were condemned: they could still find a place in political life
so long as they did not attempt to revive the.ideas of Agrarianism
which were said to have led ultimately to the Munich betrayal.
This meant that the demand for banning these parties could have
some common ground with []ene~'s desire to simplify the party system
and that gave it a much greater chance of success.
395ee Gottwald's article in Ceskos]ovnnske listy, 1/2/44, in Spisy,
XI, p.289-296, and Sverma's article of 1/5/44 in Crota ke kv~tnu,
p.123-124.
40R• Sl&nsk9: Za vft~zstvr socialismu, Vol I, Praha, 1951, p.370-
377. The article was originally published in ~eskoslovenBk~
listy, 1/3/44.
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Bene§, as has Leen argued, did no~ nccbpt the ~oscow KS~ ideas.
Nevertheless, following his visit to l'ii.lSCLJW, the Social Democrat
and National Socialist organisations were re-astablished in London
and joined with the KSC in discussions in a "Socialist liloc".
Although there was considerable common ground, the discussions
gradually stagnated. The ,point was that particularly the National
Socialists still regarded the london Qcvernmont as the supreme
organ so that the bloc remained an anumalous institution with, to
. 41them, no ObV10US purpose •
11.9.6. The Communists have to rRcuncile their ideas on
political leadership in the national democratic
revolution with their earlier concerti0n of a
dictatorship of the proletariat.
The conception of a particular form of politienl Leade rshlp
in the national struggle was the main connecting link in I(Se
thinking between resistance strategy and the future form of the
republic. It indicated that the KS~ aimed not for a simple
restoration but rather fbr a fundamental transformation from'pre-
~lunith democracy. This left open the r.ue s t.Lori of huw th is new
democracy related to the ideas on political powBr developed within
the Comintern.
There was an obvious lik8ne~,s to the Popular Front ..erLod as
democracy was presented efFecti.vely as the antithesis of fascism.
Diversity was quite acceptable with!r! the democratic camp, but it had
to be diversity within firm anti-fasciut unity excluding those
political currents that, despite thuir allegud commit.ronntto
41 ke "v;;tn~J ,v,, "Cesta" p.13~-136, anri I a~l(lVlcl,a: ~_l_u!)dynCl, e sp, 1'.3,/,.(. end
p.349. See also Jerosli}l/Stdns~,y's acc o n~, S J 1D/12/tl:S, p.::.
___ ,
democracy, had been found wantino in 1938.
This, however, leaves Lhe same am~iguities as had the Popular
Front policy. Czech politicians in London naturally doubLed
whether the KS~ had abandoned the view that it alone could lead
C' h . t 42zec soc~e y • To facilitate cooperation with Bene~ and his
associates, the KS~ had to try to answer this~ They often gave
the careful response that, with the need for active support from
the overwhelming majority of the population to surmount the immense
obstacles presented by liberation and reconstruction, it would be
43absurd for the KS~ to try to take on the task alone • Gottwald
presented the argument as follows: "Lle cannot govern alone and they
cannot govern alone either. There rl'mains the necessity for co-
operation with the other political group which is forced to cooperate
with us,,44. The National Socialists could be assured: "Lf you had
LISnot existed, we would have had to create you" • This suggested
the hope for a fairly length; period of cooperation, but it was
always left ambiguous 8xactly where it could lead to. The Communists,
while in r:lanyrespects developing new icleas on revolution, seem to
have stuck to their belief that the only state form for socialism
was similar to that existing in the USSR with a single party
425e8 below Section II.~.11.
"
43e•g• Gottwald: 5p:is)" XI, ::;.222.
441<. Cottwald: spL,::l,oj\\II,'raha, ""5, p.21. This referredspecifically to Slovakia where cooperation was always more difficult,
but the same principle could apply to cooperation w~th Genes and
his associntes.
45Kopeck9 at 8 me~tlng of the three socialist parties in Ko~ice,
13/4/45, Cesta kp. kv6tnu, p.6UO.
___________________________ -~1Di,;~ _- __
accepting the Comrrunis!:sI proqr amme and rlD:T::incltingpolitical life
to tho extent that it would b~ illecal to attaci: it46• This could
seom to contrad5ct tho jJeas:ejn~ d~veloped on the political
leadership for the national dumocratic revolution and in rebuIlding
the new Czechoslovakia. A possihle way to reconcile the two was the
expectation that the socialist wculd crndu~lly come closer
together and eventually merge to leave a single party effectively
t 1" t i 147domina ing po 1 lca . •
11.9.7. The Cor:lmunists (~~ iLlom; on further aspects of
Czechoslovak democracy.
Although the bloc of sociali~t parties was placed at the centre
of the future political power structure, it was nut suggested that
democracy was an issue for pnrti~s alone. With the socialist
parties as its core there was to t~fl ;] l.r cade r r'Ja t icna l Front
including other organisations and possibly other parties. Trade
unions were an examplo: ideas on their role wore explicitly
developed from an expJ~nation for their f3~lure to resist the
capitulation during and after iun.l ch, T!lO trcut.Lo , I t was argued,
had been their sub·-c.ivision and SUo ur dinn t Lon to pol tical par tles
which had paralysed them 2nd ~rovuntHd them from expressing tho
people's will L!ur:inS,]tho !:unich .. 40cr:S1S
.'
46 . " t I . t . ILl b 1II Insul tlng Comrn,:n.:;.ss ",erc :.s no puru cna )...0 y ow - one day 1t
w 111 be", Cot twa1cJ , 5r.i. sy, XII, p •n •
47KopoCky crgued tbLs at :.1 1::.JL Ccntr.Jl Eomm.lt teuune et.Lnq on 6/2/46,
quotod in 8elda/et aJ: I..ji: r-ozhranf , p.3r";.
48J• ~vcrma, Ccs:c:11ovr.ns:;e1;slv 1/C/!I/l, reproduced in Z clej(n
odboroveho hnu tin n2 22~!<u (191;1,-1 Ci4:-;).DO::lJmenty, Ura t i slava,
1970, p.16-18.
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There was also to be a democratisation of local government
with greater power for elected representatives. Perhaps this too
owed, something to Sverma's analysis of the KS~ failure during the
Munich crisis49 as the starting point was to be the emergence of
National Committees, as in 1918, only this time they were to assume
much wider powers. Although presented as an expedient for a brief
period only - coinciding with the transition period of a few months
~hich 8ene~ foresaw separating liberation from the re-establishment
of a parliament- the K5~ evidently hoped that National Committees
would beco~8 permanent. In this they saw the transition peri~not
,just as the speediest possible return to "normal" :conditions but as
an ppportunity to test and prove these new institutions. National
Committees were to start as uniting and co-ordinating organs for
the resistance and then were to take over from the existing state
'machine at the time of liberation. Their tasks were defined extra-
ordinarily widely as the liberation of other countries showed what
problems could be expected. They were to be responsible for
organising armed guards, confiscating enemy property, ensuring food
supplies, purging pub1ic life of fascists and collaborators and
ensuring the continuation of production and economic life in ge~eral.
50powers over revolutionary courts were lator added •
49" See above p.110.
50For the most detailed concrete proposals, which were worked outin London during 1944, see Cesta ke kv~tnu, p.169-172.
General questions were outlined by 5verma, teskoslovenske 1isty,
1/9/44, in ~verma: Za socialistickou, p. 399-408.
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II.9.S! The KSt evolves anew nationalities policy which
dovetails with an international orientation of reliance
on IISlavonJc" unity.
Any seriousyrpgramme for a new CZGchoslovak republic had to
confront the issues of the German minority, of Czech-Slovak relations
and, to a lesser extent, of the Hungarian, Polish and Ukranian
minorities. The KSC tried for a time to keep its options open,but
could not equivocate indefinitely as the activisation of a resistance
'movement was partly dependent on clear and unambiguous answers to
these sorts of questions.
The KSC was particularly reluctant to accept Oene~'s idea
for mass expulsions of Germans sticking for as long as possible to
hopes that an anti-Nazi movement would develop among Sudeten Germans
and that a future Czechoslovak repuulic could solve nationality
f l't 51questions on the basis 0 aqua 1 y • Gradually, however, hopes ?f
~his fadad and the KSt moved remarkably close to 8ene~'s notion of a
combined national and social revolution. This was reflected in calls
for reducing "to a minimum the number of Germans remaining inside
bl' 52the frontiers of the new repu lC • Land reform proposals assumed
that Germans would"leav8 the Czech landll53 and that this would
leave scope for satisfying much of the Czech peasants' desire for
land reform. Gottwald could even argue, during the discussions
54 II ituat iover the government programme : our Sl uatl0n lS different
.'
from Poland and Hungary and it may not be
51comintern resolution of 5/1/1l3, SNP, dok s t , p.42. See also the
notes prepared by Gottwald in p.pill 1944, Cesta ke kv~tnu, p.106.
52J• Ko~atko, e-eskos}ovenske listy, 1/7/44, reproduced in Za novel
~eskoslovensko, Praha, 1945, p.130.
53Ko~atko, Za nov6, p.135.
54 Sea below Section II.11.3.
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55necessary to touch Czech landowners"
Towards Slvoakia .the KS~ more obviously clashed with B8ne~.
They tried at first to retain an ambiguous position - not clearly
favouring either an independent Slovak or a Czechosmvak state55•
Gradually, however, closer relations with Bene~ required a clearer
stand and they then tried to convince him of the need to clearly
recognise the existence of a separate Slovak nation within a future
Czechoslovak state as the precondition for an active resistance in~v~
Slovak historians have critised the timid way in which Kopecky in
Moscow approached this question5?, but the KS~ leaders were left
with little scope to develop their ideas without incurring the
extreme wrath of 8ene~. He expressly requested that there be no
questioning of his positions on Slovakia and on Munich58as, for
reasons already explained, this was essential to his plan for
regaining the ~residency.
The KS~ elsa viewed favourably the Polish and Ukrainian
minorities. It opposed the suggestion that any of them should be
expelled and argued that the new Czechoslovakia, although not to
be based on a single nation, was to be based on several Slavonic'
nationalitiee while Germans 'and Hungarians were to be "weakened
.. 55Cest~ ke kvetnu, p.421 •
55BeerJet al: D~Jinna, p.11?-118. Remarkable also is. Gottwald's
careful ambiguity in welcoming the renunciation of Munich, i.e.,
"the right of Czechs and Slovaks to independent state existence".
Gottwald: SpisX' X, p.125. The ideas of Slovak Communists them-
selves are discussed in Section II.10.1.
57e•g• s. falran: Slovenska otazka v Ceskoslovensku, Bratislava,1958, p.153-154. Kopeck~'s articles in Ceskoslovensk~ listy
are reproduced in ~.
58Fierlinger: Ve SluZbach, p.219. The KS~ seem to have largely
complied with this even though acceptance of the pointlessness of
resistance after Mun~ch obviously made it harder to argue for an
active resistance later.
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59and ousted" .• This related closely to the "Slavonic'idea" that
was actively propagated within the USSR. It was welcomed by Bene~
who .saw it as a deviation from "Bolshevik" thinking and eagerly
sought assurances that it was to be a permanent element in Soviet
. 60
policy •
For the KSC the "Slavonic idea" meant complete faith in the
USSR such that it replaced any hopes that Czechoslovakia's liberation
o~ future security might be assured by a German revolution61• They
went beyond this to justify the anti-German policy in terms of
Stalin's war-time attitudes on nationality questions which could
be related to a nSlavonic idea". The national character of the
revolution was even given a status within Marxist theory by Gottwald
who claimed that Lenin had presented tho main problem of every
revolution as "which class, which nation has power¥ in its hands
62and into which nation's or class's hands that power is passing'~
It was thereby possiL;le to present the strong measures against
German and Hungarian minorities as a logical part of the national
democratic revolution. It would probably have been better not to
try to incorporate them SD firmly into a Marxist theoretical frame-
work but rather to regard the expulsion of large numbers of Germans,
" 59Kopecky, Ceskoslovenske listy, 1/2/44, reproduced in ~, dok.44, p.151.
60Fierlinger: Ve slu!bach, p.183.
61At the same time, KSC leaders made it clear that they expectedno direct Soviet interference in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs
beyond military liberation; e.g. Gottwald's broadcast of 11/5/44,
in Spisy, XI, p.321-324.
62Gottwald: SpisX' XII, p.SO.
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irrespective of social position, as a regrettable necessity which
limited the degree to which the revolution can be described as
democraUc63•
11.9.9.; The Communlsts are non-commital about the social and
economic tasks of the national democratic revolution:
they seem to be left for a later socialist revolution.
Economic measures during the transition period followed from
the need to prevent immediate economic collapse - the influence
of Lenin's "Threatening Catastrophe" is obvious54• This meant that
National Committees and ractory Comfllitteeswere to take over the
property of Germans and collaborators as quickly as possible.
The ultimate fate of this property was carefully left open until
an elected parliament could decide. Although the Communists were
very much opposed to returning it to pre-war owners, they consciously




They likewise refrained from formulating any new 'ideas on how
socialist industry might be managed. Their view of trade unions was
essentially purely of mass organisations exerting a political
56
influence in the sta..tein general on behalf of the working class •
Possible roles for workers' orga~isations in changing methods of
management were considered only after the Slovak national uprising
6
?
53c•f• K. 8arto~ek: "Antifa~isticka revoluce v Cesk0510vensku1944-1945", Revue delin socialismu, 1969, No.5, p.673.
64r•J• Kolar: "vzpom!nky na komuru s tu'", Pr!spevky k d~Jinam KSC,
1965, No.2, p.
65S1ansky: Za v!tezstvf, V~l I, p.378-379. The article was
originally published in Ceskoslovenske listy, 1/4/44.
66sverma, Ceskoslovenske list¥, 1/6/44, reproduced in Z de j!n~, p.16-18.
6?see below Section 11.10.6.
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'.
when there were also a few references to nationalisations
68
•
One argument is that this followed from a fear that such
suggestions woulddisrupt national unity69, but 8ene~ and his
associates were quite willing to accept that there would be state
Lnd tri 70ownership of many ~n us r1es • There may well have been direct
advice from Stalin to ensure that the KS~ did not mention nation-
alisations71• The outcome was a KS~ conception of revolution
placing primacy or political power questions. Slansky put it
bluntly: "A favourable solution to all economic problems assumes
that repr~sentatives of these strata capsule of aSffirtingthe general
interests of the nations of our land •• get into the decisivo
positions in the administration of the state,,72.
putting together the various specific aspects discussed above,
KS~ policy, as it gradually evolved and took shape, appeared as a
rigorous definition of the most immediate tasks alongside ,evasion
of other issues that might hinder effective national unity. ThiswaB~
reflected in the characterisation of the revolution as "national
democratic" in such a way as to counterpose it to socialist
revolution73. This provided the theoretical Justification for
68e'.g. the articles by F. pexa-Voda andJ. Kolsk9 in ~esk06lovenskelisty, 28/10/44 and 15/2/45 respectively. r-iothare reproduced in
Z dejln.
69F .J. vo16r: Zestatnerni_EJr~myslu a peneznictv!, Praha, 1945, p.21.
70e•g• Ripka's letter to Feierabend of 18/9/44, Cesta ke kv6tnu,
p.234.
71ror indirect evidence see K. Kaplan: "Poznamky ke~ll"enipr8myslu v Ceskoslovonsku 1945", pri'sp(lvkyk dejinam Kst, 1966,
No.4, p.g.
72Sl5nskY: Za vrt~~stvr, Vol I, p.382.
73e•g• Gottwald's notes of April 1944, Casta ke kv~tnu, p.106.
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cooperation with other pel) UC81 trer-:ds ccr,tring on the bl.oc of
vsocialist parties which the I<SC j ns i s ..cd should be referred to as
a national bloc because its purpose was apparently not the
implementation of socialist aims74.
That means that the question of theJ poJilical leadership in
the later, socialist revolution was left open. It could still be
restricted to the KS~ alone while the social involvement could also
be narrowed down to the working class, instead of the broad national
unity _ bringing together w0rkers, peasants, small husinessmen and
intellectuals _ as advocated by Gottwald for the national democratic
, 75revolution • There was, of course, no direct answer to this
question, Kopeck~ts account of the discussions allegedly held in
1~40~6fully justifies evasion on questions that should be left to
a la~er socialist revolution.
I
'Itwas',therafore never even stated w(,other that secant!
revolution was to involve a violent confrontation. Nevertheless,
the ,pope .that the socialist parties would peacefully merge into
a .~nglepart~77 suggested that it might not. Gottwald's views on
the ~lass strucigle, which he insisted would not end with the
national democratic revolution, point to a similar conclusion. He
saw the class struggle cuntinuing in a new form the issue being
which political and social force could provide the best leadership
74Gottwald at a meeting of the socialist parties 13/4/45, Cesta
ke kv~tnu, p.611.
75e•9• Gottwald: Spisy, XI, p.296.
76~e8 above p, 174 •
7758e above P.185.
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f th t' 78or e na ~on • Interestingly, it was not suggested that there
was any logical necessity that the working class should lead the
revolution: workers were encouraged to be as active as possible so
79
,as to have the greatest influence in the future republic ,but the
i<s~ leadership in r'10scowwas able to observe from the published lists
of Czechs executed by the Nazis that active resistance was not
80
restricted to anyone section of the nation •
. Emphasis on this form of class struggle was in its~lf a
and was used as such by Gottwald when he was confronted with impati-
justification for continuing cooperation within a National Front
ence from some Slovak Communists. In fact, during the SJovak national
uprising, the KSS leaders visualised a rapid and definitive solution
to the question of political power through an all-Slovak congress of
, ' 81National Committees • There were similar ideas about the transient
~ature of cooperation with other political forces in liberated
82.Eastern Slovakia in early 1945 • Gottwald was then, for the first
time, compelled to explain the relationship between the
national revolution and the later socialist revolution. His argu-
ment was that, from tho point of view of its political power, the
bourgeoisie's position was greatly weakened by the war and its
outcome, It was, for example, unable to use a state apparatus
78Gottwald: Spisy, XII, p.23 and 24.
79~verma, teskoslovenske list};',1/6/44, in Z dej!n, p.16.
BOcomintern resolution of 5/1/43, ~, dok.1, p.38.




from the pre~Munich republic, from the period of occupation or one
constructed in emigration. Moreover, the programme that had been
adopted by all political parties gave further scope for undermining
the bourgeoisie in the name of a national revolution. The laws
against traitors and collaborators in general and in relation to
land reform and the confiscation of property were presented as
83_examples •• Although Gottwald's argument was expressed in terms of
'the situation in April 1945, it was probably worked out ,in general
terms considerably before.
'11.9.10. Communist ornanisations inside the Czech lands evolves
strategy compatible with that developed in Moscow.
The extent of repression inside the Protectorate greatly
yrestricted the ability of KSC organisations at home to formulate any
coherent ideas. In all there were five Illegal Central Committees,
,each one created after its predecessor had been decimated. Only a
very few people could remain active in resistance organisations
throughout the whole occupation. Either the strain of illegal work
was too much for them, or they were arrested and either executed or
imprisoned in concentration camps.
Despite immense practical difficulties, Communist organisations
did continue throughout the war. The ideas that they evolved, both
~ in underground organisations and in concentration camps, were similar
but not identical to those ~oveloped in Moscow. Particularly im-
portant was the period after the Comintern's resolution of 5/1/43
had been brought to the Third Il189al Central Committee by Veti~ka.
83Gottwald: Spisy, XII, p.13-19. This was after the formation
of the Ko~ic8 government, discussed in Chapter 11.
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He had difficulties convinc1ng the cjomestic leadership that the
Comintern's optimistic predictions of an early end to the war
should be acted on at once. Finally, however, his line ~as accepted
and one immediate consequence was an insistence on the action
readiness and hence centralised organisation of the illegal KS~.
Unfortunately, the leadership was already riddled with informers so
that this could only expose the whole party to devastating blows from
the Gestapo.
This led partly to demoralisation but also to forced decentral-
isati~n with Communist groups forming themselves independently of
e~chother and of tha leadership84. The most important of these was
t~egroup pledvoj (vanguard) which was led primarily by a group of
former students who had no pre-war poll tical expar Lence at all. Tt'ley
followed 8 widespread trend of searching for the causes of the party's
8~tb;a:cksin political errors and in particular in amhiguities about
th.o~e~lcal questions and the future form of the republic85•
.,.. . - ~. ,
They
the~~{or~6pproached ths. problems of t.heresistance from a different
"," ,~~:.enola.from ~oscow although in general Justifying the line of national
liberation struggle as received from Moscow Radio.
Vnlike Moscow, and Veti~ka, who distinguished the coming
revolution from 1918 only in the fierceness of the fight that would
. 86 th h'be need to defeat the Nazls , ey emp aSlsed from the start and
84The best accounts of this period are VntiSka: Skok, and ~lenc1,SHidek I~. The latter centres on the Predv~rOL,p.
85There is an obvious development from the Central Commi~t8e's
resolution of April 19~4 (in Cesta ke Kv~tnu, p.113-118) to
Pr~dvoj's ideas, also in Cesta ke kv~tnu.
868•9• B£ 24/7/43 in ~, p.424-425.
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unequivocally its social c or.t en t , Lz cct.os Iovak Le , they argued, was
ripe for socialism so that the revolutiln would ba "social in
content and national in form,,87. In t.e resLing ly, they avoided any
reference to the dict~torship of tho proletariat but elaborated 8
programme of social changes fully consistent with their notion of
a revolution of all the workinG peorle Jed by the working class.
Demands for the workers, it "einl] iriljjlicitlyassumed tha t the uhol s
bourgeoisie had betrayed the nation, incillded democratisation of
d 1 . t i 88management and steps towar spay equB.lsalun • A policy for peasants
. 1 d dId f d t" no t J f I 1 t· . t i 89lnc u e an re arm an ,lere was men lon 0 CO_ ec IVISa"lOn •
Plenty of points remained unilnsllmred. There llJaSno mention of
the world context, of Denes or of othor poll tical parties: p r-o sumab Ly
the future political structure was to be basad . /:ilrt.yon a slng 8"snd
National Committees. The relationship of the revolution to socialism
was unclear: they could have been contemplating a new "model" or
they could have expected a further evo]Lltionary process tu the
dictatorship of the prol~tariat. en Lhe Gelman minority they were
completely silent but on Slovakia they took a strong sland in favour
thp.
of the position adopted bY"I<SS during l.he :ilovak na t icna I up rLsLnq ,
Some of these ambiguities were answererJ by A!.tiv, another group
with which they maintainerj con t.act s , r,!;j:j v r ef'errad to Lhe need for
a national revolution that should ned t:hE'r r ost.oro the old republic
nor be socialist. It should have "social aims corresponding to the
current level of consciousness of the l11i"lSSeS" which me an t "a systern
87 ke kv1Hnu, p.149.Cesta
88 ke kv~ t.nu, p.1 :5tl-1 :'.S.Cesta
SC) ke i<:vetnu,p.17c:;.~Cesta
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of peoples'democracy". This was not the final aim "but only an
important point on the flow of development".90
. Although most of the P~edvoj leadership were arrested in
October 1944 the remainder joined with other groups an~ factory
organisations in creating the Fourth Illegal Central Committee.
This produced a programmatic resolution reflecting a growing concern
with the international situation following the conflicts between
British forces and the Greek resistance91• Immediate demands for
nationalisations of industries and land reform were included92 •
.Similar d.emands appeared in the programme of the illegal trade union
.organisation and post-liberation events leave little doubt that they
accurately reflected the workers' feelings.
11.9.11. Bene~.is very distrustful of the Communist strategy.
The KSC inside the Czech lands, perhaps operating in such deep
illegality as to be unable to estimate the political diversity to be
expected in the new republic, was able to'6i~ply. assume Oene§ out of
existence. The party's leadership in Moscow, however, had delib-
erately formulated its ideas in the hope that an agreement with 8ene~
.could be reached. It is thereforo important to consider how 8ene~
responded to their ideas.
There is an analogy to his over-simplified interpretation of
Soviet policy as, broadly speaking, 8ene~ could understand the KSC
policy either as subordination to his authority or as an attempt to
stage a revolution against him. Suspicions of the latter possibility
9080u~ekJet sl , ?rogram, p.155.
91For the impact this had on ths domestic KSC ses Mencl, Sladek: ~,
p.1S9, p.195, and p.199-200.
92B£. January 1945, in Cesta ke kv€Hnu, p.330-335.
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were aroused by the Conlmunists' attitudo towulds Slovakia which [ene~
, '. interpreted as an attempt tu weaken the repub Lic rnaki nq it a more
willing instrument of Communist policios93• After the discussions
in Moscow, Bene~ was particularly worried at the suggestion that his
London government should not returf,horne: he preferred to al tel"its
composition after a period "in which a certain s t.eb i Lisa t i on of
, 94
conditions at home could occur" •
at
Tha:e were also doubts in London"giving wide powers to the National
committees. Gott,wald's proposals on this were interpreted as
demonstrating the aim of a "soviet rev.olut.ion,,95. Fears of "rual
Jjowe:t"end arguments that there was no noed to "smash" the state as
96
the London government could simply return home with its apparatus
all pointed to the desirability of limiting the life-span and powers
,,'of,National Committees. According to the London ~lovernment's Interior
Minister, their aim was to be simply ensuring "the speediest possible
return to normal legal condi tions,•97• They would lherefore be
h 98dissolved after they had slected a ~rovisional National Assembly •
Even during the transition period, t.lie ir role was to be limited.
93 'His comments of 28/9/43, ookumenty z historie, Vol I, dok.310,
p.378-379.
94 'Fierlinger: Vs slu!bach, p.207.
95Jaroslav stransky at a National Soci.a Li.st, meeting on 3/5/44,
cesta ke kv~tnu, p.137.
96e.g. P. Maxa at a NationHl SociAlisL roeeling on 7/6/44, [~Bta
ke kvetnu, p.142.
97J• Sh~vik's speech of f3/3/41.quoted in I.• nerlelmann: VznH<Narodnlch vYborB, Praha, 1')56, p.%.
98SI~vik's speech of 28/2/1..4, Costa :,8 kllctnu, p.94-'J7.
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998ene~, who often suggested that they should be lasting organs , even
argued that the existing state bureaucracy should continue to operate
"•• SO that daily life can continue as normally as possible •• "
while National Committees would "begin to function in cooperation
100with the bureaucracy" •
8ene~ was very confident that, thanks to his understanding with
the Soviet leadership, he would be able to return h~me with his govern-
m,ent and prevent such a "soviet revol utIcn", He was somewhat shaken
in the summer of 1944 by reports of Soviet help to the KS~ in sending
partisan groups into Slovakia. This was presented to him as a
,"Comintern" plan to win the Czechoslovak people for fed~ration with
theUSSR'O'. Nervousness was heightened as various plans for an
; uprising in Slovakia seemed to be clashing. The most dramatic
consequence was a worsening of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations cul-
.~inatingin a unanimous vote in the London government for the recall
'of fierlinger, their ambassador in Moscow, who supported the Soviet
actions .in Slvoakia. §ene~ refused to accept his recall and a Social
Democrat conference successfully demanded reversal of the decision102•
It sgems,then, that Bene~ was too suspicious of KS~ and too
sceptical about their likely future influence to accept the need to
make concessions to reach a compromise ageement with them, although
., .
990ene~: Demokracie, p.336 and 340, and E. Taborsky: Czechoslovak
Democracy at Work, London, 1945, p.128.
100Massage to the domestic resistance on 6/7/44, ~, dok.9~, p.241.
101Message from Pika, the senior Czechoslovak army officier in
Moscow, to Benests r'linisterof Defence on 25/8/44,.lliiE.,dok.153,
p.320-321.
102fierlinger: Ve slu~bach, p.324-325.
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he was definitely convinced of the need to avoid aunnecessarily
antagonising the Soviet Union. This was the situation on the eve
of the uprising in Slovakia which it will be argued,when followed by
.the gradual liberation of Czechoslovakia from the East, ultimately
forced Bene~ to change his views.
11.9.12. Summary and discussion.
The Kst leaders based themselves in Moscow and the policies
they worked out were naturally strongly influenced by the changing
policies of the Soviet leaders. There was not a steady development
but rather a number of stages starting with the KS~ response to
Munich. For a time they seemed to believe that broad national unity
could be established, under their own leadership, to restore the
former Czechoslovak state.
The Nazi-Soviet pact and subsequent change in Comintern policy
replaced this idea with a policy of sectarian isolationism which
damaged the party's reputation and delayed the development of policies
based on broad, anti-fascist unity. Then, after the Nazi attack
on the Soviet Union, the KS~ was very cautious in building again on
their earlier policies. A major further restriction was the Soviet
insistence that they should not unnecessarily offend Bene~. This
did not mean that they fully subordinated themselves to his ideas.
of" :
other options were still kept ap~n and they made no secret of dis~
agreements over domestic resistance strategy.
Particularly after the dissolution of the Comintern, the KSC
began working out a conception of a "national democratic revolution"
which, although different from 8enes's strategy, was to be carried
out in agreerlsqt with him. It was to inv,J1V8 an ac ti vs resistance
c~lmineting in a national uprising wherH y a new Czechoslovak state
would be created. The concept of this n1ltlonal revolution was based
on an understanding of previous Czcchosluval; history and of changes
in Czech national consciousness. r,l though bas ad on an cittempt to
learn from KsE history, it seemed to owe nothing to ideas that had
developed in the KSC tofore 1935.
There was scope for flexibility in the e xac t measur es that were to
be implemented, but it was made clear that, in the interests of the
broadest possible uni ty, socia] ist meaaur es were to be delayed to
a later revolution. It was a weakness, although not a crippling
one, that the relationship between theso two revolutions u.as never
clarified. Nothing was said about what socialism wOlJld Jook like
in Czechoslovakia and that moant that none of the weaknesses implied
Rarlier
in the Ksf's policies were definitively overcome.
I.
By excllding social questions from the national revolution its
essence was effectively re.lJuceclto a rue st.Lon of political power.
Similarly, it was presented 85 a step tow..rds socialism purGly in
that it weakened the bourgeoisie politically. Al t.hcuqb there was
soma notion of a democratisation o f pmmr uri Lh the p roposed role
for National Committees, it uias not e lal.ora ted in such a way as to
contradict simplistic views of power whereby lhe K~~, in line with
so much of its past history, could t..J81i.e.VD itself fully capable of
satisfactorily representing C:echoslovok 3uciety alone.
There were still amhiguities and omissJons in I<SC p oLicy ,
lifter liberation the r.igid Lns Ls tunco on a two n : a: e r evoLut icn
in particular was tu r equ.lra fIIudificat·itn. rJf!vorLheless, the Ldna s
evaloved in P·iascow ue rc saud eriouqh t.nh81[, Lh8 V~i~ o.iin a vory s t.r onq
position in 1945.
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CHAPTER 10: THE SLOVAK NATIONAL UPRISING
.As the situation in Slovakia during World War II was very
different fro~ that in the Czech lands, it is necessary to devote
a separate section to Slovak development. Those war-time differences
were carried through into a distinctive post-war development which
is discussed in later separate chapters. During the war itself
the central event was the Slovak national uprising which. was import-
ant for Czechoslovak development in two respects. first, it was
instrument~l in forming political relations in post-war Slovakia
and; secondly, it served to strengthen the position of the KS~ in
Moscow relative to Benes in London.
Although the uprising was the central event, its nature, its
consequences and the position of the Communist Party within it can
only be understood against the background of the creation and
~volution of the Slovak state.
11.10,1 •. The consolidation of the Slovak state leads to the
political isolation of the Communist Party inside
Slovakia.
It was an obvious difference from the Czech lands that the
Nazis felt no immediate need to occupy Slovakia as they could rely
on the subservience of a formally independent Slovak state led by
~
,. a right-wing Catholic movement. Although there were differences
within the Slovak leadership, some wanting closer allegience to the
German model while others looked rather to Catholic Italy, there
was unity in hatred of Communism and the Soviet Union and in the
lasting fear of Hungarian expansion. Sa; as German strength grew,
the Slovak government had to orient itself more clearly towards Nazi
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Germany as the only protection for the newly independent state.
Although the Slovak stc:te was created with some reluctance and
doubts about its viability, a considerable mass support was created
during 1940 and 19411. The government could genuinely claim to
represent a"lesser evil" as Slovakia was able to retain formal
independence and to keep out of the war. This made it easy to in-
corporate the pre-war bourgeois parties within one ruling party
while repressive measures were never so strong as in the Czech lands.
Slovak Communists formed a separate party - the KSS - which
was still ultimately subordinated to the KS~ within the Comintern.
The sectarian line of the Comintern from September 1939, despite its
fundamental errors, could find a particularly strong support among
Slovak Communists. Owing to the peculiar situation in Slovakia at
the time, the most plausible alternatives could not have been at-
tractive. There was no sense in a purely national liberation
struggle and niether was there scope for unity with bourgeois forces
that were not intetested in unity with Communists against the
Slovak state. It could therefore seem to be most sensible to con-
centrate on economic struggles in unity with only some Social Demo-
crats2• Moreover, Soviet expansion seemed to provide Justification
for a hope that socialist revolution might be brought by the in-
corporation of Slovakia into the USSR as happened in the Baltic
1According to Husak's account of 5/2/45 in ~, dok.576, p.945. for
general coverage of the Slovak state see Oeer,et al: D~Jinna.
Emigre supporters of ,tho Slovak state have also found spokesmen in
J. Kirschbaum: Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe,
New York, 1960, and J. Mikus: Slovakia in the Drama of Europe,
Milwaukee, 1963.
2for a general account of KSS activities see Prehl'ad, Chapter 9.
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states. This, again, could appear as an interpretation of and hence
justification for the Comintern's line. It was expressed in the
slogan of a "Soviet Slovakia" which developed inside Slovakia but
was rejected by Moscow in the spring of 19413•
Nevertheless, this notion and more generally sectarian attitudes
still persisted within the KSS even after the change in Comintern
line in mid-1941. There were still no serious potential allies for
a broad anti-fascist struggle and even in late 1942 the, KS5 was not
advocating the Czechoslovak state but rather an undefined close
,relationship with the USSR4. The anti-fascist struggle was still
understood as a more or less direct route to Communist power with-
out requiring any compromises to broaden the anti-fascist movementS.
The scope for such broader unity was only gradually created during
the war.
German domination was visibly increasing as shown in the
privileges given to the German minority, the subordination of the
'economy to German war needs, anti-Jewish measures culminating in
their sale to Gsrmany6, and military subordinntion leading to involve~
ment in the war in tha East. Thase, however, were not simple processes.
Leading economists could argue that close relations with Germany were
~ c,3prehl'ad, p.54. For a general discussion of the problems of ~SS
strategy see Beer,et al: D~jinna, p.74-80.
4Prehltad, p.268-269, and Deer.et a1: D~Jinna, p.121-123.
SBee~et al: D~jinn~. p.103.
6L,. Lipt~k: "Slovensky ~tat a pr{ifa!istick~ hnutia ~ rokoch 1939-
1943", Historicki ~asopis, XIV, No.2, 1966, p.194-195.
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a sound baeis 7for aovar.cn arid the E'er,' :l'I'I/ die! inde,:,c! 888fT] to t'e
functioning better than t'fdor8~. Jellli"'t, p ropert y "las given not to
Germans but to Christian Slovaks and Lt is was by ne means universally
. 9opposed. Also the uhiquilous pres2rce of German advisers was
associated with great advances for Slovaks at the expense of Czechs.
The size <Jnd influence of the Slovak inte'liCJentsia actually increaserJ10•
Even peasants were generally ahle to prosper from the war even ttlfXJgh
a land reform which was promised was not fully implemented,11.
So,the Slovak state could appear to many Slovaks 85, on balance,
an advance for the Slovak nation and certainly as the hest possible
arrangement under the circumstances. This does not mean that there
many ,was ever much enthusiastic support: in"areas ~t proved imposslible
to,create lasting branches of the ruling party or the fascist
Hllnka Guards.
11.10.2. Problems in creat inn a unitF;(j 1fJiidership for the
resistance are Qradually overcorne, The upri~jng
begins •
.The tenuousness of the raq ime J s snppo rt was demoriet ra ted
., ,
particularly in 1943 after Soviet m i LlLary 511CCElS"es and Italy's
defection from the Axis. Reliance on ~azi Germany then seemed to
78eer
J
et sI: D~jinn8, p.49.
BAccording to Husal(, sr~, dok.576, p.949, and L·. lipUik: S]ovensko
v 20.storo~r. Bratislava, 19G6, r.203-204.
9 .e.g. message to londen of 12/.3/43,~, duk.6, p.67, and Liptak:
5lovensko, p.203-204.
1°5. FaIt'an: Slovensk&,. p.109-111.
1'L' t'klp a : 51 ovcnsko , p , 20·1-2C5.
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threaten the Slovak nation with disaster and the regime soon seemed
to be collapsing at all levels. This W8S particular noticeable in
Central Slovakia where there was a significant working class and a
large Protestant population which could articulate discontent even
within the peasantry. Fascist organisations were always weak there
and in many villages they were either never formed or collap~ed.
Even state officials began expressing a preference for a new
'Czechoslovakia and the security forces themselves se8meq to be
Joining a general disintegration12• They lost the power to dominate
the courts and sometimes even turned a blind eye to resistance
. t I 13organ~sa ~ons • Even some of the high8st figures in the state
prepared to change sides and, in one way or another, helped the
f th .. 14preparations or e uprlslng •
In many cases this may have be:n no more than "alibism" - an
attempt to ensure a secure future after the war by having helped
the winning sides but there were also many genuine resistance
15groups • As 8ene~ was the only alternative to the USSR, they
generally favoured restoration of a Czechoslovak republic. Closest
to 8ene~ts idea of constitutional continuity was the group around
v. Srober but there were also many more. One of the most serious
12M• lich;: Z bojov komunistov bclnskohystrickeJ oblasti, Vol II,
" Bratislava, 1966, asp , p.112, 122, 168, 172, 174 and 94.
13See the message from a resistance group to London, JViarch1944,
~, dol,.55, p.1 BC.
14Many also felt unable to break from alliance with Nazi Germany
bacause of their hatred for the USSR; Kirschbaum: Slovakia, p.144.
15The fullest account is in Jablonick~: Z ileqallty.
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was led by the Protest.ant former I;grarjafls Urs.lny end Le t t r Lcb ,
They could see the Communis ts ~ecr.rnl.nqmore ac t Ive in 1943
and trying to organise partisan units. As Slovakia was likely to
be liberated from the East they were aware of how poworful the KSS
could become and therefore tJsgan thinking of creating a very broad
t t· t t 16movemen 0 ~ncorpora e he KSS • They may well also have seen
th KSS th 1 ff t· 1 . d . t f 17e as e on y e ec ~ve y organIse reSlS ance oree •
The Communists too saw the need to broaden their appeal by
creating a joint platform with a bourg80is group and made the first
approaches to Lettrich and Urslny in mid_194318• Their sectarian
past was not completely forgotten but a new leadership had been
established around K. ~midke, a pre-war M.~. who returned to Slovakia
with the Comint.ern's resolution of 5/1/43. He brought the line of
"a united anti-fascist movement culminating in a national uprising
and headed a new Central Committee composed of himself, Hus~k and
· ..19Novomesky •
The. essential poin~ of agreement between the KSS and UrsIny and
Lettrich wes acceptance of the Czec~oslovak state but simultaneous
insistence on Slovakia's rights within it. ether differences had
to be ironed over.
16J• Lettrich: "Odhoj a povstanie", Zbornik uvah i1 osotlnych
spomienok 0 Slovenskom n~rodnom povstanr, Toronto, 1976, p.74-75.
17 .Jablomick1: Z ilegality, r.2n3•
18Lettrieh: "Ddt,oJ", p.75.
19The only complete accounts of KS5 activity in this period are
Husak: Sv~d8Ct\d, and Iluc,ak'srepurt of 5/2/45 in 2.!!£_, dok.576.
The few other documents in Sf'P sug,.jest Lhere may have baan more
flexibility and d lversLty willin U'lD V~;S than !~us5k !lIAS willing
to admit.
Husak ano Novomo sky had to ce rin I t Lve Iy renounce ideas of a
"Soviet Slovakia", although apparently they were at first reluctant
20to do so • There were disagreements on the nature of democracy
with Urs!ny and Lettrich placing emphasis on diversity and plurality
while the Communists argued that, to defeat facsism for ever, a
firmer unity would be required than that of the pre-Munich republic21•
On foreign policy the Communi3ts had to qualify their desire for a
f· Id' 1 51 . . t t i 22lrm y an unlque y avonlc arlen a lon •
Oy reaching compromise formulations on these and other questions
the two sides could agree to a single rlatform in December 1943 and
establish the "Slovak National Council" (SNR) as the potential
supreme representative of the Slovak nation. The hope was, by
to
gradually incorporaLing more groups, hroadon the organ, but ~rob~r
"was probably not incorporat8d23• Even more important, the most
influential anti-fascist group in the Slovak army always owed
allegience to 8ene~ before the SNR. This group was led by army
chief of staff J. Galian in Oansk~ Oystrica: he represented a
powerful desire within the army, particularly after its best units
were destroyed in the USSR, to transfer allegiance to Czechoslovakia
and to Bene~.
"
20Let trich: "Odt:oj", p.79.
21Lettrich: "Odllojll,p.8[J.
22Lettrich: "Cd~oj", p.79-BO.
23For suggestion that he was included, se Fierlinger:'Ve slu~b~ch,
p.33G-331, and St!P, dDI~.157, p.332. Coth record ~midke's report
to r;;oscowimmedTci7ely prior to the start of the uprising. Husak,
however, insisted in 1963 that no attempt had been made to meet
~rob~r; ~, p.451.
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Golian's ~lDnG were eSGentially for an army putsch apparently
prepared entirely by cor~piratorial mearic, The Soviet command
1\
regarded this with great scepticism as the Slovak army would be
24fighting, very probably, under condi tions of Germ: n encirclement •
The KS~ leaders also regarded Colian's plan, which reached them
through London, as "a bit fantastic and certainly exaggerated,
because we know that 'conspiracies' like this do not have much
25chance of success" • Instead they favoured maximum excourfigement
to partisans in Slovakia aiming for " • • a mass transition of
Slovak soldiers and of Slovaks generally to the partisan units.
This seemed to them to be Hie t)est uny t.o help the general Soviet
advance.
The KSS inside Slovakia, however, had rejected the aim of
destroying the army. Instead, noting the changes at all levp.ls of
the army, they hoped to win it for an anti-fascist uprising27•
This still meant encoura~ing the growth of partisan units as a
necessary procondition for a genuinely mass uprising rather than
a military putsch, but the uprising itself was to be co-ordinated
with the army, It proved possible for Golian and the SNR to agree
roughly on the military planG for the uprising and ~midke and
Lt-Col. rerjen~rk then went to tho,USSR to try to coordinate their
o.
24Kral: Osvohozenl, esp. p.43-44 ~nd p.n~.
25Letter from ~verma to Slansky, who was than working in the partisan
command base in Kiev, 12/8/44, quoted in Husak: Svedectvl, p.158.
26Letter from Slinsky to Gottwald, 29/7/44 quoted in deer,et al:
Dejinna, p.278.
27Husak: Sv~dectvr, p.33, and ~iroky, Za svoborlu r:eskeho, p.311.
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plans with the Soviet army. There were, however, unexplained
delays and then a dramatic political change in Rumania which made
Slovakia irrelevant to Soviet military plans. The Slovak uprising
therefore started without any great power expecting it.
Towards the end of August partisan units, finding that the
Slovak army did not oppose them, started major offensive actions
occupying several towns in Central Slovakia where National' Committees
..emerged to take power. Their aim, in line with their orders from
Kiev, was simply to create the maximum difficulties for the German
armies: t~ey were therefore not too worried at the prospect of a
German occupation of Slovakia because they considered it effectively
inevitable. On August 29th Nazi troops crossed the frontier to
suppress the developing uprising. The decisive question then became
the 'Slovak army as the partisans alone could not resist for long.
Although absolute generalisations are difficult, it seems that when
.the action was restricted to a conspiracy among officxers, the
uprising was easily disorientated by the Nazi, attack which was
officially welcomed by the government in Bratislava. Where the
movement was genuinely broad, including the army, partisans, political
groups and industrial workers, then it was most successful. This
applied to much of centra~lovakia where a consolidated area was
.
quickly established. In the crucially important Eastern area, where
we~l equipped units were to have opened a route through the
Carpathians for the Soviet army, vacillations and isolation of the
28
army command allowed the German army to quickly consolidate control •
28tor a region by region account of the st~rt of the uprising, see
Jablomick1: Z ilegality. His conclusions are summarised in
Prehl'ad, Chapter 10.
o -
In military terms the uprising was then isolated3and there was little
hope for survival. Confined to a consolidated area and able to
mobilise perhaps 80,000 men, the uprising could last for two months
after which a fairly successful partisan war was continued until
liberation. Effective defeat by a Nazi force of 30,000 was a
consequence of shortages, particula rly of heavy equipment and good
officers: otherwise the Slovak army and partisans, joined by
escaped prisoners and anti-fascists of numerous other n,ationalities,
gave no evidence of a particularly low state of morale until their
. 29military inferiority had been exposed •
11.10.3. Soviet and Western aid to the uprising: still a
confused and controversial question.
Help from the great powers could conceivably have altered the
balance of military forces and there hnvG been plenty of accusations,
against both the West and the Soviet Union, that help was deliberately
restricted so that the uprisinG would fail. There could be reasons
for this as the Soviet side, so it has been argued, feared the
political consequences of the urrising and preferred to ensure that
only their own army liberated Slovakia. The West too could doubt
the political conse 'uences of the uprising and could elsa fear that
it would enable the Soviet army to advance rapidly towards Vienna.
,f The issue is greatly complicated as no great power could admit such
cynicism and had to make at least a token gesture of attempting to
help the uprising so as not to lose all political prestige among
anti-fascist Slovaks.
29Kr,n: OsvotJozenf, p , 179-180.
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In fact, the initial Soviet attitude serms to have been one of
suspicion towards the uprising. Gottwald, however, following
discussions with ~midke, made a special point of convincing Molotov
that this was not a repeat of the Warsaw uprising and that its
leadership was friendly to the USSR.
h ld b . . t 30s au 8 g~ven every aSS1S ance •
He therefore argued that it
As a response to this the
Soviet army launched the Carpathian operation which, despite
enormous losses, failed to open a route into Central Slovakia until
after the uprising had been defeated. Evidently they did not believe
that the uprising could succeed if left in isolation and therefore
did not concentrate major efforts on air-lifting supplies and men,
although a certain amount was sent. Despite later claims that this
was somehow inadCQUate;1uenes's own representatives in Slovakia
during the uprising, Drtina and UhlIr, were quite emphatic in rejecting
the 3rgument that inadequate Soviet help caused the uprising's
32defeat •
Aid form the West was nowhere near so important. The US expressed
33no interest at all in giving any help • Britain made it clear, in
private negotiations with Bene~, that they required a definite
assurance from the Soviet Union that there would be no objection to
"
30Gottwald to f';olotov,2/CJ/44, ~, dol:.223, p.4D4.
31e•9• M.J. Li~ko: "K ot~zke spojeneckej pomoci v Slovenskom
narodnom povs t anf!' , Z bornil< uvah, p.225.
32.§!:!..E,dok ,560.
33 " L 'e.g. Licko: "K otClzke", p.246. Fortun.:tely documentary evidence
of the course of negotiations with the great powers is reproduced
in.§!:!..E.Particular ly revealing is the report propared by Oeno§' s
r'linistryof Defence on 12/12/4!q llt.!?, dok.561, p.867-87S.
- 212 -
aid being sent. App ar en t Ly
is
Lhcre s t i 11
1\
no ovLrcnce ef a Soviet
veto but there was felt tu bu Soviet reticence which, for some
reason, dissuaded E!rita in from taking ,my action34• A note from
Fierlinger indicated that there ~as unJlkely to he any o~jection
from the Soviet side35, but British military help was etill minimal.
The exact reasons remain unclear but it W;JS ex trerne I y embarrassing
for 6ene~ es it inevitably gave the impression that the LJest was not
interested in Slovakia's liberation. Perhaps through misinformation
or perhaps in an attempt to cover up for the West, he exaggerated the
Soviet response claiming that they had forbidc1en Britain from send-
ing any help because Slovakia was to be within their"sphere of
36influence" • This claim was repeated by such knowledgeable partici-
pants in the uprising as Lettrich, Lau~man and Ferjen~!k when
writing in emigration.
11.10.4. The spirit of the uprising •
.1( international help to the uprising appeared to be a political
as well as a military question, then the overall significance of
the uprising was even rr:oredefinitely political aT" moral rather than
military. It demonstrated that Slovak natiunalism need not be
allied with reactionary forcos in the world. The Communist poet
Novomesk9 developed this argument with great force, Ho helieved that
the Slovak nation and the guiding ideas to be linked with its
national consciousness were still in the process of formation. The
34Li~kO: "K otazke", p.241.
35Fierlinger: Va sllJzbach, p.357.
36Senes: I'ipmoirs,p.2~ 3. For a thorough discussion of this pr cbLem ,
see Kral: Usvobozenr, p.151-158.
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uprising represented a new hi~h point in national action: it was the
first ever great armed action by the Slovak nation and could there-
fore occupy a central position in Slovak national consciousness and
traditions simultaneously linking them with the anti-fascist forces
. :37of the world • Bene~'s arguments about how he could help Slovakia
avoid being regarded as Hitler's ally were no longer so powerful
.and certainly could not be used as a justification for Slovakia
'r~turAing to a subordinate position within a new Czechoslovakia.
Instead, Slovakia's status within the new republic would logically
have to reflect its newly emphasIsed national consciousness •
.Because of this central importance of the uprising, many of
the political forms it created wore consciously readopted in the
new republic. Different political philasophi~s have tried to claim
the uprising as their own although, as a precondition for its
b!eadth, it had in practice to bring together many different political
ideas. Perhaps the most objoctive assessment was made by one of
Bene~'s informants who reported that the Communists were certainly
the most impressive with their serious hard work but that they alone
the
could not win the peasants, the intellectuals andAwhole army for
38revolutionary action • The uprising's strength was in fact derived
from its ability to bring together such diverse social and political
forces into a genuinely national movement which no single grouping
has any right to claim for itself alone.
37eeskoslovenske listy, 1/1/.:'15, in 2::£" dok.570, p.922,:",927.
38r'1essagesent via Istanbul, September 1944, ~, dok.260, p.460.
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11.10.5. The SJolfak rictiDnal (ounei] f;stflhlishpsits
dominance in Central Slovakia and challenges Rene~'s
supremacy.
Alongside this general moral impact, tho uprising had an
immediate importance in the balance between the London government
and the domestic resistance ultimately leading to a boost for the
KS~ in Moscow. from the start the London government tried to
present the uprising as their own op~rBtion as if they had initiated
and led it at all times39• Naturally, they hoped for statements
or'unqualiried recognition from the leaders of the uprising.
In practice, despite some confusion at the very beginning,
the SNR established itself as the supreme political organ. This
required the liquidation of an attempt by ~rob~r to take the Initiat-
ivs in 8ansk~ Bystrica. He lacked backing from the rest of Central
Slovakia where Communist dominated National Committees had taken
power end aven the army refused to back him whon partisan units
entered 8anake 8ystrica as a further demonstration of Communist
. 40influence .• The SNR was then broaduned to include ~rob~r as joint
chairman with Smidke and. in the following days, it firmly
established itself with a "Board of Commissioners" - effectively
i i . 418 Counc I of M nlsters •
39The aim, as Drtina explained it on 11/12/44, lJas "to exploit the
uprising on the international forum in London as it was in fact the
first great fighting action of the Czechoslovak people at home •• ",
~. dok.560, p.865.
40This incident remains very unclear. The only full account is in
Hus6k: Sv~dedlJr, p.221-222. Also see he Lourp.l22..
41Reports of its meetings confirm the improssion that cooperation within
the SNR was good from then on, but the army never fully accepted the
SNR's authority and for a long time resisted demands for its own purg-
ing, although its failures were ~eing hJemed on political weaknesses;
e.g. Husak at the SNli meeting 22/9/L:4 in SNP, dok.337, esp p.560. In
--- (Continued overleaf)
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Now, the point was that the SNR had already clearly stated its
views on the relationship between the domestic resistance and the
emigration. In a statement in July 1944, they accepted continuity
with the pre-Munich republic "only with respect to foreign countries
and in international relations, while in the organisati6n of
domestic affairs this cannot in any way prejudice new a~angements
of internal political relationships". They argued that only a
.clear statement that Czech-Slovak relations would be on the basis
of equality could win the ordinary working people to fight for
Czechoslovakia42•
This inevitably led to sharp conflicts between london and
the SNR. The intransigence of London enraged absolutely all
Slovak leaders who decided to send a delegation there: this was
composed of Urs!ny, Novomesky and Lt-Col. Vesel. Their hand was
strengthened when N~mec, who was the London government's official
representative inside Slovakia, himself conceded on 18/10/44 that
the right of the SNR to govern all of Slovakia could no longer
. . 43
be questioned.. Ortina followed this on19/10/44 by acknowledging
the existence of the Slvoak nation44• Bene~, however, could not
agree with the SNR who, in their statement of 2/11/44, took the
41(continued from previous page)
turn, the Communists resisted attempts to subordinate the partisans
to the army, and hence ultimately to Bene~,and even successfully
demanded reversal of a command from Kiev on this; SNP, dok.303,
p.524, and Cesta ke kv~tnu, p.223. formally speaking, as decided
at its meeting of 12/9/44, both were subordinated to the SNR; SNP,
dok.277, p.480. . ----
42SNP, dok.112, p.259 and p.261.
43SNP, dok.461, p.726 •
.
44Cesta ke kv~tnu, p.279.
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KSC position of recognising his right to be President but not the
45right of the london government to retlJrn home • He made only
. . b d' h' . t I 46m~nor concess~ons y rewer ~ng 1S POS1 10n • His hopes were
raised again when the defeat of the uprising suggested that the
47SNR might not be a permanent organ and he even returned to his
stubborn rejection of Slovak nationhood48 •
. II.10.6. The Communist Party emerges as the most powerful
political force in ~he uprising but events encourage
some modifications in its strategy.
Another consequence of the uprising was the creation of a
party-political structure based on two parties. At first the KSS
seemed to be almost completely domin~nt as it was the only organised
political force within the uprising and defined its aims within the
broad anti-fascist struggle rejecting both Lrn.uad.i ata socialist
revolution and simple subordination to 8ene~. General confovmity
of this with the Moscow Kst line was confirmed when §midke returned
to Slovakia on 9/9/44 and then when Sverma arrived with some othor
Communist leaders on 28/9/44. They then re-established radio contact
with Moscow.
KSS dominance within the wurking class was clearly demonstrated
when the party held a congress on 17/9/44 accomplishing a merger
with the Social Democrats. This was a complete surprise to both
45~, dol<.521, p.798-799.
462iE" do!;.530, p.806-810.
47S• falt'an: Slovensk~, p.181-182.
488ene~: ~vahy, p.353.
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49Moscow and London ,but it was achieved easily within Central
Slovakia. This reflected both the desire for maximum national u~IY
during the uprising50 and the feeling of most Social Democrats
that the failure of the pre-Munich republic was also the end of
51their former raison d'etre as a reformist party • This attitude
was likely to be particularly prevalent in Central Slovakia where
the KSS had always been stronger and where Social Democrats were
'involved in resistance activity and in the SNR largely as an
appendage to the Communists.
Duriryg the early 1950's the KSS leaders of the uprising
suffered persecution for alle~ged "bourgeois nationalism". A
highly voluntaristic argument was constructed whereby objective
difficulties were ignored. The uprising's failure was attributed
entirely to these Communist leaders who apparently deliberately
s~bordinated their actions to the bourgeoisie and the Slovak army
,'~hereby holding back the Soviet backed partisans and National
Committees in the localities. Subsequent studies of the uprising
have completely superseded such views but that does not mean that
the KSS had an identical line to the Moscow KS~.
At the start the KSS took a position vary similar to ~06COW.
Political-power changes were seen as most pressing with precedence
d given to the establishment of National Committees and the dissolution
49Kopeck?: ~SR, p.374-375, and 8. Lau~man: Pravda a la! 0 slovenskom
n~rodnom pa;stan!, Petrovec, 1951, p.33.
50 'J. Nedv~d: Cesta ke 9lou~en! socialn! demokracie s komunlstickou
stranou v roce 1948, Praha, 1968, p.29.
51pravda 17/9/44 (editorial).
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of fascist organisations. To ensure that this was done, Husak
insisted on becoming Commissioner for the Interior. Questions
like land reform and nationalisation of industries, it was thought,
.could be delayed as they would threaten the unity of the anti-fascist
52front and thereby hinder mobilisation for the armed struggle •
There were, however, many difficulties with the National Committees
and often the old apparatus retained effective power53 •. Pe~haps
this, along with other difficulties in mobilising the 1I.ation,
encouraged the suggestion that social demands would actually
strengthen 54the anti-fascist struggles •
The urgency of this was emphasised by 8ene~'s continuing
"Czechoslovakism" which could only encourage the revival of the
idea of a "Soviet Slovalda,,55. This was particularly apparent at
the conference of Factory Committees which the KS5 organised in
podbrezov~ on 15/10/44 to help mobilise the working class for the
.uprising. So strong was apposition to the Czechoslovak state that
Husak had to abandon his draft speech and instead strongly emphasise
that the new Czechoslovakia would have an extremely close relationship
with the USSR56• ~verma too fortified his previous language calling
52Husak: Sv~dectv!, p.226.
53Sverma's report of 14/10/44 and Husak's of 5/2/45; ~, dok.433,
p.6S9-690, and dok.576, p.972 respectively •..
54 'k Nove slovo, 24/9/44, p.1.Husa ,
55H 'k Nove slovo, 15/10/44, p.49-51.usa ,
56 Sv~dectv!, p.273.Hus~k:
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for a Slovakia in which the ruler would not be "the German, the
Hungarian even the Czech or Slovak cap.i talist, but the Slovak working
57"people •
So towards the end of the uprising it was being definitely
accepted that mobilisation of the working class would come primarily
around "social" issues58• Wages were the most obvious issue of deep
concern, but economic realities indicated the dangers rather of
·declining living standerd~ rising unemployment and even .impending
59economic collapse • r'10reover,the uprising itsel f required
sacrifices and demanded that workers Bssist in redirecting production
towards war needs. The rosa] u t Lons f rom Pcdbrczova therefore made
only ambiguous references w wages while colling rather for workers'
involvement in the running of their factories and a legal guarantee
of the continuation of the powers being assumed by the most active
factory Committees. These included the right to an equal say with
management in all decisions. They evsn called for the immediate
statisation of the property of enomies and domestic traitors60•
It was also suggested that f"ll nationalisation would probably
. 61be necessary before the ractory Committees' powers could ba assured
nnd this amounted to introducing fully socialist measures into the
.. 57pravda 17/10/44, p.2 •
58e•g• J. Pull, r..lov~ slave, 22/1U/44, p.67.
595ce Kub~~ts report to tho S~JH rnec tinqs of 14/9/44 and 19/9/44 in
SNP, dok.288, p.496, and do:(.30B, p.529. Also revealing is ~vermals
report to r'IOSCOW on 1/./10/1;4, 2lli:, dok.433, p.69f!.
60fravda, 17/10/44, p.1.
61Pull a t the srm moe ting of 2U/10/44, l de j In , p.43
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anti-fascist revolution. The up ri s i n., \lIas c o LlaosI nc before any
formal legal changes eau} rI be made, 'Jut all s uhs aquan t programmatic
statements produced inside Slova:<ia reFerred clearly to nationalis-
62ations •
With peasants and land reform events were less dramatic but
the KSS leaders again differed from the Moscow KS~. Their ideas were
not ,fully worked out but they broadly advocated a "general" land
reform on "class" lines63• eulen, who flew in from Moscow,advocated
land reform on national and anti-fascist lines, by the expropration
of Germans, Hungarians and traitors64• This followed from the view
held in Moscow that land reform could be closely linked to national
liberation with Slovakia described beforehand as effectively Germen
65occupied and the German minority as an instrument of foreign
66imperialist domination • The question of widespread expulsion of
Hungarla~s wes not raised at all 8e the SNR hoped Hungary would
r~main neutral towards the ~rising and therefore did not even raise
the issue of Slovakia's southern frontier67•
In prQctice, although there were disagreements between ~v8rma
628•g• the SNR proqramme of 4/2/45, C.'sta ke kv~tnu, p.486-488.
63e•g• M. Falian, Nov~ slovo, 15/10/44, p.60, and Hus~k: Sv~dectv!,
p.285.
64c8sta ke kv~tnu, p.267-268.
65E• Fri~, ~eskos)oversk~ listy 15/4/44 reproduced in Za nov', p.112.
66[. Fri§, ~eskoslovensk~ listy 15/7/44 in la nov~, p.80.
67L'. Liptak: "~1ad'arskov slovenskej pol i tike za druhej svetoveJ
vojny", PrlspRvky k dejinam fa~HzmlJ, p.26fJ.
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and Husak, preoccupation with military affairs prevented any slart
. 68to land reform • Nevertheless, this bias towards the social
aspects of the revol'.tion was revived by the KSS later when it
could be given the stamp of approval of the uprising. The lessons
drawn by the Moscow KS~ at the timo did not include this. Rather
they strengthened their emphasis on Nntional Committees, a speedy
purge and on the need to recognise the importance of Slovak national-
ism.
11.10.7. The Democratic Party is formod, but only slowly
takes shape.
Slovakia's second party grew from a merging of the diverse
and scattered non-socialist groups in direct response to the strength
and initiative of tho KSS. They saw the need for unity as the
Communists seemed to have the potential to dominate all political
life with their strength in partisan units and their ability to
incorporate and thereby silence even tho "Czechoslovakist" right-
wing of Social Democracy. It would have been folly for the right
to allow again the fragmentatiuA of its own forces that existed in
the pre-Munich republic.
Genuine unity was, however, restricted I'¥ old party loyalties
and this made it much, asier for tho KSS to take the initiative in
the early days of the uprising69• The formulation of new programmatic
fiB S. Cambel: Slovenska nqrarna otftzka 1944-1948, Bratislava, 1972, p.38.
69see R. fra~Lacl<y: "lo Slovenska cez freya", J. Lettrich: "OdlJoj
a povstanie", and I"i. I<vetko: "Na prelome dvoch epoch; V ilsgalite
a v pov s tanL'", all in Zhornfk l~vah. I<.vetko's account is
particularly revealing, esp. p.118-12U and p.132-133.
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principles was also cumbersome. Nothing approaching a united
guide for action was created and moves towards a programme always
appeared like an artificial attempt to find space between the KSS
and the Slovak state. Programmatic statements appeared,in many
important places as an evasive response to events that had superseded
former ideas rather than a programmatic basis for social change or
national revival. Private property and free competition were first
,supported in principle but then characterised as an "out-dated
construction" needing to be restricted in the interests of the·
broad masses of the nation. Socialism was rejected as being "•• in
some respects practically unrealisable,,70.
The Democratic Party really began organising after liberation
and its strength was then derived not from clarity of principles
but rather from flexibility. It could claim joint credit for the
uprising and therehy appear as a genuinely anti-fascist and also
non-Communist force able to hold together very diverse tRsdencies.
In 1946 this characteristic became still more prominent.
This two party system was not the only possibility. Ge8e~ him-
self wanted the National Socialists to be revived as a Czechoslovakist
force but this was opposed vigorously by the KSS and the Democrats'
could not be persuaded either. Uhlif represented Bene~'s position
in Slovakia and tried to convince Lettrich of the need for a third•
party. He argued that the KSS might win outright in an election
against only one opponent. They had, he argued, a head's start
with a clear programm9~ organisational unity, an energ~tic young
70SNP, dok.383, p.623-624.
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leadership and, unlike the Democrats, a definite refusal to entertain
people associated with the previous regime. Lettrich, however,
believed that a majority could be won without positive policies
but by exploiting widespread fears of Communism accentuated by the
indiscipline of some partisans?'.
11.10.8. Summary and discussion.
The Slovak state was created after Nazi pressure i~ 1939 and
always owed its existence to German approval. It could, however,
winsome ~ass support as the lesser evil compared with the complete
German domination experienced by the Czech lands. It ~aso seemed
able to keep to a minimum Slovakia's direct involvement in the war.
As the course of the war changed and Germany's defeat seemed
probable, so the scope increased for an active opposition which
could unite around the aim of a new Czechoslovakia. This culminated
in the Slovak national uprising in the late summer of 1944. In
military terms it was unsuccessful and was largely subdued by the
German army. It nevertheless had a great influence in Czechoslovak
politics, because it symbolised the emergence of a new, anti-fascist
Slovak nationalism which demanded recognition within the new Czecho-
slovakia. Particular Slovak political trends have tried to claim
the credit for this uprising b~t, in fact, its strength was derived
to a great extent from its breadth and diversity.
Within Slovakia it provided the names for new Slovak institutions,
it created B two-party political structure and had a strong influence
?1Uhl!l's report to the StatD Council, 14/12/44, ~, dok.563, p.898-
899.
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on the ideas within both car t ies, In Cl wider Czechoslovak sense
it weakened the position of Lenes in London because the new
Slovak org2ns cha llanr-ed his authority. He ba i-e Iy began to recognise
the need to make concessions to this new Slovak nationalism.
The Ksf in ~osco~ could see the uprising, in a veryg~neral
sense, as confirming their line. It proved that the anti-fascist
movement was troed - much broader in fact than the bloc of socialist
parties - and that it included very diverse political forces.
There were indicatioDs that the KS~ conception of an anti-fascist
revolution was incomplete and that they had not fully understood
the nature and meaning of Slovak nationalism. They did not, however,
signific~ntly revise their conceptions. Instead, as argued in the
next chapter, the KSt leaders saw the emergence of this new Slovak
natlonalism.as a trump card against Dene§ within the context of a
,
general strategy that placed rrimacytm reaching an agreement with
BeneJ.,
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CHAPTER 11: THE FORMATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE KO~ICE
GuVERNf'IENT.
11.".'. 8cne~ is forced to make major concessions as Soviet
troops he~in tho liheration of Czechoslovakia.
If 8ene~ had hoped that the defeat of the Slovak national
uprising meant that, as Czechoslovak territory was liberated, so
organs of power would emerge to express unCluestioning loyalty to
his london government, then he was quickly disappointed by events
in the first part of pre-Munich CZGcholsovakia to be permanently
liberated. That was the Sub-Ca'pathinn Ukraine, an area occupied by
Hungary in 1939. Bene~ had ignored it seemingly regarding its
incorporation into the USSR as inovitable and even desirable'.
It had far less reason than Sloval~ia to desire re-incorporation into
a Czechoslovak state and the arrival of the Soviet army was greeted
with a powerful ~ovement for incorporation into the Soviet Ukraine.
As it did become part of the USSR, no detailed and objective account
exists of how far this was irlstigated or encouraged by the Red Army
or the NKV02• The different accounts of this period do, however,
roughly agree on the ultimate bredth and strength of this movement
which led to the grodual isolation of N~mec after his arrival as
representative of CzechDslova:<ia3•
•f
'Mackenzie: Dr 8eno~, p.290, quoting an interview in ~ay 1944,
and F. tJ~mec, V. hou1iry: The ~"wiet Seizure of Suh-CC'lrpathian
RutheniA, Toronto, 1955, p.129 and p.162-163.
2For their activities in Slovakia, sec below Vol II, p.44.
3The relevant rJocun:entsare in fierlinger.: Vc s1 u~h6ch, N~n,~c, ~'Ioudry:Tho Soviet, and Cesta ke kv~tnu. Tho only real disagreement was
whether, as Gottwald oe Licvao , r\J~mecwas completely isolated from
the start or whether, os he c),aimed, he did have some support for a
time.
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local Communists, who had been the only active opposition to
Hungarian rule, took the initiative in creQting National Committees,
4and then established an independent party. Then followed a congress
of National Committees on 26/11/44 which unanimously adopted a
resolution for joining the USSR. All army recruitment· was then
directly into the Red Army and N~mec, as the representative of
Czechoslovakia, was asked to leave forthwith5•
Benes was then confronted with an extremely embarrassing
situation. Despite Soviet hopes that he would simply relinquish eny
claim to ~he territory, he felt Gound to stubbornly resist. His
notion of constitutional continuity me2nt that no concessions should
be made as that would weaken his ;.,arsainingposition in the West
over disputed borders with Germany, Poland and Hungary and over the
unsettled question of expelling non-Slavonic minorities.
Even more immediately, he had no control at allover the local
organs that emerged. The Soviet authorities seemed to be if anything
encouraging them despite the May 1944 treaty. There was nothing
to stop them repeating this among the Ukrainians of Eestern Slovakia
and then in Slovakia generally. The London government might
gradually find itself as irrelevant to events at home as its Polish
counterpart.
The london government's only wea~on against the USSR was to
threaten to break rolations and hope that the Soviet side, owing to
4This was in def~ of the IIno of the ['ioscowKS~; e.g. Slansky's
article 1n ~eskoslovensk~ listy, 15/5/44, reproduced in Za novd.
He visualised a Czechoslovak state based on three Slavonic nations
enjoying equal rights.
5Cesta ke kv~tnu, p.463-466.
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its desire for post-war economic help from the West, could be
persuaded to actively resist such spontanoous revolutionary movements6•
This, however, aroused concern in the Soviet leadership. They
evidently understood their treaty with rene~ not just as an
insurance against "non-intervention" but rather as willingness to
procede in unison in international questions? An analysis of Soviet
policy is beyond the scope of the present study but it seems likely
that their attitude towards Czechoslovakia was based neither on a
desire to dominate absolutely nor on an altruistic desire to provide
disinterested assistance. Still less were they concerned with
Mexporting" their revolution. Rather thoir first concern was for
Czechoslovakia as an ally·toa certain extent against the West where,
the Soviet leaders feared, many influential people would like to
conduct a policy directed ngdnGt them. Already fearing the cold
war, the Soviet hope was that Jenes would follow their wishes in
international policy. Gene§, of course, had different hopes and·
expectations which conflicted with those of the Soviet leaders.
He did not at this stage se:m to understand Soviet expectations or
fears and even N~mec became deepiy perturb~d by Lonuon's course
arguing: "there mus t be no doubt about our sincere desi re to be a
8loyal ally of the USSR"
8enes stuck to the constitutionally correct position over the
Sub-Carpathian Ukraine only formally coding the territory in June
0'
6This is discussed in I<rnl : L:svobozen!, Chapter 5.
7rierlinger: Ve slu!bdch, p.482.
8rierlinger: Ve slu~b~ch, p.4G5.
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1945. Otherwise, however, hQ had to make major concessions. As
Slovakia was teing liberated, so the government delegate was once
more shown to be irrelevant so that [ene~'s Authority was minimal.
Instead, National Committees, often completely dominated by the
KSS, took power often on the day of liberation. The Soviet and
Czechoslovak armies established direct contacts with these organs
of pallieror even helped in their crea t i on , Tiley recognised the
SNR:es the supreme authority simply because it was the only body
9with any authority • So, far from being liberated or defeated, the
uprising'proved itself to be of all-Slovak significance. Although
the Communists in liberated Slovakia faced many doubts,and difficulties
and often committed serious errors10, this did not help BeneS at all.
Then.the prospect of the SNR playing a role like the Polish lublin
government'~as reaffirmed when hopes of even the Czech lands being
liberated from the West faded with a renewed and vigorous Soviet
offensive 1n January 1945 •
. f. .
, ;
"Benelfinally started making real concessions. The vague and
s';!l:liguousdecree on National Committees issued on tl/12/4411 uas
,
~' j
followed by ;ecognition of the Lublin gClvernment, acceptance at lnst
that the Agrarian party could not be renewed in any form and the
signing of a law on punishing co Lla: .orators meaning that a ~Jinister
12in eny Protectorate government could go before a special court •
9The best accounts ara J. Jablonicky: Slovensko na rreloma, Bratislava,
1965, and S. Camtel:"Vzt'ahy ~ervenej ;~rmady a sLovanskych n6rodnych
organov po oslobocen!", rHsp~vky k riejinam KS~, 1965, No.2.
10See below SectionlIl.22.1.
11Casta ke kv~tnu, p.317-318.
1200u~ek et a1: Program, p.19S-197.
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The hardest concession of all was acceptance that the London govern-
ment could not return home and that a new government would be
formed on the basis of discussions in Moscow. Although sometimes
presented as a mistake, 8ene~ls decision appeared as the only way
to retAin influence at home as the country was being gradually
liberated from the East. He hoped that it would be only a temporary
concession with free elections roughly reaffirming the pre-war
1iti 1 ·t t· 13po ca 61 ua lon •
11.12.2. The two main non-Communist earticieant earties
~reEare themselves for the discussions on a new
government.
The discussions were held in Moscow between 22/3/45 and 29/3/45.
. , 8ene~ took no direct part and behaved instead as a non-party
President leaving the formulation of policies to a meeting of the
.three socialist parties. The Catholic People's Party was also
represented but in practice that made no difference to the course of
.the discussions. The conclusions from the meeting were presented
to representatives of the SNR who argued only on the question of
Czech-Slovak relations. The National Socialists and Social Democrats
had no firm organisation in emigration or at home so that their
representatives in the Moscow discussions and subsequent government
.were in effect the new leaderships of the parties.
~
The Social Democrats were demoralised and divided in emigration
14and it remains unclear how their representatives were chosen •
13Kr61: Osvohozen!, p.229.
14ror the right-wing view see V. Majer: "Moskevsk' casta", feskos1ovenskieocialnf demokracie v axilu. Osm~desat let ~eskoslovensk~ialn!
demokracie 1878-1958, London, 1S58, p.144-145.
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Dominance went largely to the party's left-wing which had been
taking shape from 1940 with Lausman and Fierlinger playing important
15roles • Although their ideas were distinct from those of the
Communists, disillusionment with previous failures even led to
thoughts of a merger with the KSC16• Paradoxically, when this
happened in Slovakia, their response was rather a confirmation of
independence1? and the development of their own programme. Central
·points were close friendship with the USSR and an assessment of the
main error in 1918-20 as hesitancy which let slip a golden opportunity
for socialism18: they thought conditions in 19~5 would be even mora
favourable and were therefore surprised by the Communists' moderation19• '
They must, however, havo welcomed the chance to take part in forming
a new government in Moscow.
The National Socialists, in reviving their organisation, also
the-iTchanged form. They started incorporating formor members of
right-wing parties20 and their proQrammatic documents suggested fear
of the KS~ rather than concern with thc concrete problems of lib-
21erating and rebuilding the country • In all discussions in Moscow
15Nedv~d: Cesta ke sloucen{, contains the best account.
16fierlinger: Ve slu~b6ch, p.125.
1?e.g. Nosek's letter to Gottwald on 13/11/44, Costa ke kvOtnlJ, p.305 •..
1Bcesta ke kv~tnu, p.359.
19rierlinger: Va slu~h~ch, p.508-580.
20Bou~ek et al: Procram, p.leD.
21e.g. Cesta ke kvetnu, p.555-~jO?
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and then in ;<o~ice their recurrent t.hamo uia s fear of cne party
establishing a monopoly ,;fpouo r, They even de f Lned their just-
ification for existence not with ideas about how the new republic
should be constructed or changed ~ut 6S no mars than the need lIto
ensure democratic com~tition, control and criticism ••• "22.
Not surprisingly~ they were ver~ nervous of discussions in
23~09COW and balanced this with a more pro-western tactic. Ripka
remained in london to provide continuity in relations with the
West~rn powers and, revealingly, Zenkl went straight to London on
his release from Buchenwald. Zankl stood firmly on the right of
the party but had been mayor of Prague and was hailed by the
National Socialist as their saviour24• He was elected party chair-
man in Ko!ice in April 1945 in his absence. This aroused left-
wing suspicions that the ou rcome of tho f<oscow discussions was
provisional and open to revision particularly should the US Army
25liberate Pragua •
11.11.3. lhe Communists' draft is aC~8rted as the new
Qovernment rroqramme with or,ly minor chanoe e,
During the actual discussions the KS~ took the initiative
and directed attention first and foremost onto the programme of the
new government. They presented a 32-p3ga draft which was accepted
as the only basis for discussion. Although there was considerable
22"Ceska' pravda, 12/5/45, p.1. lIow these ideas were developed laLer
is discussed in Chapter '8.
23e.g. Ripka: Czechoslovakia, Chapter 3.
24e•9• Jaroslav Stransky, ~ 1()/12/45, p.2.
25Fierlinger: VB slulh~ch, p.591.
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disagreement on some points, the draft was generally accepted with
I t 1· t' t i 26on y s y ~s lC correc 10ns •
The programme appeared, like KSC policy generally, as a clear
statement of general principles for the creation of a new, anti-
fascist Czechoslovakia on those points where agreement was possible.
At the same time, a major compromise had to be made and these
principles were often expressed only in terms of immediate tasks
within the transition period before a parliament could be established.
At various points in the discussions the KS~ representatives made
explicit ~he temporary nature of the programme so as to avoid dead-
lock or outright concessions on points of principle. This gave
the National Socialists real grounds for hoping that the programme
could be altered fairly quickly, particularly as the government was
'.given only a very limited life expectancy with pluns for its alterat-
ion very soon after liberation.
The biggest disagreements arose over Czech-Slovak relations.
policies towards Germans and Hungarians were less controversial
presumably because the mild tone of expelling only those who had
immigrated after Munich or who were found guilty of a definite crime
\against the republic could not be made stronger until international
agreement.was forthcoming. The Slovak quostion, however, was still
an explosive issue.
The KS~ approach was dominated by discussions involving Dimitrov
who had on 6/12/44, advocatod a symmetrical arrangement of Czech-
Slovak relations each hQving their own governments alongside a
26The full dialogue is in Cesta ke kv~tnut p.391-453.
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27common federal Czechoslovak government • Gottwald never committed
himself to any definite state form largeJy because this advice
conflicted with the tactical need, as reiter~ated by Stalin, to
28be accomodating towards Penes. •
By evading a statement of definite aims on the Slovak issue
and instead subordinating it to the need of a compromise with 8ene~,
the K5~ gained enormously in the ~ioscow discussions. Slovak presence
.was in the form of a united S~R delegation basing itself on a
programme presented by the KSS: this prevented the formation of a
.t d f t f Cid 51 k . ht· 29un~ e ron 0 zec) an ova r~g -w~ngers • Nevertheless,
Gottwald felt obliged to persuade the KSS to weaken their position
on Czech-Slovak relations so as to avoid a major conflict with
308ene~'s followers •
The National Socialists refused to accept even this. They ;t "
objected to any recognition of the Slovak nation or of the SNR as
its supreme representRtive. At one stage they withdrew from the
discussions but finally accepted the draft with an additional let-
theout sentence giving the final decision on the powers ofASNR to
;..
,,' .,. ;, .
r :
" \,
elected representatives of the Czech and Slovak people. This gave
the programme the character of a tem~orary agreement rather than a
statement of pr Irciple,
It remains unclear why S~vakia should have become the issue of
such open dispute. Gottwald interproted the National Socialists'
27Cesta ke kv~tnu, p.519.
28Hus6k: Sv~dectv{, p.523.
29Hus6k: Sv~doctv!t p.528.
30Beer,et a1: D~jinn~, p.40C-407.
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position as an attempt to win votes on the basis of anti-Slovak
31feeling in the Czech lands • Perhaps also the National Socialists-~
feared that, unless the KS~ clearly stated the SNR's subordination
to Czechoslovak institutions, the country could still be split in
two should Prague be liberated from the West. It is certainly
noti~ble that the Slovak question never appeared as the major
dispute after the republic was consolidated.
11.11.4. Aareement is reached on the composition of the
first post-war government: the Communists can
.feel satisfied with the results.
Perhaps equally fierce were disagreements over the actual
composition of the government, although the record of the
discussions shows only unanimous agreements. The National Socialists
wanted some of the "key" ministries and were not averse to Gottwald
. i r·· t 32becomlng Pr me ~lnls er • Perhaps this would have made it easier
to completely change the government later on the grounds that it , '
was Communist dominated. In practice Fierlinger, part~cularly
"articles angering
mOTe 33';?oviet than the Soviets" and for writing
capit.ialist circles,,34, was accepted as Prime
disliked for being
Minister with a "Government Presidium" containing one representative
of each party. These were Urs!ny (OS), Siroky (KSS), J. David (NS),
.. ~ramek (lS) and Gottwald (KSC). The whole government was then
31Cesta ke kv~tnu, p.436.
32fierlinger: Ve sluzbach, p.593, and Casta ke kv~tnu; p.441 and 442.
33Jan Str&nsky: East Wind over Prague, London, 1950, p.196.
348ene~ in Moscow in December 1943, Cesta ke kv~tnu, p.51.
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agreed to and individual Ministers were required to express agreement
with its composition and programme. This became known as the Ko~ice
programme because the government formally assumed office there.
The rest of the government was as follows, showing that the
KSC had ensured that the most important posts were taken either by
themselves or by "non-party specialists":
Interior v. Nosek (KS~)'
Information v. Kopecky (KS~)
Agriculture J. l3uris (KSS)
foreign Affairs J. rf:asaryk (non-party)
Defense L. Svoboda (non-party)
finance v. ~robar (OS)
Industry 8. Lau~man (SO)
food Supply v. f'iajer (SO)
foreign Trade H. Ripka (NS)
Justice Ja~oslav Stransky (NS)
Posts f. Hale (LS)
Health A. Prochazka (LS)
Internal Trade I. Pie tor (OS)
Transport A. Hasal (non-party)
., Education z. Nejedly (non-party)
Social Security J. Soltesz (KSS)*(see overleaf)
There were also three "State Secretaries" to give Slovaks representa-
tion in Ministries which had no equivalent in the Board of Commissioners:
foreign Affairs v. Clemen tis (KSS)
Defense ~1.fcrJen~ik (non-party)
foreign TradC3 J. Lichner (OS)
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So the Communists had a strong but not completely dominant
position. They were represented both as the KSC and through the SNR
as the KSS, although this was not really an independent party.
Several non-party Ministers would be unlikely to oppose the
Communists in a crisis: particualrly important was Svoboda who had
been appointed commander of the Czechoslovak forces during the
Dukla operation.
Not surprisingly, emigre writers have often characterised the
f . . 35outcome 0 the Moscow discuss~ons as a disaster for their side •
They had, however, made an important gain simply in the form taken
by the discussions. Despite KSt ideas of a bloc of three parties
or of a much wider National Front to include mass organisations,
the programme had been agreed in emigration by four Czech parties
and the government gave equal representntion to all of them. This
enabled the National Socialists to return home with more presti~e
as a political party then their role in the domestic resistance
warranted.
They could help build a political system based on competing
political parties, in line with 8ene~'s conception of democracy, and
look forward with optimism to free elections. In Slovakia too the
35The defensive tone of the National Socialist 'leaders after liberat-
~ ion about the concessions they had made is striking; e.g. Jaroslav
Stransky, ~ 10/12/45, p.2, or J. Firt, ~ 2/3/47. As Ripka
realised, the composition and programme of the Ko~ice government meant
that preparatb~ made in London were wasted; Ripka: Czechoslovakia,p.38.
*(from previous page)
The abbreviations for parties are: KS~ - Communist Party of Czecho~
slovakia, KSS - Communist Party of Slovakia, OS - Democratic Party,
SO - Social Democracy, NS - National Socialist, LS - Peoples' Party:
a full explanation is given in the list of abbreviations on p.
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Democrats, who had previously accep t cr: t he idea of ":I r'~,.tionalFr-ont.
including the mass organisations and within which they would in
practice have been swamped, could take hoart from the Moscow
discussions and reduce the National front to an agreement between
36two political parties •
But the creation of the government and agreement on its
programma was still not enough to ensure its return home or that
it would surviue in a liberated Czechoslovakia. 8ena§, in fact,
faIt that th~ KS~ was ouar-represented following their "trick" over
tha Slovak ministers. Ha still expected the alleged conservatism of
the Czech lands to show itself after liberation and to force
37changes!n the government • He kept his own options open by
refraining from approving the Ko~ice programme. A great deal was
still undecided and could depend on how Prague was liberated and on
what'political character the Czech resistance would assume in the
last. days of the war.
r' .• :.
Il.1~.5~ The KoHce government enters Prflgue after an
uprising in the Czoch lands which was saved by
the arrival of Soviet troops.
Even as liberation drew nearer the Czech resistance could not OV8r-
come its fragmentation. Different groups with different origins
continued to operate in isolation from each other cautious of
broadening their contacts for fear of becoming enmeshed in the
network of Gestapo informers. So, aI tt iouqh resistance groups often
36Jablonick9: Slnvpnsko, p.418-422.
37e.g. his comments in March 1945 to Hnrriman, the US ambassador to
the Soviet Union: Foreign Helations United Stal'es 1'")45, Vol IV(Eurl1pe)
Washington, 1968, p.~32-433.
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developed similar it8~s, they lookod to the emigration centres for
a uniting idea and programme.
They looked to the emisration not only for ideas but also for
concrete help. This was provi~ded by parachutists from both East
and West. These from Britain brought the old idea of reviving
the underground military networks in preparation for an uprising.
38Their hopes were totally unrealistic and, disappointed with the
atmosphere of depression and resignation among so many of their
contccts, they either sank into passivity or betrayal, or were led
39to the partisans • Messages back to Landon often reflected this
. . 40
with requests for immediate arms deliveries •
Soviet parachutists came for a short time in 19Li1 and began
appearing agein as the front drew closer in 1944. It was soon
learnt.that Oroups of 15 to 20 experienced partisans were the most
effective es they could establish themselves outside the civilian
population. They could then grow and make contact with illegal
. ' 41politicel organisation~ from a position of safety • This, however,
,
remained B local phenomenon as partisan groups lacked contact with
)~" ;:...
each other so that their political activities could not go beyond
creating local National Committees.
38e.g. the plans for an uprising in ~Ioravia to coincide with the
Slovak uprising; K. Vesel~-~tainer: Ces\ou naro!nlho odbojs, Praha,
1947, p.133-135, ana Grna: ~, p.147. iC
39o. Sl~dek: Kryc{ heslo: svoboda - Hnut! odporu v Jifnfch Csch'ch,
tesks BudeJovie, 1967, p.294-295, and Oolezal: Jedi~a, passim.
40 l' ~e.g. Vese y-~tniner: Cestou, p.118.
41Their activities are described by Dalelal who estimated that there
were 7,500 partisans in the Protectorate in the spring of 1945;
Dolezal: Jedina, p.179.
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Political groups too were creating National Committees. Their
composition and origins roflocted the diversity of the movement:
initiatives came froln the KS~, partisans, ill-defined anti-fascist
groups or clearly right-wing groups who saw the need to take action
to prevent the KS~ from dominating everything. ence the fighting was
over, the majority of National Comn.I t t.aea could be seen to be
dominated by Communists or these who quickly joined the KS~42.
Amid this picture of fragmentation - as if the same uprising
were being prepared by a multitude of different groups - attempts
were made.to create a united central leadership. The most important
was the Czech National COl!ncil (~rJf1) which was based on the KS~, URO,
(an underground trade union organisation which developed from withIn
the Protectorate unions and was clos8 to the Communists' position) and
R 3 All f th La i d dot f tt 0 0 t La t 0 43 btl R:3_ • 0 e se c a ime cre .i or le aru a l.V8 , U on y - ,
had contacts with the outside world through London. It had developed
after Heydrich's assassinatIon out of the remnants of pro-western groups.
It started from the PVVZ programmes and stood somewhere to the left
of Benes while fully recognising his righ~ to be President. Along-
side radicalism on social issues and a very strong line against
Germans, it contained ideas of a Presidential dictatorship and of
rejecting all previous political parties. Perhaps most important,·
R-:3 rejected "attentism" and started actively encouraging partisan
0' . 44
" groups: this brought them closer to the KS~ •
4200le!al: Jedina, p.193, and Kral: Osvobozenf, p.330.
43e•g• V. Kouck9: Ilen~ln! VS~ a Prafsk~ povst~n!, Praha, 1946, p.11-12,
and E. Erl1an, A. Lvorak: (jhL v Fra~si(em povsUinl, Praha, 1946, p.30.
44Two leading members of the group have ~oth written excellent accounts,
of its activities and ideas; Vese19-~tainer: Cost.ou, and GrI"ia:~.
There were, tioueve r, con tLnui no eli ff icul t Les in maintaining
contacts between these constituent groups of the ~NR £s repression
did not abate: the Fourth Illegal KSC CenLral committee was
discovered by the Gestapo in March 1945. Nevertheless, the CNR
was formally founded at the end of April. It remained firmly
under the dominance of trade unionists - especially J. Kub~t and
E. Erban - and Communists led by J. Smrkovsk~45. An attempt was
made·.to broaden representation by including, among others, members
of underground army gr.oups and of the political parties represented
in Ko~ice government. This gave it a somewhat artificial appearance
and, unlike the SNR, it accepted from the start that its existence
was only temporary and that it was completely subordinated to the
46Koiice government •
~i ~Although there could be no authoritative organ without the
three '~under9 of the tNR, it did not initiate the uprising.
Instead, with the German and Hungarian armies completely demoralisBd,
thera were .diverse local~ uprLs Inqs takLnq power and disarming the
. ,
oocupiers from 3/5/45 onwards. The initiative came variously from
'partisane, ~ation8l Committees, strikes in factories or Bven the
POlice. Sometimes events appeared as a simple repeat of 1918 and
it was common for the new organs of power to reach a modus vivendi
with the occupiers to prevent armed clashes. This often led to the
spectacle of arms, seized from the Germans.with the advantage of
surprisB, being handed hack when the occupiers so demanded. Rather
4S0• r'lachotkaz "~eska n6rodn! rada za revalues", and J. Kotrly:
"~1oje ueast v Pra!skem povstanl", both in Pra~sk9 povsUini' 1945,
Washington D.C., 1965.
46See the t~R statement of 5/':_1/45, Costa ke kviHnu, p.685.
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than representing tetrayal or cowardic~, this seems to have been
a consequence of the lack of a clenr aim for thG uprising. Local
groups could not see the situation as a whole and had to judge things
according to the local situation47•
Even in Prague the uprising began spontaneously particularly
from the large factories on 5/5/45. This was two days before the
data planned by the tNR4B. Caution was shared by the KSC who,
following the experiences of Warsaw and Slovakia, were terrified
49of 8 premature beginning unco-ordinated with the Red Army •
Nevertheless, once the uprising began it quickly seized the initiative
50end showed an energy surprising even to its leaders • Moreover, it
transformed "the situation in the Czech lands as a whole as all
. ,
~~~i9ta~Cegroups werer8sented with a clearly defined task: arms
had,to be provided for Prague to prevent the immensely superior




:'.'On 9/5/45 the upris~ing was saved t,y the arrival of Red Army
unlts~Thie, however, marked the end for the ~NR which, in recog-
nition'ot its own weakness, had sought gains through ~egotietions
with the Nazi authorities. Soviet distrust, leading to categorical
47The best accDunt is in uole!al: JedinA. An illustration of the
precariousness of the situation WAS tho Kladno National Committee
which, armed with two rifles, a pistol am: a sabre, tried to
bluff 4000 well armed hut daruo r-aLdsed Cermans into surrendering
by spreading rumours of thousands of partisans hiding in the woods;
Pr~b~h n'radnl revalues ne Kladn~, Klndno, 1~45.
48K• f3arta~ek: Pra~ske povstanl, Praha, 1960, p.3(-I.
49Gartosek: Prazske, p.48.
50 l' l!t .Vese y-~ alner: Cestou, p.291.
demands for the trm' s dissolution, was engondered t!y the right-
wing's appruach8s to Vlasov's forces and a strange compromise of
8/5/45 whereby German forces were to be allowed to keep their arms
and pass through rraguc to escape from the Red Army and surrender
51in the West • In turn Smrkovsky, as loading KS~ representative
in the CNR, has been and sometimes still is strongly criticised
for this52.
The greatest difficulty facing the ~NR, apart from .their own
shortage of arms, was their ignorance of the rapidly approaching
Soviet forces and of the complex intrigues involving foreign help
.and intervention. Cene~ had already disappointed R-3 by not sending
arms and even argued in ~o§ice that it was too late53• Infuriatingly,
this was combined with continuing calls from London for armed action.
This was~cause of bitterness to Grna who nttributcd the comparative
weakness of the Czech partisan movement entirely to the absence of
54such outside help • There is no clear evidence that it can all
be attributed to a refusal from Stalin to allow the delivery of
arms that had already been loaded into Crltish aircraft55• The
51Belda1et a1: NB rozhranf, p.40, and Kr§l: Osvohozenf, p.360.
52e•g• Kr~l: Osvobozen!, p.355. Earlier it had been emphasised that
Smrkovsk9 hod acted in good faith; e.g. Kouck9: llega!n!; p.37 •
..53 ;r:Grna: ~, p.30B and p.282-283, and Vesely-~tainer: Cestou, p.2BD-282.
54Dne~ek, 9/1/47, p.659.
55This claim is made in D. r'lachotka:"Vznik ~eske nar odnf rady a
jeji pfedrevo!u~n! cinnost", Prazske povstan! 1945, W8shington .D.C.,
1965, p.20-21.
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alternative sugge~itiull,that Lrilain uas refusing to help any such
56uprising as would directly aid the Soviot udvancB ,also lacks
6ubstantia~ion. BensA and his associates in london were always
conspicously silent on what r ha exp lana t ior.could be.
Meanwhile Rika, still in Landen, nogoti~ted OVBr a possible
US advance to Prague. This would have 0een fairly easy as German
57commanders agreed not to oppose tLe US army • There were vcices
within the State Department for taking the opportunity to secure a
strong bargaining position against the ~oviet Union and Churchill
d t 1 f thO 58presse s rang y or ~s • Eisenhower, however, saw the need to
reach agreement with the USSR on any such operation as otherwise
tho two allied armies could clash and elsa because he lacked the
resources for a confrontation with the USSR while the war with
Japan continued •
59The US army therefore halted in western Bohemia •
.''.,'The50viet leadership was also fully aware of the political
significance of liberating Prague. Fierlinger expressod opposition
to a110lllingUS troops iota Prague as it would help "conservative
. 60elements" end Marshall Koniev himself emphasised the political
significance of a speedy action tu prevent any direct Western share
in Prague's liberation61• The Soviet military operation to reach
56Kr~1: Osvobozenr, p.252.
57 Message from the US amba ssador in France to the Sncre tary of sta Le
11/5/45, foreign Rplatims 1Cl45, p.!151.
58His message to Truman, 3C)/~/(_15, Foreign rle]atiCins 1(1!15, P.~(~6-q/j7 •..
59K '1ra : osvobozenf, p.304-3D7.
.
:!'. ~; .'.' .....~ .,. ,.
7 .. :.. ..
t_: .... • ...
-.'
60Kr&1: Osvobozen!, p.320 •
61KrLl•• 0 t rCl .svoJozen ,
"
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Prague, which had already been prepared before the uprising62, was
therefore quickly set in motion. On 9/5/45 Soviet tanks reached
the capital.
So Czechoslvoakia's new political life could start with the Kosice
government arriving on 10/5/45 from the East and the ~NR clearly
subordinating itself in jOint discussions63•
·11.11.6. Summary and discussion.
It was during the actual liberation of Czechoslovakia that the
balance of strength between r:ene§ and the KS~ was decided. During
that period Bene§ gradually recognised his own weakness and saw
the need to make important concessions. His position had seemed
to be guaranteed by the treaties with the USSR hut he was shaken
by the even t s of November 1941; in the Su[;-Carpathian Ukraine. The
Soviet authorities did nothing to resist a movement for the in-
corporation of the territory into the Soviet Ukraine. BeneA feared
that this could be repeated in Slovakia where the Communists were
strong but where nouody seemocJ la be lJnquestio~y loyal to him.
Then the Soviet government put pressure on him to follow more closely
Soviet foreign policy. This he r-esLsted un'i;tllthe ~ovi8t military
offensive of January 19'15 after which he could foresee complete
Soviet domination of Central Europe •..
8ene§, cut off from the siluation inside Czechoslovakia and
fearing that the Soviet leaders might even support an alt~rnative
62
Kr~l: Osvobozenf, p.3G7, and f3arto~el;:!JrEt7ske,p.88.
63pL, 12/5/45, p.1.
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government, then conceded on a whole num.ie r of points of international
and internal policy. He even 2greed to return home via Moscow where
a new government was formed including tho Communists. In the dis-
cussions for that government the KSt had an enormous initiative
because they had prepared a definite programme and they could man-
ipulate the divisions between Denes and the Slovak representatives.
The government although still a compromise seemed, in its composition
.and policies, to be the best they could hope for.
Bene~ was still hopeful that the V.SC could be weakened once the
political feeling of the Czech lands had shown itself. In this
he was disappointed. The Czech uprising, centring on Prague, confirmed
the strength of the KS~ wIthin a broader revolutionary movement.
Moreover, there was no help for Bene~ from the West as the Soviet
leaders vetoed a US request to advance to Prague and instead ensured
that it was their own troops who took the credit.
So Bene~ returned to Prague as President but with a coalition
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